STE WILLIAMS

The DEF CON hackers’ report on US voting machine security is just as grim as feared

Hackers probing America’s electronic voting systems have painted an astonishing picture of the state of US election security, less than six weeks before the November midterms.

The full 50-page report [PDF], released Thursday during a presentation in Washington DC, was put together by the organizers of the DEF CON hacking conference’s Voting Village. It recaps the findings of that village, during which attendees uncovered ways resourceful miscreants could compromise electoral computer systems and change vote tallies.

In short, the dossier outlines shortcomings in the electronic voting systems many US districts will use later this year for the midterm elections. The report focuses on vulnerabilities exploitable by scumbags with physical access to the hardware.

“The problems outlined in this report are not simply election administration flaws that need to be fixed for efficiency’s sake, but rather serious risks to our critical infrastructure and thus national security,” the report stated. “As our nation’s security is the responsibility of the federal government, Congress needs to codify basic security standards like those developed by local election officials.”

Criminally easy to hack

Researchers found that many of the systems tested were riddled with basic security blunders committed by their manufacturers, such as using default passwords and neglecting to install locks or tamper-proof seals on casings. These could be exploited by miscreants to do anything from add additional votes to create and stuff the ballot with entirely new candidates. It would require the crooks to get their hands on the machines long enough to meddle with the hardware.

Some electronic ballot boxes use smart cards loaded with Java-written software, which executes once inserted into the computer. Each citizen is given a card, which they slide in the machine when they go to vote. Unfortunately, it is possible to reprogram your card yourself so that when inserted, you can vote multiple times. If the card reader has wireless NFC support, you can hold your NFC smartphone up to the voting machine, and potentially cast a ballot many times over.

“Due to a lack of security mechanisms in the smart card implementation, researchers in the Voting Village demonstrated that it is possible to create a voter activation card, which after activating the election machine to cast a ballot can automatically reset itself and allow a malicious voter to cast a second (or more) unauthorized ballots,” the report read.

“Alternatively, an attacker can use his or her mobile phone to reprogram the smart card wirelessly.”

The DEF CON village was not without its share of controversy. Voting machine maker ESS condemned the conference’s workshops and contests as a security threat, while the organizers noted that the results of the gathering were limited because hackers were only being able to access publicly obtainable machines – typically decommissioned devices bought on eBay – leading some wondering how much damage a hacker could deal to today’s in-production voting systems.

People voting with good old paper

Judge: Georgia’s e-vote machines are awful – but go ahead and use them

READ MORE

Ultimately, however, the researchers believe that the findings from the event show that there are more than enough holes to warrant a larger effort by US Congress to get national security standards in place for electoral computer systems.

“While many local election officials have worked tirelessly to advocate for Congress to act and fund robust security practices, it’s not enough. National security leaders must also remind Congress daily of the gravity of this threat and national security implications,” the report stated.

“It is the responsibility of both current and former national security leaders to ensure Congress does not myopically view these issues as election administration issues but rather the critical national security issues they are. Disclosing vulnerabilities does not seem to be enough to get them fixed, even years later.”

Hopefully, the dossiers’ authors – Matt Blaze, University of Pennsylvania; Jake Braun, University of Chicago; Harri Hursti, Nordic Innovation Labs; David Jefferson, Verified Voting; Margaret MacAlpine, Nordic Innovation Labs; and Jeff Moss, DEF CON founder – aren’t hoping to get that any time soon. Despite the repeated calls to improve election security ahead of the midterms, Congress has steadfastly refused to take any significant action. ®

Article source: http://go.theregister.com/feed/www.theregister.co.uk/2018/09/28/defcon_vote_hacking/

Ransomware Attack Hits Port of San Diego

The attack began Monday and continues to have an impact on services at the port.

The Port of San Diego has been hit with a ransomware attack affecting several computers and having an impact on processing park permits and record requests, along with other business services. The attack, first reported to port officials on Tuesday, is ongoing, according to a statement from the port.

Some experts have noted the similarities between this attack and the one that hit the city of Atlanta earlier this year. In both cases, essential customer services were affected and the criminals demanded payment in Bitcoin.

While the Port of San Diego has not released the amount of the ransom demanded, Barry Shteiman, vice president of research and innovation at Exabeam, says that the decision on whether or not to pay will likely come down to economics. “If the cost of paying the ransom is less than the downtime caused by unavailable data, or by the backup restoration process, then organizations should pay. By the same token, if the cost of giving up on the encrypted data is higher — both in lost revenue or intellectual property — than remediation would be, the company doesn’t have much choice but to pay up,” he says.

The attack was originally reported to the California Office of Emergency Services and the County of San Diego Office of Emergency Services, and the port is now partnering with the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security on investigating the attack. Officials note that normal port operations, including ship access and public safety, have not been affected by the attack.

For more, read here.

 

Black Hat Europe returns to London Dec. 3-6, 2018, with hands-on technical Trainings, cutting-edge Briefings, Arsenal open-source tool demonstrations, top-tier security solutions, and service providers in the Business Hall. Click for information on the conference and to register.

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Article source: https://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/ransomware-attack-hits-port-of-san-diego/d/d-id/1332924?_mc=rss_x_drr_edt_aud_dr_x_x-rss-simple

Russia’s Sednit Deploys First Firmware-Level Rootkit in the Wild

The advanced persistent threat group’s LoJax can install malware capable of surviving both OS reinstallation and hard disk replacement.

Advanced persistent threat (APT) group Sednit has deployed a rootkit capable of modifying a computer’s Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) to install malware that can survive both an OS reinstallation and hard disk replacement.

Security vendor ESET recently discovered the malware — dubbed LoJax — installed on a system as part of a broader Sednit APT campaign and described it this week as the first UEFI rootkit ever discovered in the wild. The discovery shows that UEFI rootkit attacks — long perceived as a theoretical threat — are a reality, says Alexis Dorais-Joncas, security intelligence team lead at ESET.

“Organizations should review the Secure Boot configuration on their hardware and make sure they are configured properly to prevent unauthorized access to the firmware memory,” Dorais-Joncas says. They also need to think about controls for detecting malware at the UEFI/BIOS level, he says.

UEFI is a specification for the interface between a computer’s firmware and its operating system. The interface contains information for booting the operating system and for running pre-boot applications. Anyone able to tamper with the interface can make firmware changes that completely compromise the integrity of the system.

In recent years, chipmakers, hardware vendors, OS makers, and others have introduced measures that make it very hard for anyone to make such changes. One example is Secure Boot, a mechanism that ensures only securely signed firmware and software can be booted up and run on a system.

Secure Boot is supported on nearly every modern computer and, when enabled, can make it very hard for someone to make unauthorized changes at the firmware level. Such controls are the reason why security researchers have considered UEFI rootkits as something that typically government and government-backed entities are likely capable of developing and successfully using.

The discovery of LoJax shows that capabilities around UEFI rootkits are developing. “We certainly should expect rootkits of this type to evolve,” says Ang Cui, CEO of Red Balloon Security. “We shouldn’t be surprised to see more UEFI rootkits in the wild going forward, which could potentially incorporate more advanced capabilities like signature verification bypass.”

Stealthy and Persistent
ESET says it discovered LoJax on a system belonging to an organization that the Sednit group is targeting as part of a broad campaign against government entities in the Balkans and also in Central and Eastern Europe. Sednit, aka APT28, Sofacy, and Fancy Bear, is a notorious Russian threat actor, perhaps best known in recent times for its attack on the Democratic National Committee in 2016. The group’s success in deploying the rootkit should serve as a warning to those it its crosshairs about the group’s growing sophistication.

According to ESET, its analysis shows that the Sednit group used a kernel driver bundled with a legitimate and freely available utility called RWEverything to install the UEFI rootkit. The driver can be used to access a computer’s UEFI/BIOS settings and gather information on almost all low-level settings on it.

Sednit bundled RWEverything’s functionality into two custom tools. One of the tools was for reading the contents of the flash memory where the UEFI is located and saving the image to a file. The second was a patching tool to add the rootkit to the firmware image and write it back to flash memory, thereby installing it on the system, ESET said.

This module can drop and execute malware on disk during the boot process, making the malware hard to remove even with an OS reinstall and a hard disk replacement, ESET said.

“The infection mechanism was to write the entire UEFI firmware memory with unsigned code,” Dorais-Joncas says. However, the same technique — flashing the UEFI firmware — would not work on a modern system with Secure Boot properly enabled, he says.

The only reason it did in this case was because the victim system was likely misconfigured or was running an older Intel chipset. “In this attack, either the firmware did not properly configure the BIOS write protection mechanisms or the victim’s machine had a chipset older than the Platform Controller Hub,” Dorais-Joncas says.

However, it is a mistake to underestimate the threat all the same. Researchers have previously found several vulnerabilities that bypass UEFI protections and gain write access, so there is no guarantee the same thing can’t happen again, he notes.

“We should not assume that Secure Boot will be a magic-bullet solution against UEFI rootkits going forward,” Cui says. If not properly locked down, attackers can take advantage of new features that hardware manufacturers have begun implementing, like UEFI, CPU Management Engine, and One Time Protect, in flash to launch devastating attacks.

UEFI, for instance, is a particularly good place for a rootkit to live because it is easier for it to stay persistent and stealthy, Cui says. “On top of that, it can also change the system and modify the OS before the OS loads, giving it lots of ways to change the rules on modern hardware and OS security.”

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Black Hat Europe returns to London Dec. 3-6, 2018, with hands-on technical Trainings, cutting-edge Briefings, Arsenal open-source tool demonstrations, top-tier security solutions, and service providers in the Business Hall. Click for information on the conference and to register.

Jai Vijayan is a seasoned technology reporter with over 20 years of experience in IT trade journalism. He was most recently a Senior Editor at Computerworld, where he covered information security and data privacy issues for the publication. Over the course of his 20-year … View Full Bio

Article source: https://www.darkreading.com/vulnerabilities---threats/russias-sednit-deploys-first-firmware-level-rootkit-in-the-wild/d/d-id/1332923?_mc=rss_x_drr_edt_aud_dr_x_x-rss-simple

Cryptojacking – coming to a server-laptop-phone near you (and how to stop it)

If you’ve heard of cryptocurrency – and who hasn’t these days? – you’ve probably heard of “the blockchain”.

Technically, of course, the phrase the blockchain refers to any number of different blockchains – each cryptocurrency typically has its own – and we use the word in much the same way that we talk about “the weather” or “the automobile”.

Simply put, a blockchain is a digital list – an electronic ledger or transaction record, if you like – that is maintained by a community of volunteers, using cryptographic algorithms to make the ledger itself immune, or at least very highly resistant, to tampering by hackers.

A secure, community-created ledger like a blockchain doesn’t need a central authority to maintain it, because the community does that job, and it doesn’t rely any one service provider to keep it backed up securely, because everyone in the community has their own copy of it and can check it for tampering any time they like.

Blockchains, therefore, are ideal for decentralised, unregulated, largely anonymous digital cash systems such as Bitcoin and Monero.

There are a couple of catches, though.

Because the blockchain relies on consensus to decide which transactions to lock in and which to reject, you need sufficiently many community members, and sufficient diversity, that no one person or cartel controls more than 50% of the community’s decision-making power.

At the same time, you need a decision-making system that means it’s only worth participating if you play by the rules, so that any fractious minority will find it computationally too expensive to try to vandalise the system with bogus transactions that take time and effort for the majority to identify and reject.

In most blockchains, the validation algorithm is therefore deliberately designed to make it time-consuming to come up with a genuine transaction confirmation.

Usually, trillions or quadrillions of computationally expensive cryptographic calculations are needed, meaning that there are no algorithmic shortcuts – it’s all down to how much computing power you have, and how much you are willing to spend on electricity (and airconditioning!) to run your cryptocurrency computers.

To pay back the “volunteers” who perform these potentially expensive calculations, anyone who successfully confirms a new transaction – or block of transactions, thus the name blockchain – is rewarded in some way, for example via a processing fee that slices off a fraction of each of the transactions in the block and remits it to the solver as a commission payment.

Because the calculations require you to do loads of cryptographic computations, and because the rewards come from value that is essentially “dug out” of the transactions that you confirm, this process is known in the jargon as cryptomining.

You can see where this is going.

When hijacking meets mining

If I’m a cybercrook and I can hijack your computer by implanting malware, I can use your CPU for my cryptomining.

Simply put, you pay for the electricity (and you get to fry eggs on your computer, because cryptomining is hot work for your processor), while I get to steal any cryptocurrency earned by your CPU.

Combine the phrases “cryptomining” and “computer hijacking” and you get the portmanteau word cryptojacking.

Cryptocurrency values have fallen since the start of 2018 – bitcoins, for example, are down from about $20,000 each to somewhere between $6000 and $7000 – but that hasn’t been enough to make cryptojacking attacks dry up.

After all, from a cybercrook’s point of view, it’s as good as free money, so there are plenty of criminals still willing to devote themselves to cryptojacking.

There are two main way that cryptojacking is carried out these days:

  • Sneak dedicated cryptomining software into your network and leave it running all the time. Servers are especially at risk here: the crooks love them because they’re usually more powerful than desktops and laptops, and they’re usually running 24/7.
  • Sneak JavaScript cryptomining software into hacked web pages so that your browser mines for currency as you surf the web. The crooks get much less out of each victim – as soon as you leave the poisoned website, the mining stops – but a single hacked site could end up cryptojacking millions of visitors each day, whatever operating system they’re using.

As cyberthreats go, cryptojacking is often considered the best of a bad lot, given that it doesn’t try to plunder your confidential data, capture your passwords, map out your network, or violate your customers’ privacy.

In fact, it’s this data-neutral aspect of cryptojacking that makes it work even inside the sandbox of a web browser, because the cryptomining code doesn’t need to read files, log keystrokes or snoop on network traffic – all it needs is CPU power…

…and plenty of it.

Sadly, even mobile phones aren’t immune from cryptojacking, despite the fact that they’re usually less powerful than laptops (and a lot less powerful than servers) and in sleep mode most of the time.

As we mentioned above, even if the crooks extract no more than a few cents of ill-gotten gains a day, it’s as good as free money; it all adds up; and it’s not their phone battery that’s getting cooked or their battery that’s getting hammered.

Worse still, even sticking to Google Play isn’t a guarantee of avoiding apps with hidden cryptojacking features.

SophosLabs recently found a whole raft of disguised cryptojackers still available for download, even though Google itself banned cryptomining from the Play Store back in July 2018,

The apps passed themsleves off as games, utilities and educational apps, but their main purpose was to make money behind your back.

What to do?

Usually, we urge Naked Security readers to avoid Android malware by sticking to the Play Store, but that’s clearly not enough on its own.

So, whatever sort of device – phone, netbook, laptop, server – you’re looking to protect from cryptojackers, consider the following:

  • Use an anti-virus that blocks both dangerous content and risky websites. Browser-based cryptojacking relies on pulling down mining code from an external web server every time you browse, so blocking known cryptojacking sites stops the malicious JavaScript arriving in the first place.
  • Watch out for unexpected CPU load. You pay an opportunity cost for cryptomining because it typically makes your laptop runs as though it’s 10 years out of date. On a Mac, click the battery icon to see apps Using Significant Energy; on Windows, use Ctrl+Shift+Esc to bring up Task Manager.


Article source: http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/nakedsecurity/~3/yImTjuZqXhI/

Looking after the corporate Apple mobile fleet? Beware: MDM onboarding is ‘insecure’

Hackers can blow holes in Apple’s managed service technology and sneak their own rogue devices onto corporate fleets of mobile iThings.

Weaknesses in Apple’s Device Enrollment Program (DEP) allow the ne’er-do-wells to run targeted attacks on both the networks of the corporate shiny-shiny and the backend systems that support them, researchers at Duo Security warned.

DEP, for those unfamiliar, is a free service provided by Apple that facilitates Mobile Device Management (MDM) enrolment of iOS (iPhones and iPad), macOS (MacBooks), and tvOS devices.

The root cause of the problem is authentication weakness in DEP. Apple’s MDM protocol supports strong user authentication (PDF) prior to MDM enrolment without actually requiring it – and allows device serial numbers to be used instead of more secure alternatives. Device serial numbers can be used to register iThings through Apple’s DEP service during initial onboarding.

This is bad practice because serial numbers are generated using a well-known schema that makes them predictable. These serial numbers were never designed to be kept secret. Repositories of some serial numbers have already leaked and, even if that were not the case, valid serial numbers can be generated before being tested to see whether they are registered through programming interfaces (APIs) with the DEP via a form of brute-force attack.

Duo Security further warned that the weakness creates an opportunity to spy on targeted networks. “The DEP profiles contain information about the organization such as phone numbers and email addresses, which could be used to launch a social engineering attack against the organisation’s help desk or IT team.”

The research was unveiled at the ekoparty conference in Buenos Aires, Argentina, today. Duo Security flagged up the issue to Apple three months ago before going public at the South American hacker powwow.

Lock it down

Duo is advising Apple to move towards strong authentication of devices and to stay well away from relying on serial numbers as a sole authentication factor. Until this core issue is addressed, Apple can make life harder for baddies by rate-limiting requests to its DEP APIs, a move that would throw a spanner in the works of those trying to guess numbers by trying every possible combination.

“Additionally, Apple could strongly authenticate users as part of the DEP enrollment process, using modern authentication protocols such as SAML or OIDC ,” Duo Security added.

If an organisation uses DEP – a technology widely but not universally used even among all-Apple shops – authentication should be tightened up at corporate mobile device management servers so that “knowledge of a serial number alone does not allow device enrollment”.

Duo Security said it was not calling on organisations to ditch Apple’s tech, but rather to be careful about using it.

“The benefits of ensuring that devices are securely configured and managed via MDM and bootstrapping that process via DEP outweigh the risks associated with this authentication weakness,” the firm concluded.

Professor Alan Woodward of Surrey University told The Register: “I’ve seen too many security problems caused by using only serial number to validate not to be suspicious. But, although there might be a chance if some info leakage, maybe a foothold from which to pivot, I’m not sure how much real damage you could do.” ®

Article source: http://go.theregister.com/feed/www.theregister.co.uk/2018/09/27/apple_mdm_insecure/

Sunny Cali goes ballistic, this ransomware is atrocious. Even our IT bill will be something quite ferocious

The Port of San Diego in California has shipping in outside help to deal with a crippling ransomware infection that is now in its third day.

Port CEO Randa Coniglio said on Thursday that a number of services, including park permits, public records requests, and business document filings, have been hit by file-scrambling malware getting into officials’ systems. Processing of applications and queries has slowed to a crawl or stopped completely due to computer terminals being taken down by the infection. The network intrusion is also affecting the San Diego Harbor Police Department.

“The Port has mobilized a team of industry experts and local, regional, state and federal partners to minimize impacts and restore system functionality, with priority placed on public safety-related systems,” Coniglio said in an update.

“The team is currently determining the extent and timing of the incident and the amount of damage to information technology resources, and developing a plan for recovery. The Harbor Police Department continues to use alternative systems and procedures in place to minimize impacts to public safety.”

Water palaver?

Least you think this is only about container ships and dockworkers, in the case of sunny San Diego, the “Port” also is the section of the US city that includes its waterfront tourist and parks districts. The area covers about 34 miles of the metropolis and includes two cargo and cruise ship terminals, as well as private boat marinas, a shopping and restaurant area, and the city’s convention center.

The attack is said to have first been uncovered on Tuesday, with the Port issuing its first formal statement on the matter Wednesday. So far, details on what specific infection or group was responsible for the attack are unknown.

The city has not provided any timeline for recovery of its systems. The San Diego Union Tribune reports that, so far, residents themselves have seen minimal impact from the attack.

If past events are any indication, clean-up from the infection could prove to be a long and costly affair for San Diego. Earlier this year, the city of Atlanta ended up spending around $2.5m to clean up a ransomware attack that had paralyzed a number of its services. ®

Article source: http://go.theregister.com/feed/www.theregister.co.uk/2018/09/27/san_diego_shipping_port_ransomware/

The Cyber Kill Chain Gets a Makeover

A new report demonstrates how the cyber kill chain is consolidating as criminals find ways to accelerate the spread of their targeted cyberattacks.

The early phases of the traditional cyber kill chain are merging as criminals seek out faster ways to launch targeted attacks, a new report explains.

As part of the “2018 Critical Watch Report,” researchers at Alert Logic reviewed 254,274 total verified security incidents, 7.2 million events linked to those incidents, and 1.2 billion anomalies between April 1, 2017, and June 30, 2018. They surfaced five key insights, top of which was the realization that the traditional cyber kill chain is transforming for different types of attacks.

Since 2011, they report, the typical kill chain has comprised seven steps: reconnaissance (harvesting credentials, email addresses, etc.), weaponization (bundling exploits with backdoors into deliverable payloads), delivery of weaponized bundles to victims, exploitation to execute code on a target system, installation of malware, command and control, and acting on objectives.

In this model, each phase has a corresponding stage to interrupt and contain the attack. The earlier in the kill chain the threat is addressed, the less potential it has to do damage. Companies can detect attackers as they poke around during recon, deny access to data, stop data going to attackers, counterattack command and control, and contain network segmentation.

The traditional attack method is typical of advanced persistent threat (APT) attacks and was common in cybercrime from the mid- to late 2000s, explains Matt Downing, principal threat researcher at Alert Logic.

“It’s an explicit set of steps where the kill chain really made sense,” he says. “An attacker is interested in you because of what you possess or who you are. They do reconnaissance to figure out your attack surface … this is your typical targeted attack scenario.”

Depending on what they found during the recon phase, attackers would match a victim’s vulnerabilities against the exploits they had, bundle them up, and pass them on.

What researchers found is attackers now have modified this kill chain to consolidate the first five phases into a single action, accelerating the process of identifying vulnerable systems and launching attacks. The phases of recon, weaponization, delivery, exploitation, and installation are compressed as attackers leverage predefined, weaponized packages against targets. This merged kill chain was used in 88% of attack cases, researchers report.

Its use case is evident in cryptojacking, which researchers found to be the driving motivation for many attacks showing the condensed cyber kill chain. Most (88%) WebLogic attacks were cryptojacking attempts, and while this type of cybercrime doesn’t steal data or hold systems hostage, it is a sign that target systems are vulnerable to the placement of other malware.

“In the context of cryptojacking, it makes every single host on the Internet valuable,” Downing says. Attackers armed with cryptominers don’t need to conduct recon. They can simply send off their preweaponized payload, and the contained sequence of events plays out. Ransomware is similar; however, a few factors are boosting the appeal of cryptojacking.

For starters, many view cryptomining as a more benign activity. “There’s a lower ethical bar for some,” points out Christine Meyers, director of product marketing at Alert Logic. “[Attackers] just feel as though this is a victimless attack, whereas ransomware isn’t.”

Operationally, cryptojacking is easy, Downing says. Morally, it’s “a bit ambiguous” but growing among financially motivated cybercriminals who want direct access to digital currencies.

On a broader level, researchers noticed an uptick in automated attacks and “spray and pray” techniques. Web applications remain the primary attack vector across industries, including retail and hospitality (85%), nonprofits (82%), media and entertainment (80%), information technology and services (77%), education (74%), and financial services (71%).

To mitigate risk, researchers advise going back to basics. Vulnerability scanning, especially for low-level vulnerabilities, is essential to learn how an attacker can gain easy access to an environment. “It’s a fundamental hygiene issue,” says Downing, noting that “knowing and patching” is the key to defending against the consolidated cyber kill chain.

Meyers advises regularly assessing security posture – and doing so often. “It’s not a one-and-done thing where you address risk once and it never changes,” she says. “You need to continuously assess it.”

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Black Hat Europe returns to London Dec 3-6 2018  with hands-on technical Trainings, cutting-edge Briefings, Arsenal open-source tool demonstrations, top-tier security solutions and service providers in the Business Hall. Click for information on the conference and to register.

Kelly Sheridan is the Staff Editor at Dark Reading, where she focuses on cybersecurity news and analysis. She is a business technology journalist who previously reported for InformationWeek, where she covered Microsoft, and Insurance Technology, where she covered financial … View Full Bio

Article source: https://www.darkreading.com/threat-intelligence/the-cyber-kill-chain-gets-a-makeover/d/d-id/1332892?_mc=rss_x_drr_edt_aud_dr_x_x-rss-simple

Managing Data the Way We Manage Money

In the data-driven enterprise, myriad types of data have become a new form and flow of currency. Why, then, hasn’t the CISO achieved parity with the CFO?

In perhaps the most comprehensive experiment to study cybersecurity decision-making, MIT’s Sloan School of Management last year paired a group of seasoned security executives with a control group of inexperienced graduate students to test who might fare best in a simulated threat environment.

While the two groups performed differently on various aspects of the simulation, overall there was no significant difference in the success rates of the two groups. The study’s authors note that their conclusion is not to diminish the importance of expertise, but rather that security executives need better tools and training that provide clear visibility into the state of security on the ground. The disconnect, the MIT researchers observe, is in the “significant gaps between business managers’ perceptions, and the actual state of the cybersecurity of their organizations,” exhorting the cybersecurity community to design and adopt enhanced educational and training programs that challenge entrenched mindsets and encourage proactive cybersecurity capability development.

The results are not surprising. Hard-to-define “knowledge gaps” abound between IT leadership, the C-suite, and even boards of directors who are ultimately accountable for the security of data. This is the argument made increasingly by CISOs themselves. In a 2017 survey of 300 CISOs by the cloud-based software company ServiceNow, 81% of respondents say they are highly concerned that breaches at their companies are going unaddressed. Some 78% worry about their ability to detect breaches in the first place. Only 19% of security chiefs say their company is highly effective at preventing security breaches.

The situation is hardly hopeless, but it does require a mindset that begins with an acknowledgement of the fraught way IT and data management has evolved within companies. In the past, IT infrastructure was simply a production tool and source of tactical advantage. Data’s use as a strategic tool came later.

Enter the Data-Driven Enterprise
Data security was always an issue for IT managers, but the squalls were smaller. Today’s emphasis on cloud computing, distributed systems, native mobile apps, and the Internet of Things has created the perfect storm. Customer data, market data, intellectual property, resource consumption data, productivity data, and dozens of other categories are a new form and flow of currency in the data-driven enterprise. However, as data flow has achieved parity with cash flow, the CISO or the CSO has not achieved parity with the CFO.

Consider that companies have had decades to work out the metrics of finance: balance sheet, income statement, and statement of cash flows. These are the standard tools that every CEO has been trained to read. They roll up detailed financial information from every corner of a business into brief, concise reporting that can be quickly consumed and watched over time to aid understanding of the health and progress of a business.

A similar reporting interface can be developed for commercial and business data — and the associated risks. It starts with three guideposts:

1. Establish a common language. Every executive knows what EBITDA is, or the difference between receivables and payables. Data must be characterized into groupings that executives can understand when they approach it from a compliance and risk perspective. Rather than using application names or table or column names, group data at the lowest level into buckets like “high-sensitivity personally identifiable information” or “customer payment information.”

2. Draw a direct line between the user and the data. Financial reporting focuses exactly on who is spending what. Too often companies focus on the relationship between users and application access. This is important, but it doesn’t take into account which applications have access to what data, and therefore ignores the direct relationship between users and data. Who is accessing what? Understanding that direct relationship and even enforcing policy focused on that relationship brings new clarity to data use.

3. Create digital truth. Financials are audited on an annual basis so that executives and regulators know that they can be trusted. Through new technologies like blockchain, data flows can be recorded directly as they happen, making the resulting audit trail immutable and virtually impossible for the record to be manipulated.

It’s time that the business owners and the decision makers who are accountable for the integrity and security of their enterprise data have the tools on hand that correlate with this accountability. Just as financial statements deliver the truth about money, the intelligence on critical flows of data must be structured and organized to deliver concise truth about data.

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Black Hat Europe returns to London Dec. 3-6, 2018, with hands-on technical Trainings, cutting-edge Briefings, Arsenal open-source tool demonstrations, top-tier security solutions, and service providers in the Business Hall. Click for information on the conference and to register.

Dave Sikora is a technology industry veteran with more than 20 years of experience that spans enterprise software, data intelligence, private equity, mobile applications and supply chain solutions. As CEO at ALTR, he is focused on expanding the ways enterprise companies can … View Full Bio

Article source: https://www.darkreading.com/analytics/managing-data-the-way-we-manage-money/a/d-id/1332896?_mc=rss_x_drr_edt_aud_dr_x_x-rss-simple

Alphabet’s Chronicle Releases VirusTotal Enterprise

Chronicle, the cybersecurity business under Alphabet, releases a major update to VirusTotal geared toward corporate threat hunters.

Chronicle, the independent cybersecurity business under Alphabet, today is releasing a major update to VirusTotal, dubbed VirusTotal Enterprise. The new offering combines VirusTotal’s existing capabilities with new tools, features, and an interface for corporate security pros.

Alphabet, the parent company of Google, Nest, and other ventures, announced Chronicle in January. At the time, Chronicle was the latest program to graduate from X, Alphabet’s tech incubator. It was created to help tech pros detect cyberattacks before they did harm through the combination of a security analytics platform and VirusTotal, which Google bought in 2012.

Chronicle has expressed a focus on enterprise security from the start. This marks VirusTotal’s first major release since Chronicle made its debut earlier this year. Under Alphabet, the platform has grown from increased scalability of data collection, processing, and search. Now, it’s leveraging this expansion to help businesses detect, organize, and address security alerts.

“We’re bringing enterprise expertise in Chronicle to make the product more useful for the cases enterprises are going to be facing,” says Mike Wiacek, Chronicle co-founder and chief security officer.

Security pros can use the tool to search for malware samples with VirusTotal Intelligence, look for future malware samples using VT Hunt with YARA, analyze malware relationships using VT Graph, and automate all of this with VirusTotal’s API. Below, a description of what’s new:

(Image: VT Graph, Chronicle)

(Image: VT Graph, Chronicle)

Private Graph
Businesses using VirusTotal Enterprise will have access to Private Graph, a feature VirusTotal announced earlier this year to create visualizations of malware relationships while integrating internal corporate information and keeping it all private from other VirusTotal users.

In studying different forms of malware, Wiacek explains, security pros want to know how different forms of malware relate to one another. They can build a giant mesh of which files relate to one another, which relate to different IP addresses, which link to different forms of malware, and how all of their behaviors interrelate. This is all possible with VirusTotal Graph.

“They’re trying to use that knowledge to discover new malware and new features and functionality related to it,” Wiacek says.

But practitioners don’t always want to share enterprise assets (people, departments, machines) publicly, so they requested a way to keep some graphs hidden from the VirusTotal community. Unlike traditional graphs, private graphs aren’t visible to other users on the platform.

Enterprise users on VirusTotal have different concerns than security researchers, Wiacek explains. “An enterprise analyst has different concerns around privacy and data,” he adds. A university researcher looking into an attack might not have the same concerns around keeping the process under wraps as someone trying to protect customers’ information.

With Private Graph, security teams can create investigations restricted to the people collaborating on it. They can add their own data elements, combined with VirusTotal data, to visualize threats and compare internal and external data. For example, if someone’s machine was infected, you can enter it on a graph and compare that threat with others seen in the wild.

Private graphs can automatically identify and extract threat commonalities from nodes to pinpoint indicators of compromise. Owners of private graphs can share their graphs with other private groups, Wiacek adds.

Ramping Up Malware Search
Chronicle reports VirusTotal Enterprise increases search speed by 100x using new malware n-gram content searches and improves search accuracy by looking for additional parameters: spam emails with a common visual layout, for example, or common icons across files.

“Traditionally, if you’re a commercial customer, you can write custom malware signatures to match files, and match files to see a particular malware strain you’re looking for,” Wiacek explains. “Really, you can enhance and improve speed with which researchers use the VirusTotal corpus to compare malware at scale,” he adds, noting that the new capabilities in VirusTotal Enterprise can accelerate searches from a few hours to seconds.

Malware analysis is also getting an update: Users will have access to more details about uploaded files, included embedded domains, IP addresses, and interest-ranked strings. The search tool lets them look for links across files, behaviors, and relationships, says Wiacek.

Enterprise Management Tools
VirusTotal is adding another layer of security with this release by letting customers use their existing two-factor authentication to access VirusTotal Enterprise accounts. A new API management for corporate groups will keep internal user directories synced with VirusTotal.

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Security Flaw Found in Apple Mobile Device Enrollment Program

Authentication weakness in Apple’s DEP could open a window of opportunity for attackers.

Researchers have discovered a security flaw in the authentication process of the Apple Device Enrollment Program (DEP), an Apple service that helps enterprises enroll iOS, macOS, and tvOS devices in mobile device management systems.

The problem is centered around the authentication required (or not required) for those enrolled devices.

“The vulnerability lets someone send a valid Apple serial number to the server and retrieve the DEP profile,” says James Barclay, senior RD Engineer and lead analyst at Duo Labs, which found the bug.

And that doesn’t necessarily mean that the attacker has seen the devices. “The key space is small enough that the attacker could conceivably generate brute-force numbers and submit them in bulk until they get a valid response,” explains Barclay. While the DEP profile contains information on networks and privileges that could be useful to expand an attack, the news could be much worse for some organizations with specific MDM configurations.

“Many configurations of MDM don’t require further information on the system it’s recording,” says Rich Smith, director of Duo Labs. “If the MDM server doesn’t have authentication requirements, an organization that’s dispensing the certificates for their VPN through the MDM server could see an attacker be enrolled, get the certificate and VPN configuration information, and be an authorized device in the network.”

And at that point, the malicious device is free to roam the network doing its dirty work with little to slow it down, he says.

As of the time of this posting, there is no evidence that this attack has been used in the wild, Smith says.

Duo Labs, which detailed its findings in a blog post published today, followed a 90-day disclosure policy for the vulnerability, notifying Apple approximately 3 months before issuing their report. Duo will not publicly release the code to exploit the vulnerability, Smith says.

Remediating the vulnerability is not something an individual customer can do much about, Smith says. “It’s less a bug and more a flaw; the serial number as the only information used to authenticate a device is the source of the issue.”

“Fixing a flaw may be more complex than fixing a bug,” he notes.

The serial number is not sufficient for authentication, he says. It’s not a “strong enough form of authentication to provide the properties we’d like to see for enrolling in an organization’s fleet,” Smith says.

Meanwhile, Apple may not have to release a patch for the flaw to users. Barclay points out that the issue exists in server-based code within Apple; remediation may happen at any time, with little or no notice to users of the service. Apple has not yet responded publicly about the flaw.

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Black Hat Europe returns to London Dec 3-6 2018  with hands-on technical Trainings, cutting-edge Briefings, Arsenal open-source tool demonstrations, top-tier security solutions and service providers in the Business Hall. Click for information on the conference and to register.

Curtis Franklin Jr. is Senior Editor at Dark Reading. In this role he focuses on product and technology coverage for the publication. In addition he works on audio and video programming for Dark Reading and contributes to activities at Interop ITX, Black Hat, INsecurity, and … View Full Bio

Article source: https://www.darkreading.com/threat-intelligence/security-flaw-found-in-apple-mobile-device-enrollment-program-/d/d-id/1332920?_mc=rss_x_drr_edt_aud_dr_x_x-rss-simple