Port Numbers 0-1024

Port↓ TCP↓ UDP↓ Description↓ Status↓
0 UDP Reserved Official
1 TCP UDP TCP Port Service Multiplexer (TCPMUX) Official
2 TCP UDP Management Utility Official
3 TCP UDP Compression Process Official
4 TCP UDP Unassigned Official
5 TCP UDP Remote Job Entry Official
6 TCP UDP Unassigned Official
7 TCP UDP Echo Protocol Official
8 TCP UDP Unassigned Official
9 TCP UDP Discard Protocol Official
10 TCP UDP Unassigned Official
11 TCP UDP Active Users (systat service[2]) Official
12 TCP UDP Unassigned Official
13 TCP UDP Daytime Protocol (RFC 867) Official
14 TCP UDP Unassigned Official
15 TCP UDP netstat service[2] Unofficial
16 TCP UDP Unassigned Official
17 TCP UDP Quote of the Day Official
18 TCP UDP Message Send Protocol Official
19 TCP UDP Character Generator Protocol (CHARGEN) Official
20 TCP FTP – data transfer Official
21 TCP FTP – control (command) Official
22 TCP UDP Secure Shell (SSH)—used for secure logins, file transfers (scp, sftp) and port forwarding Official
23 TCP Telnet protocol—unencrypted text communications Official
24 TCP UDP Priv-mail : any private mail system. Official
25 TCP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP)—used for e-mail routing between mail servers Official
34 TCP UDP Remote File (RF)—used to transfer files between machines Unofficial
35 TCP UDP Any private printer server protocol Official
37 TCP UDP TIME protocol Official
39 TCP UDP Resource Location Protocol[3] (RLP)—used for determining the location of higher level services from hosts on a network Official
41 TCP UDP Graphics Official
42 TCP UDP nameserver, ARPA Host Name Server Protocol Official
42 TCP UDP WINS Unofficial
43 TCP WHOIS protocol Official
47 TCP UDP NI FTP Official
49 TCP UDP TACACS Login Host protocol Official
50 TCP UDP Remote Mail Checking Protocol Official
51 TCP UDP IMP Logical Address Maintenance Official
52 TCP UDP XNS (Xerox Network Systems) Time Protocol Official
53 TCP UDP Domain Name System (DNS) Official
54 TCP UDP XNS (Xerox Network Systems) Clearinghouse Official
55 TCP UDP ISI Graphics Language (ISI-GL) Unofficial
56 TCP UDP XNS (Xerox Network Systems) Authentication Official
56 TCP UDP Route Access Protocol (RAP)[4] Unofficial
57 TCP Mail Transfer Protocol (MTP) Unofficial
58 TCP UDP XNS (Xerox Network Systems) Mail Official
67 UDP Bootstrap Protocol (BOOTP) Server; also used by Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) Official
68 UDP Bootstrap Protocol (BOOTP) Client; also used by Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) Official
69 UDP Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) Official
70 TCP Gopher protocol Official
79 TCP Finger protocol Official
80 TCP UDP Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Official
81 TCP TorparkOnion routing Unofficial
82 UDP Torpark—Control Unofficial
83 TCP MIT ML Device Official
88 TCP UDP Kerberos—authentication system Official
90 TCP UDP dnsix (DoD Network Security for Information Exchange) Securit Attribute Token Map Official
90 TCP UDP Pointcast Unofficial
99 TCP WIP Message Protocol Unofficial
101 TCP NIC host name Official
102 TCP ISO-TSAP (Transport Service Access Point) Class 0 protocol[5] Official
104 TCP UDP ACR/NEMA Digital Imaging and Communications in Medicine Official
105 TCP UDP CCSO Nameserver Protocol (Qi/Ph) Official
107 TCP Remote TELNET Service[6] protocol Official
108 TCP UDP SNA Gateway Access Server [7] Official
109 TCP Post Office Protocol v2 (POP2) Official
110 TCP Post Office Protocol v3 (POP3) Official
111 TCP UDP ONC RPC (SunRPC) Official
113 TCP ident—user identification system, used by IRC servers to identify users Official
113 TCP UDP Authentication Service (auth) Official
115 TCP Simple File Transfer Protocol (SFTP) Official
117 TCP UUCP Path Service Official
118 TCP UDP SQL (Structured Query Language) Services Official
119 TCP Network News Transfer Protocol (NNTP) — retrieval of newsgroup messages Official
123 UDP Network Time Protocol (NTP)—used for time synchronization Official
135 TCP UDP DCE endpoint resolution Official
135 TCP UDP Microsoft EPMAP (End Point Mapper), also known as DCE/RPC Locator service[8], used to remotely manage services including DHCP server, DNS server and WINS. Also used by DCOM Unofficial
137 TCP UDP NetBIOS NetBIOS Name Service Official
138 TCP UDP NetBIOS NetBIOS Datagram Service Official
139 TCP UDP NetBIOS NetBIOS Session Service Official
143 TCP UDP Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP) — management of email messages Official
152 TCP UDP Background File Transfer Program (BFTP)[9] Official
153 TCP UDP SGMP, Simple Gateway Monitoring Protocol Official
156 TCP UDP SQL Service Official
158 TCP UDP DMSP, Distributed Mail Service Protocol Unofficial
161 UDP Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Official
162 TCP UDP Simple Network Management Protocol Trap (SNMPTRAP)[10] Official
170 TCP Print-srv, Network PostScript Official
177 TCP UDP X Display Manager Control Protocol (XDMCP) Official
179 TCP BGP (Border Gateway Protocol) Official
194 TCP UDP Internet Relay Chat (IRC) Official
199 TCP UDP SMUX, SNMP Unix Multiplexer Official
201 TCP UDP AppleTalk Routing Maintenance Official
209 TCP UDP The Quick Mail Transfer Protocol Official
210 TCP UDP ANSI Z39.50 Official
213 TCP UDP Internetwork Packet Exchange (IPX) Official
218 TCP UDP Message posting protocol (MPP) Official
220 TCP UDP Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP), version 3 Official
256 TCP UDP 2DEV “2SP” Port Unofficial
259 TCP UDP ESRO, Efficient Short Remote Operations Official
264 TCP UDP BGMP, Border Gateway Multicast Protocol Official
308 TCP Novastor Online Backup Official
311 TCP Mac OS X Server Admin (officially AppleShare IP Web administration) Official
318 TCP UDP PKIX TSP, Time Stamp Protocol Official
319 UDP Precision time protocol event messages Official
320 UDP Precision time protocol general messages Official
323 TCP UDP IMMP, Internet Message Mapping Protocol Unofficial
350 TCP UDP MATIP-Type A, Mapping of Airline Traffic over Internet Protocol Official
351 TCP UDP MATIP-Type B, Mapping of Airline Traffic over Internet Protocol Official
366 TCP UDP ODMR, On-Demand Mail Relay Official
369 TCP UDP Rpc2portmap Official
370 TCP UDP codaauth2 – Coda authentication server Unofficial
370 TCP UDP securecast1 – Outgoing packets to NAI’s servers, http://www.nai.com/asp_set/anti_virus/alerts/faq.as Unofficial
371 TCP UDP ClearCase albd Official
383 TCP UDP HP data alarm manager Official
384 TCP UDP A Remote Network Server System Official
387 TCP UDP AURP, AppleTalk Update-based Routing Protocol Official
389 TCP UDP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) Official
401 TCP UDP UPS Uninterruptible Power Supply Official
402 TCP Altiris, Altiris Deployment Client Unofficial
411 TCP Direct Connect Hub Unofficial
412 TCP Direct Connect Client-to-Client Unofficial
427 TCP UDP Service Location Protocol (SLP) Official
443 TCP HTTPS (Hypertext Transfer Protocol over SSL/TLS) Official
444 TCP UDP SNPP, Simple Network Paging Protocol (RFC 1568) Official
445 TCP Microsoft-DS Active Directory, Windows shares Official
445 TCP Microsoft-DS SMB file sharing Official
464 TCP UDP Kerberos Change/Set password Official
465 TCP Cisco protocol Unofficial
465 TCP SMTP over SSL Unofficial
475 TCP tcpnethaspsrv (Aladdin Knowledge Systems Hasp services, TCP/IP version) Official
497 TCP Dantz Retrospect Official
500 _ UDP Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP) Official
501 TCP STMF, Simple Transportation Management Framework – DOT NTCIP 1101 Unofficial
502 TCP UDP asa-appl-proto, Protocol Unofficial
502 TCP UDP Modbus, Protocol Unofficial
504 TCP UDP Citadel – multiservice protocol for dedicated clients for the Citadel groupware system Official
510 TCP First Class Protocol Unofficial
512 TCP Rexec, Remote Process Execution Official
512 UDP comsat, together with biff Official
513 TCP rlogin Official
513 UDP Who Official
514 TCP Shell—used to execute non-interactive commands on a remote system (Remote Shell, rsh, remsh) Official
514 UDP Syslog—used for system logging Official
515 TCP Line Printer Daemon—print service Official
517 UDP Talk Official
518 UDP NTalk Official
520 TCP efs, extended file name server Official
520 UDP Routing Information Protocol (RIP) Official
524 TCP UDP NetWare Core Protocol (NCP) is used for a variety things such as access to primary NetWare server resources, Time Synchronization, etc. Official
525 UDP Timed, Timeserver Official
530 TCP UDP RPC Official
531 TCP UDP AOL Instant Messenger, IRC Unofficial
532 TCP netnews Official
533 UDP netwall, For Emergency Broadcasts Official
540 TCP UUCP (Unix-to-Unix Copy Protocol) Official
542 TCP UDP commerce (Commerce Applications) Official
543 TCP klogin, Kerberos login Official
544 TCP kshell, Kerberos Remote shell Official
545 TCP OSIsoft PI (VMS), OSISoft PI Server Client Access Unofficial
546 TCP UDP DHCPv6 client Official
547 TCP UDP DHCPv6 server Official
548 TCP Apple Filing Protocol (AFP) over TCP Official
550 UDP new-rwho, new-who Official
554 TCP UDP Real Time Streaming Protocol (RTSP) Official
556 TCP Remotefs, RFS, rfs_server Official
560 UDP rmonitor, Remote Monitor Official
561 UDP monitor Official
563 TCP UDP NNTP protocol over TLS/SSL (NNTPS) Official
587 TCP e-mail message submission[11] (SMTP) Official
591 TCP FileMaker 6.0 (and later) Web Sharing (HTTP Alternate, also see port 80) Official
593 TCP UDP HTTP RPC Ep Map, Remote procedure call over Hypertext Transfer Protocol, often used by Distributed Component Object Model services and Microsoft Exchange Server Official
604 TCP TUNNEL profile[12], a protocol for BEEP peers to form an application layer tunnel Official
623 UDP ASF Remote Management and Control Protocol (ASF-RMCP) Official
631 TCP UDP Internet Printing Protocol (IPP) Official
631 TCP UDP Common Unix Printing System (CUPS) Unofficial
635 TCP UDP RLZ DBase Official
636 TCP UDP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol over TLS/SSL (LDAPS) Official
639 TCP UDP MSDP, Multicast Source Discovery Protocol Official
641 TCP UDP SupportSoft Nexus Remote Command (control/listening): A proxy gateway connecting remote control traffic Official
646 TCP UDP LDP, Label Distribution Protocol, a routing protocol used in MPLS networks Official
647 TCP DHCP Failover protocol[13] Official
648 TCP RRP (Registry Registrar Protocol)[14] Official
651 TCP UDP IEEE-MMS Official
652 TCP DTCP, Dynamic Tunnel Configuration Protocol Unofficial
653 TCP UDP SupportSoft Nexus Remote Command (data): A proxy gateway connecting remote control traffic Official
654 TCP Media Management System (MMS) Media Management Protocol (MMP)[15] Official
657 TCP UDP IBM RMC (Remote monitoring and Control) protocol, used by System p5 AIX Integrated Virtualization Manager (IVM)[16] and Hardware Management Console to connect managed logical partitions (LPAR) to enable dynamic partition reconfiguration Official
660 TCP Mac OS X Server administration Official
665 TCP sun-dr, Remote Dynamic Reconfiguration Unofficial
666 UDP Doom, first online first-person shooter Official
674 TCP ACAP (Application Configuration Access Protocol) Official
691 TCP MS Exchange Routing Official
692 TCP Hyperwave-ISP Official
694 TCP UDP Linux-HA High availability Heartbeat Official
695 TCP IEEE-MMS-SSL (IEEE Media Management System over SSL)[17] Official
698 UDP OLSR (Optimized Link State Routing) Official
699 TCP Access Network Official
700 TCP EPP (Extensible Provisioning Protocol), a protocol for communication between domain name registries and registrars (RFC 5734) Official
701 TCP LMP (Link Management Protocol (Internet))[18], a protocol that runs between a pair of nodes and is used to manage traffic engineering (TE) links Official
702 TCP IRIS[19][20] (Internet Registry Information Service) over BEEP (Blocks Extensible Exchange Protocol)[21] (RFC 3983) Official
706 TCP Secure Internet Live Conferencing (SILC) Official
711 TCP Cisco Tag Distribution Protocol[22][23][24]—being replaced by the MPLS Label Distribution Protocol[25] Official
712 TCP Topology Broadcast based on Reverse-Path Forwarding routing protocol (TBRPF) (RFC 3684) Official
712 UDP Promise RAID Controller Unofficial
720 TCP SMQP, Simple Message Queue Protocol Unofficial
749 TCP UDP Kerberos (protocol) administration Official
750 TCP rfile Official
750 UDP loadav Official
750 UDP kerberos-iv, Kerberos version IV Official
751 TCP UDP pump Official
751 TCP UDP kerberos_master, Kerberos authentication Unofficial
752 TCP qrh Official
752 UDP qrh Official
752 UDP passwd_server, Kerberos Password (kpasswd) server Unofficial
753 TCP Reverse Routing Header (rrh)[26] Official
753 UDP Reverse Routing Header (rrh) Official
753 UDP userreg_server, Kerberos userreg server Unofficial
754 TCP tell send Official
754 TCP krb5_prop, Kerberos v5 slave propagation Unofficial
754 UDP tell send Official
760 TCP UDP ns Official
760 TCP UDP krbupdate [kreg], Kerberos registration Unofficial
782 TCP Conserver serial-console management server Unofficial
783 TCP SpamAssassin spamd daemon Unofficial
829 TCP CMP (Certificate Management Protocol) Unofficial
843 TCP Adobe Flash socket policy server Unofficial
847 TCP DHCP Failover protocol Official
860 TCP iSCSI (RFC 3720) Official
873 TCP rsync file synchronisation protocol Official USA only
888 TCP cddbp, CD DataBase (CDDB) protocol (CDDBP)—unassigned but widespread use Unofficial
901 TCP Samba Web Administration Tool (SWAT) Unofficial
901 TCP VMware Virtual Infrastructure Client (UDP from server being managed to management console) Unofficial
901 UDP VMware Virtual Infrastructure Client (UDP from server being managed to management console) Unofficial
902 TCP ideafarm-door 902/tcp self documenting Door: send 0×00 for info Official
902 TCP VMware Server Console (TCP from management console to server being Managed) Unofficial
902 UDP ideafarm-door Official
902 UDP VMware Server Console (UDP from server being managed to management console) Unofficial
903 TCP VMware Remote Console [27] Unofficial
904 TCP VMware Server Alternate (if 902 is in use, i.e. SUSE linux) Unofficial
911 TCP Network Console on Acid (NCA)—local tty redirection over OpenSSH Unofficial
953 TCP UDP Domain Name System (DNS) RNDC Service Unofficial
981 TCP SofaWare Technologies Remote HTTPS management for firewall devices running embedded Check Point FireWall-1 software Unofficial
989 TCP UDP FTPS Protocol (data): FTP over TLS/SSL Official
990 TCP UDP FTPS Protocol (control): FTP over TLS/SSL Official
991 TCP UDP NAS (Netnews Administration System) Official
992 TCP UDP TELNET protocol over TLS/SSL Official
993 TCP Internet Message Access Protocol over SSL (IMAPS) Official
995 TCP Post Office Protocol 3 over TLS/SSL (POP3S) Official
999 TCP ScimoreDB Database System Unofficial
1001 TCP JtoMB Unofficial
1002 TCP Opsware agent (aka cogbot) Unofficial
1222 TCP Suptechnology ERP 2.0 Unofficial
1023 TCP UDP Reserved[1] Official

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Four Anons cuffed in Italy

Four individuals accused of being members of Anonymous and participating in “Operation Tango Down” have been arrested in Italy.

According to AFP, the four are being accused of various attacks in Italy, including a DDoS against the Vatican and the parliamentary Website.


The Postal Police – responsible for enforcement of communications law – carried out 12 raids across Italy, according to this report in Gazetta del Sud.

The police also claim the group “carried out a series of attacks agains the computer systems of critical infrastructure, institutional sites and important companies”.

The four men arrested are a 20-year-old from Bologna, a 43-year-old from near Lecce, a 28-year-old from the province of Venice, and a 25-year-old from the province of Turin.

Attacks reported in Italy include downing the home page of the country’s interior ministry, the police, and the Carabinieri.

In 2011, Italian and Swiss police arrested 15 Anonymous suspects. ®

Article source: http://go.theregister.com/feed/www.theregister.co.uk/2013/05/19/anon_arrests_italy/

EMC vuln gives mere sysadmins the power of storage admins

EMC has warned a flaw in the Control Station software for its VNX and Celerra arrays could allow just about anyone logged into them to do just about anything.

EMC’s described the fault as stemming from “Script files in affected products exist with ownership permissions for the nasadmin group account.”


The nasadmin group is designed as a group of general users, while the user with the same name “has system-wide management capabilities for the box and is authorized to make extensive changes to the storage system.” The flaw means folks in the group get the same privileges as nasdmin, the user.

That means mere sysadmins allowed to log into to VNX and Celerra devices and “exploit this vulnerability to run arbitrary commands as the root user.”

Which may get storage admins more than a little jumpy, lest those less familiar with their arrays’ operation

Celerra owners know their boxen are already obsolete, but nonetheless have been urged by EMC to upgrade “at the earliest opportunity” by getting their hands on this download. VNX users are urged to do likewise, with their download available here.

EMC has tipped its hat to Doug DePerry of iSEC Partners for finding the flaw. ®

Article source: http://go.theregister.com/feed/www.theregister.co.uk/2013/05/19/emc_vulnerability/

Yahoo! Japan says 22 MEELLION User IDs may have been nabbed

Yahoo! Japan has told its 200 million customers to change their passwords after revealing that 22 million user IDs may have been exposed in a suspected intrusion last week.

The attack was detected at around 9:00 PM local time on Thursday night, with the internet giant apparently cutting access while it checked what had happened.


Reports suggest it discovered an attempt to steal User IDs, with a file containing 22 million potentially exposed.

“We don’t know if the file was leaked or not, but we can’t deny the possibility, given the volume of traffic between our server and external terminals”, Yahoo! Japan said in a statement sent to AFP.

Although the data which may have been compromised apparently doesn’t include passwords and the kind of user data needed to reset passwords, the firm is taking no chances.

Hackers also tried to breach Yahoo! Japan last month in a similar raid on user data, although their motives remain unclear.

Yahoo! Japan is a joint venture between the internet pioneer and Japanese mobile and broadband operator SoftBank, which remains one of the US giant’s few remaining success stories.

In the first quarter of 2013, it was Yahoo!’s Japan JV – in which it has a 33 per cent stake – as well as its 20 per cent investment in China’s Alibaba, which helped the firm to record a 36 per cent year-on-year increase in net income to $390 million (£253.9m). ®

Article source: http://go.theregister.com/feed/www.theregister.co.uk/2013/05/20/yahoo_japan_user_id_breach/

Breaking news, LITERALLY: Financial Times vandalized by hackers

The Financial Times website and its Twitter accounts were this afternoon hijacked by pro-government hackers from the “Syrian Electronic Army”.

The posh broadsheet’s Tech Blog – at http://blogs.FT.com/beyond-brics – was compromised to run stories headlined “Syrian Electronic Army Was Here” and “Hacked by the Syrian Electronic Army”.

Meanwhile, the Technology News (@FTtechnews), FT Media and FT Markets Twitter feeds were seized by miscreants, who posted web links to disturbing YouTube videos of jihadis executing men by firing squad.

The blog has been cleaned up, but the Twitter accounts remain compromised.

Breaking news, literally … the compromised Pink ‘Un‘s tweets

The takeover is the latest in a series of high-profile attacks against media organisations by hackers apparently in favour of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad. The so-called electronic army has knackered the online operations of the The Guardian, Associated Press, the BBC and even satirical newspaper The Onion.

Techies at The Onion published an informative postmortem after the attack, revealing its email accounts were infiltrated following a multistage phishing expedition – a raid that gave the hackers control of the magazine’s social networking pages. The techniques used against the FT are unclear at the time of writing.

Computer security biz Arbor Networks said Twitter’s anticipated introduction of two-factor authentication ought to curtail, if not eliminate, this sort of account hijacking. Dan Holden, director of research at Arbor, commented: “Twitter recently announced plans to introduce two factor authentication, which is a big step forward from a security perspective. As this particular event shows the human element is often the weakest link in any security solution.”

“Given similar attacks in recent weeks against the Guardian in the UK and The Onion in US these attacks seem to be very targeted. Organisations should put processes in place to ensure that their staff are trained on best practices and have the support and training needed to allow them to follow these practices easily during their normal working routine. Ideally network monitoring solutions should also be put in place to alert an organisation when a user system connects to a known bad actor on the internet as this may indicate a compromise, allowing remedial action to be taken before there is any business impact,” he added. ®

Article source: http://go.theregister.com/feed/www.theregister.co.uk/2013/05/17/ft_twitter_hijacked_by_sea/

Jailed Romanian hacker repents, invents ATM security scheme

A Romanian man serving a five-year jail sentence for bank-machine fraud says he’s come up with a device that can be attached to any ATM to make the machine invulnerable to card skimmers.

Valentin Boanta was arrested in 2009 and charged with supplying ATM skimmers – devices that can be attached to ATMs to surreptitiously copy the data from unwitting users’ cards – to a local organized crime gang.


It was during his subsequent trial and sentencing that Boanta saw the light and traded in his black hat for a white one, Reuters reports.

“Crime was like a drug for me. After I was caught, I was happy I escaped from this adrenaline addiction,” Boanta told reporters from his jail cell in Vaslui, Romania. “So that the other part, in which I started to develop security solutions, started to emerge.”

Boanta’s solution, known as the Secure Revolving System (SRS), is an ingenious one that uses mechanical rather than digital security.

ATM skimmers work by installing a second, concealed card reader over the one that’s built into the ATM. When an unsuspecting bank customer inserts a card into the slot, the card’s magnetic stripe first runs past the read head of the skimmer, allowing it to copy all of the card’s data. The transaction then proceeds as normal and the ATM returns the card to the customer, who is none the wiser.

With Boanta’s device installed on the ATM, however, that all changes. Customers insert their cards into the slot long side first, so that the magnetic stripe is parallel to the face of the machine. The device then rotates the card 90 degrees into the ATM, where the legitimate card reader scans the magnetic stripe, then rotates it back out again to return it to the customer.

That rotation makes it impossible for an add-on skimmer to read the card, because the magnetic stripe never moves in a straight line until it is secure inside the ATM.

Obvious, yet ingenious: You don’t need to understand Romanian to get the idea

While awaiting the outcome of his trial, Valentin pitched his idea to Mircea Tudor and Adrian Bizgar of Bucharest-based technology firm MB Telecom, who helped him to patent his idea and funded development of the SRS device.

The design would go on to win the International Press Prize at the 41st International Exhibition of Inventions in Geneva, Switzerland, in April. Boanta, however, wasn’t available to accept the award. He’s currently just six months into his sentence and won’t see freedom for another four and a half years. Still, his partners at MB Telecom say all credit for the SRS design should go to him.

“He fully deserves such recognition,” Tudor told Reuters. “He’s taking part in improving Romania’s image abroad and he’ll surely join our team when released.”

MB Telecom is currently finalizing details of the commercial version of the device and expects to bring it to market in the second half of the year. ®

Article source: http://go.theregister.com/feed/www.theregister.co.uk/2013/05/17/romanian_hacker_atm_security/

US military welcomes Apple iOS 6 kit onto its networks

The US Department of Defense has welcomed Apple’s iDevices into its secure networks, and has announced that that it is “taking bold steps to provide sound information and proper analysis as it fortifies its cloud computing, acquisition and data processes.”

On Firday, the DoD set the stage for a three-way smackdown among Apple, Samsung, and BlackBerry for some military love by approving the security technical implementation guide (STIG) for iOS 6 devices, thus allowing them to be used when connecting to DoD networks.


BlackBerry passed muster earlier this month, and Samsung’s KNOX hardware-software security combo is expected to gain approval soon.

For Apple and Samsung, DoD approval is important to their bottom lines, but hardly critical. BlackBerry, on the other hand, is struggling to remain relevant in what was once an enormous market for it. BlackBerry can ill-afford the competition when attempting to sell the DoD on the advantages of its Z10 and Q10 handsets.

According to Reuters, the DoD currently has 470,000 BlackBerrys, 41,000 of Apple’s mobile devices, and a mere 8,700 Android-based items in its arsenal. Those numbers, however, are relatively inconsequential, seeing as how the DoD plans to open its own mobile store and build its own system to handle as many as eight million devices.

There’s a lot of purchasing to be going on, and with Apple and Samsung as its competitors, BlackBerry’s sales team will have its work cut out for it.

In a separate but related announcement, Mark Krzysko, the DoD’s deputy director for acquisition resource analysis and enterprise information – who may very well be referred to as ARAAEI in military-minded acronym-speak – said that the Pentagon is taking “bold steps” in its adoption of cloudy infrastructure.

“The technology, architecture framework and data management constructs the cloud can bring to us create ‘app-like’ thinking that [enables us to] move faster and forward more data sources out,” Krzysko said, apparently using “forward” as a verb.

The challenges that the DoD faces is not unknown among the less-armed general public: not only figuring out how to get cloudy tech and data working together, but also accomplishing the move from desktop to mobile while ensuring security.

“It is pretty much a known … intractable problem, so it gives us the opportunity to experiment … [and] create an organization to manage data and delivery in support of the decision-makers,” Krzysko said.

The Reg knows of three major manufacturers who would love to help in the mobile-device part of Krzsko’s chore – but only one of them is an American company. It will be interesting to see whether the DoD’s relationship with our close neighbor Canada or its active security partnership with South Korea play a political role in the upcoming business tussle among Apple, BlackBerry, and Samsung. ®

Article source: http://go.theregister.com/feed/www.theregister.co.uk/2013/05/17/department_of_defense_approves_apple_discusses_cloud/

Trying to kill undead Pushdo zombies? Hard luck, Trojan is EVOLVING

The crooks behind the Pushdo botnet agent have developed variants of the malware that are more resistant to take-down attempts or hijacking by rival hackers.

Dell SecureWorks and Damballa warned (PDF) on Wednesday that the latest variant of Pushdo comes packed with a fallback mechanism for cases where zombie clients are unable to contact the main command-and-control server for whatever reason.


The malware starts by using a Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) to come up with a list of 1,380 unique domains to poll on any particular day. Bot-herders can thus restore control of compromised hosts by leaving updated malware and instructions available for download at any of these domains.

However after the first DGA involved was exposed, security researchers began to work hard at developing countermeasures that block communication to the generated .COM domains. But it seems the nimble cybercrooks behind Pushdo were alive to that possibility and have already adapted, according to Aviv Raff, CTO of Seculert.

“The group behind Pushdo probably figured out that they are being investigated by the security vendors, because it didn’t take them too long to adapt to this new reality and change their Domain Generation Algorithm,” Raff explains in a blog post.

“This new DGA now generates .KZ domains instead of .COM domains. Not only that but there are now at least two new variants of Pushdo that are being pushed to victims from several different hijacked websites.”

This latest development is likely to kick off a further round of cat-and-mouse games between Pushdo’s cybercrooks and security researchers.

Pushdo has been used to distribute other malware such as ZeuS and SpyEye, as well as conduct spam/phishing campaigns with its Cutwail module. Despite four takedowns in five years of Pushdo command-and-control servers, the botnet (believed to be run by a single Eastern European hacker group) endures.

The malware is responsible between 175,000 and 500,000 active bots on any given day. The botnet is typically used to deliver malicious emails with links to websites that foist banking Trojans upon unsuspecting victims. Sometimes, the messages are made to look like credit card statements or they contain an attachment disguised as an order confirmation.

As well as applying new secondary recovery techniques, the unknown crooks behind Pushdo have begun masking command and controller traffic using a fake JPEG image file, said the researchers. They have also made greater use of encryption.

A blog post by Damballa giving more background on Pushdo and how the latest variants were uncovered can be found here. David Dagon of the Georgia Institute of Technology worked together with three researchers from Damballa and one from Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit in researching the latest form of the malware. ®

Article source: http://go.theregister.com/feed/www.theregister.co.uk/2013/05/17/pushdo_extra_stealth/

Who is the mystery sixth member of LulzSec?

Analysis Thursday’s sentencing of three core members of hacktivist crew LulzSec and an accomplice hacker who gave them access to a botnet closes an important chapter in the history of activism. But it also leaves a number of important questions unanswered.

One of the most interesting of these puzzlers is the identity of the mysterious sixth member of the group.


LulzSec was a constant feature of the information security headlines in May-June 2011 during its “50 days of Lulz” when it attacked Fox, PBS, Sony, Nintendo, Sega, FBI-affiliated security outfits such as Infragard and HB Gary Federal, the US Senate, the Arizona State Police, the CIA and the UK’s Serious Organised Crime Agency.

Most of its targets were entertainment firms opposing file-sharing, information security outfit, or law enforcement agencies. Tactics ran from basic website-flooding attacks to defacement and site redirection. In several cases the group published stolen data from compromised websites.

The motive of the group was described by prosecutors during a London sentencing hearing this week as “anarchic self-amusement” rather than anything profit-motivated. In truth filthy lucre does play a part in the story of LulzSec, even though the overriding driver appeared in several cases to be the chance for the accused to play rock-star black-hat hackers on a global stage, sticking two fingers up to The Man.

Consequences

LulzSec had six core members: The first four were Topiary aka Jake Davis (@aTopiary), UK; T-Flow, aka Mustafa Al-Bassam (@let_it_tflow), UK; Kayla, aka Ryan Ackroyd (@lolspoon), UK; Sabu, aka Hector Monsegur (@anonymouSabu), US.

The final two, at least according to the US Attorney’s Office and the FBI indictment, were Pwnsauce, named as Darren Martyn (@_pwnsauce), Ireland; and finally the mysterious AVunit (@AvunitAnon), whose identity is unknown.

The first three of these suspects were sentenced in London’s Southwark Crown Court on Thursday. Jake Davis, 19, of Lerwick, Shetland received a 24-month sentence in a young offenders’ institute, of which he’ll serve half.

Ryan Ackroyd, 26, of Mexborough, Doncaster, received a 30-month sentence. Providing he behaves himself, he’ll serve only 15 months. Mustafa Al-Bassam, 18, from Peckham, south London, got a 20-month sentence, suspended for two years, as well as 300 hours of community work. Al-Bassam avoided jail because of he was underage and still at school at the times of his offences.

Ryan Cleary (AKA Viral), 21, of Wickford, Essex, was found to have supplied a botnet of around 100,000 compromised computers that acted as a platform for LulzSec to blitz targeted websites. He was not a core member of the group but was prosecuted in the same case and ultimately received the most severe punishment of all the accused: a 32-month prison sentence.

Extradition ‘not anticipated’

The quartet were investigated in a joint operation by the Metropolitan Police’s Central e-Crime Unit and the FBI. In a statement welcoming the sentencing, Scotland Yard explained that each member of the group had a clearly defined role.

Ackroyd was responsible for researching and executing many of their hacks, Cleary assisted by allowing the use of his botnet – a system of malware-infected computers he controlled – to coordinate DDoS attacks. Al-Bassam assisted in discovering and exploiting online vulnerabilities, and also created and controlled LulzSec’s website. Davis was their spokesperson, managing their Twitter account and press releases.

Karen Todner, Cleary’s solicitor (and the law firm who represented McKinnon, issued a statement on Thursday saying they “do not anticipate” that he will become the subject of a US extradition request. Davis has also been indicted in the US but early reports suggest its unlikely that US authorities will seek his extradition.

The alleged ringleader of LulzSec, US-based Hector Xavier Monsegur – known online as “Sabu” – agreed to act as an informant following his arrest in June 2011, according to the FBI. The Feds said that Monsegur had helped them to identify other members of the group and other hackers.

Monsegur frequently acted as the group’s ideologue as well as directing attack campaigns. He was the midfield play-maker in a group that was at least nominally leaderless. He has already pleaded guilty to 12 counts of hacking, bank fraud, and identity theft and will be sentenced in August.

Darren Martyn (Pwnsauce) 26, of Galway, Ireland, was indicted in March 2012 for conspiring with other LulzSec members to attack Fox Broadcasting Company, Sony Pictures Entertainment, and the Public Broadcasting Service. He also allegedly hacked into the website of Fine Gael, a political party in Ireland. He’s yet to be tried.

That all means that while four of the six core members of LulzSec have been caught, and police have indicted a fifth man whom they suspect of being number five, the identity of Avunit remains a mystery, presumably even to Sabu or other members of the group who might have given him up in the hope of receiving a lesser sentence.

“We have no idea who Avunit is,” writes Mikko Hypponen, CRO at Finnish anti-virus firm F-Secure. “We have no identity. We don’t even know which continent he is from.”

Next page: Tradecraft

Article source: http://go.theregister.com/feed/www.theregister.co.uk/2013/05/17/lulzsec_analysis/

Breaking news, LITERALLY: Financial Times vandalised by hackers

The Financial Times website and its Twitter accounts were this afternoon hijacked by pro-government hackers from the “Syrian Electronic Army”.

The posh broadsheet’s Tech Blog – at http://blogs.FT.com/beyond-brics – was compromised to run stories headlined “Syrian Electronic Army Was Here” and “Hacked by the Syrian Electronic Army”.

Meanwhile, the Technology News (@FTtechnews), FT Media and FT Markets Twitter feeds were seized by miscreants, who posted web links to disturbing YouTube videos of jihadis executing men by firing squad.

The blog has been cleaned up, but the Twitter accounts remain compromised.

Breaking news, literally … the compromised Pink ‘Un‘s tweets

The takeover is the latest in a series of high-profile attacks against media organisations by hackers apparently in favour of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad. The so-called electronic army has knackered the online operations of the The Guardian, Associated Press, the BBC and even satirical newspaper The Onion.

Techies at The Onion published an informative postmortem after the attack, revealing its email accounts were infiltrated following a multistage phishing expedition – a raid that gave the hackers control of the magazine’s social networking pages. The techniques used against the FT are unclear at the time of writing.

Computer security biz Arbor Networks said Twitter’s anticipated introduction of two-factor authentication ought to curtail, if not eliminate, this sort of account hijacking. Dan Holden, director of research at Arbor, commented: “Twitter recently announced plans to introduce two factor authentication, which is a big step forward from a security perspective. As this particular event shows the human element is often the weakest link in any security solution.”

“Given similar attacks in recent weeks against the Guardian in the UK and The Onion in US these attacks seem to be very targeted. Organisations should put processes in place to ensure that their staff are trained on best practices and have the support and training needed to allow them to follow these practices easily during their normal working routine. Ideally network monitoring solutions should also be put in place to alert an organisation when a user system connects to a known bad actor on the internet as this may indicate a compromise, allowing remedial action to be taken before there is any business impact,” he added. ®

Article source: http://go.theregister.com/feed/www.theregister.co.uk/2013/05/17/ft_twitter_hijacked_by_sea/

US government wants security research on car-to-car nets

David Strickland, Administrator of the USA’s National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), has told that nation’s Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation that he plans to research the security requirements of automated cars and vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) networks.

Strickland appeared before the committee this week and gaped with appropriate metaphorical awe at the likes of Google’s self-driving vehicles and V2V network proposals that would see one car radio another to tell it when heavy braking is required. Such systems, Strickland said, could “potentially address about 80 percent of crashes involving non-impaired drivers once the entire vehicle fleet is equipped with V2V technology.”


He’s also worried about what he called “vehicle cybersecurity”, because he believes more technology in cars creates ”growing potential for remotely compromising vehicle security through software and the increased onboard communications services”

NHTSA has asked for an extra $US2m to research the problem, with the aim of “of developing a preliminary baseline set of threats and how those threats could be addressed in the vehicle environment”. Standards for car-makers are also on the agenda.

Strickland detailed other objectives as follows:

For the V2V program, our research is evaluating a layered approach to cybersecurity. Such an approach, if deployed, would provide defense-in-depth, managing threats to ensure that the driver cannot lose control and that the overall system cannot be corrupted to send faulty data. In partnership with the auto companies and other stakeholders we have developed a conceptual framework for V2V security. We are also developing countermeasures to prevent these security credentials from being stolen or duplicated. Additionally, we are developing protocols to support a V2V security system that is designed to share data about nefarious behavior and take appropriate action.”

Just what that last sentence means is anyone’s guess. Here in Vulture South we imagine privacy groups might imagine liberty-challenging driver tracking, or at the very least cars letting it be known when someone’s tickling their digital innards in suspicious ways.

Strickland’s testimony (PDF) also signalled his agency has started work on a policy framework to allow self-driving cars. He offered the Committee an interesting hierarchy of vehicle automation that’s too long to re

  • Level 0—No Automation. At the initial Level 0, the driver is in complete control of the primary vehicle controls (steering, brake, and throttle) at all times, and is solely responsible for monitoring the roadway and for safe operation of all vehicle controls.
  • Level 1—Function Specific Automation. Level 1 automation involves one specific control function that is automated. The driver still maintains overall control, and is solely responsible for safe operation, but can choose to cede limited authority over a primary control.
  • Level 2—Combined Function Automation. Level 2 automation means that under some circumstances “the driver can disengage from physically operating the vehicle by taking hands off the steering wheel and feet off the pedals at the same time.”
  • Level 3—Limited Self-Driving Automation. Level 3 automation enables the driver to cede full control of all steering, brake, and throttle functions to the vehicle while remaining “available for occasional control, but with a comfortable transition time that will enable the driver to regain situational awareness.”
  • Level 4—Full Self-Driving Automation. The vehicle is designed to perform all safety-critical driving functions and monitor roadway conditions for an entire trip.

Strickland also said the agency is looking into whether guidelines are needed for how voice-activated in-car technology is designed, with an eye to possible future guidelines. ®

Article source: http://go.theregister.com/feed/www.theregister.co.uk/2013/05/17/usa_car_network_security_research/