STE WILLIAMS

State Department scores an F on 2FA security

Five Senators have discovered that the State Department is breaking the law by not using multi-factor authentication (MFA or 2FA) in its emails. They’ve sent a letter to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, and they want answers.

The letter, from Senators Ron Wyden, Cory Gardner, Edward Markey, Rand Paul and Jeanne Shaheen, referenced reports from federal auditors that the Department of State was failing to meet basic federal cybersecurity standards.

The General Services Administration (GSA), which is the US department dealing with government procurement, property management and information delivery, analysed federal cybersecurity this year, stated the letter.

The GSA’s report found that the Department of State had deployed “enhanced access controls” across just 11% of required agency devices.

MFA or 2FA requires users to enter a second piece of information along with their password. This is linked to a physical asset that only they hold, thwarting imposters trying to steal their accounts remotely. That second piece of information could be biometric, such as your fingerprint; a hardware key, such as Google’s recently-announced dongle; or a code delivered to a mobile phone.

Federal agencies in the Executive Branch are legally required to enable 2FA for any accounts with elevated privileges under the Federal Cybersecurity Enhancement Act, passed as part of an omnibus spending bill in December 2015.

This wasn’t the only blot on Pompeo’s copybook, according to the Senators. They said that according to the Department of State’s Inspector General, one third of diplomatic missions failed to conduct…

…even the most basic cyber threat management practices, like regular reviews and audits.

Penetration testers also successfully hacked email accounts along with applications and operating systems at the Department, the letter said. It added:

We are sure you will agree on the need to protect American diplomacy from cyberattacks, which is why we have such a hard time understanding why the Department of State has not followed the lead of many other agencies and complied with federal law requiring agency use of MFA.

The Senators demanded that Pompeo’s Department respond by October 12, telling it what actions it has taken to remediate the classification of its cyber-readiness as “high-risk” by the White House’s Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Although not explicitly mentioned, the letter is likely referring to a May OMB report on cybersecurity that categorised almost three quarters of the 96 Federal agencies as at risk or high risk.

The letter also asked what the Department of State has done to fix the “near total absence” of MFA-enabled accounts, and asked for statistics detailing the number of cyberattacks against Department of State systems located abroad.

The importance of MFA shouldn’t come as a surprise to the State Department. In February 2016, then-President Obama announced federal initiatives to improve cyber security awareness, including a national 2FA awareness campaign.

Unfortunately, not many people outside the government seem to be paying attention either. MFA is readily available to many consumer email users, including Gmail’s one billion users.

Seven years after Google introduced two-step verification (its own implementation of MFA), fewer than one in 10 people use it, according to one of its engineers.

It seems that Joe Public is even further behind the Department of State in the account security stakes.


Article source: http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/nakedsecurity/~3/x-fNE4UrZ6g/

TV Licensing admits: We directed 25,000 people to send their bank details in the clear

The UK’s TV Licensing agency has admitted that 25,000 viewers were induced into sending their bank details over an insecure connection.

tv television cable cableco entertainment netflix hbo

HTTPS crypto-shame: TV Licensing website pulled offline

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The organisation ran transactional pages for bank debits through an insecure connection before being called out on the practice earlier this month.

In response to criticism by techie Mark Cook and others as well as press criticism in The Register and elsewhere, the publicly funded agency temporarily took its website offline as it migrated everything over to HTTPS.

TV Licensing already had an HTTPS website but it was running an HTTP site in parallel hosting forms that invited the submission of sensitive personal information. This issue ran from 29 August until around 3.20pm on 5 September 2018, as per the FAQ. Running an insecure version of its site simply to provide information in this era of HTTPS ubiquity would have been inadvisable, but TV Licensing went far beyond that.

The agency pushed to get the insecure site to appear at the top of search engine rankings and there was no attempt to redirect users over to HTTPS, even when it came to filling out sensitive bank direct debit payment application forms, as The Register previously reported.

Privacy, performance and search optimisation be damned. The setup was wrong-headed and TV Licensing compounded its errors by initially ignoring complaints from infosec types.

Its online support staff at one point even told surfers to ignore any warning Chrome might throw up because of the HTTP page, as evidenced below.

Card payments were managed by an external provider and always went over HTTPS.

TV Licensing eventually admitted the error of its ways. On Monday, it supplied a post-slip-up statement admitting that 25,000 customers had been sent down an insecure route for submitting their bank details, lower than initial estimates of 40,000.

We can now confirm that fewer than 25k customer sent over unencrypted bank details and that credit and debit cards numbers were always secure. We mailed 40k people who may have entered bank details and sort codes as a precaution but we’ve now been able to confirm that the actual number was much lower.

The UK’s National Cyber Security Centre has recommended that websites should use HTTPS “even if they don’t include private content, sign-in pages, or credit card details”.

Any information submitted to an unencrypted site might be stumbled upon by hackers. An unencrypted site might also be more easily targeted by people impersonating others and some forms of man-in-the-middle attacks.

TV Licensing has started to contact affected customers directly. Its support service has been telling people to be wary about phishing emails. ®

Article source: http://go.theregister.com/feed/www.theregister.co.uk/2018/09/18/tv_licensing_encryption/

C’mon, biz: Give white hats a chance to tell you how screwed you are

There have never been more white-hat researchers hunting for vulnerabilities on internet-facing systems and yet barely any organisations provide a way for them to report the issues they find.

In theory, the easiest way is to publish a Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (VDP), yet recent research here and here (PDFs) from bug bounty outfit HackerOne showed that only 7 per cent of Forbes 2000 companies advertise a process that could be as simple as providing an email address and PGP key.

Some sectors were better than others, with financial services a surprising laggard. In the money sector, 93 per cent of businesses have no VDP compared to 76 per cent for telecoms and 53 per cent for tech, and yet the overall situation is still extraordinary given that such policies are a zero-cost security upgrade.

Whether confidence or complacency, it’s not as if corporations haven’t been told that VDPs should be a priority, with the US Department of Justice (DoJ) recommending them as standard issue for all industries as far back as 2017.

Beyond the vuln disclosure policy lies the bug bounty – and here even wealthy sectors such as financial services seem reluctant to invest, with the average reward from HackerOne’s programmes averaging only $1,118 per flaw, well below the tech sector.

The reticence of financial services companies was cultural, according to HackerOne security engineer Laurie Mercer. “The idea of someone outside this organisation submitting a vulnerability report to them is quite alien.”

This was despite these companies having mature security practices internally. “The exception is the new generation of fintech companies that often will have a VDP or bug bounty programme,” he said.

“One of the challenges companies face is that their software development lifecycle is still a waterfall approach with long latencies. If all of a sudden you switch to this method of receiving vulnerability reports almost at random, what do you do with them? A lot of companies just aren’t ready to embrace this change.”

The effect of lower bug bounties in the finance sector was that researchers would focus their attention elsewhere. A growing area of vulnerability is unintentional information disclosure, which HackerOne’s figures show now account for 18 per cent of financial services sector vulnerability reports.

“It’s a lot easier to make a mistake leading to a security configuration such as allowing read access to anyone,” said Mercer. Because this type of vulnerability involves access to sensitive data, it can be among the most difficult to report to companies lacking a clear process. “If they don’t see a policy, they worry they might get in trouble.”

While VDPs can be simple reporting mechanisms, big companies are increasingly fashioning more comprehensive ones in an attempt to give researchers legal reassurance. One example is Dropbox, which earlier this year started advertising its VDP as a template it said any company could adopt.

Pen-testing struggle

And yet according to Dutch pen-testing company Blueprint Cyber Security, having a VDP is no guarantee of plain sailing.

“It’s a real hit-or-miss when disclosing vulnerabilities directly to the organisation. They have a responsible disclosure policy and we follow the rules of engagement and disclosure, but they could still react with legal threats or escalate the situation instead of fixing the issue,” said managing director Michael Gesner. “Researchers in our network have approached us in the past to be a go-between to reduce their risk of being penalised for their discovery.”

Unfortunately, a lot of companies publish a policy on their website but fail to manage it, while others remain nervous about the motivations behind vulnerability researchers they know little about. But even well-run programmes require resources to technically validate submissions and to communicate, as well as issue bounties where appropriate.

Gesner believes that the uncertainty on both sides will only end when managed vulnerability disclosure programmes – including HackerOne’s – become commonplace, possibly backed by new legislation to protect researchers.

“These platforms are vital for researchers as [they] completely reduce the risk of legal actions, as long as they have followed the guidelines provided by the associated organisation.” ®

Article source: http://go.theregister.com/feed/www.theregister.co.uk/2018/09/18/financial_services_vulnerablity_disclosure_policies/

Oh Smeg! Hacked white goods maker resurfaces after system shutdown

The Brit limb of unfortunately named and reassuringly expensive domestic appliance maker Smeg is up on its feet again after being hacked.

The firm said yesterday it was “back up and running” after an “unfortunate cyber attack” that hit Wednesday 12 September.

Smeg admitted it took internal systems offline in response to a “targeted cyber attack”, adding that it didn’t think customer information had been exposed.

In response to questions from The Register, the white goods maker reaffirmed that customer data had not been exposed. The attack against its system has been reported to the police, it added.

Unfortunately Smeg has been the victim of a targeted cyber-attack that resulted in the company making the decision to shut down its systems to protect its infrastructure. The National Crime Agency is leading the criminal investigation into the cyber incident affecting Smeg. These investigations are complex and take time before full details can be established.

Smeg and the National Crime Agency are pleased to confirm we have no reason to believe customer’s personal or financial information has been compromised. All customers, however, should continue to remain vigilant. Any suspicious activity should be reported to Action Fraud via www.actionfraud.police.uk.

We continue to slowly get the business back online and are dealing with communications as quickly as possible. Our business continuity plan is now in full swing.

Deliveries started again yesterday, said Smeg, “We kindly ask for your patience while we continue…to recover fully”.

Data breach guru Troy Hunt told El Reg that he hadn’t seen any evidence of customer leakage, another positive sign. The nature of the attack is unclear with some form of malware outbreak or denial of service assault among the possibilities. Smeg is yet to respond to a request from El Reg for clarification.

Bootnote

Smeg is the all-purpose swear word in sci-fi sitcom Red Dwarf as well as the name of a white goods manufacturer.

Article source: http://go.theregister.com/feed/www.theregister.co.uk/2018/09/18/smeg_cyber_attack/

Putting the privilege back into access management

Promo At 2pm UK we’ve got a live broadcast in which we speak to privileged access management vendor Thycotic about new research, showing how much of a challenge privileged account management is for enterprises of all shapes and sizes. We look at the anatomy of a privileged account hack, showing how cybercriminals target their victims.

Most importantly, we look at what’s driving the challenges, and alongside potential tools and technologies, we consider what you can do to reduce your risk and prevent abuse of your critical information.

So, if you’re looking at how to manage accounts on a by-privilege basis, or you simply want to get your head around how to slay your access management demons and don’t know where to start, tune in.

Article source: http://go.theregister.com/feed/www.theregister.co.uk/2018/09/18/putting_the_privilege_back_into_access_management/

Just 13 – no, er, make that 3,200 punters hit in Oz’s Perth Mint hack

A computer security breach at Perth Mint first thought to have affected just 13 customers turned out to be more widespread – with more than 3,000 punters now screwed over by hackers.

Last week, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation reported barely more than two handfuls of users of the mint’s online repository were hit in the cyber-break-in.

The Western Australian-government-owned Perth Mint is Oz’s bullion mint, and its repository is the customers buy-and-sell trading platform for precious metals.

The organisation launched an investigation into the network intrusion, and as part of that, CEO Richard Hayes yesterday announced the security breach involved 3,200 customers.

Hayes’ announcement stated: “As previously advised, ongoing forensic investigations continue and we were made aware of this development over the weekend. We have moved quickly to contact the affected Depository Online customers in order to protect their interests.“

Hayes attributed the security failings to a third party provider, and said the mint’s internal systems have not been compromised.

Affected customers had their personal information breached, the mint said, but “we have again assured our customers that their investments are unaffected and remain safe and secure”.

The mint also said it believes it’s now identified the full scope of the breach, with Hayes saying he was “confident that no data belonging to any other investors or customers had been accessed”.

The Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Western Australian Police, and the Australian Federal Police have been notified.

One punter told Vulture South that users’ entire profiles leaked, and that the mint is advising those affected to look for suspect transactions in their bank accounts. We have asked the mint for confirmation. ®

Article source: http://go.theregister.com/feed/www.theregister.co.uk/2018/09/18/perth_mint_data_breach/

Perth Mint leaks 13 accounts in data breach. No, make that 3,200

A data breach at Perth Mint first thought to have affected 13 customers turned out to be more widespread, with more than 3,000 customers breached.

Vulture South ignored the story when it broke, because of the small scale of what was reported. Last week, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation reported a small-scale breach affecting users of the mint’s online repository.

The WA-governmnt-owned Perth Mint is Australia’s bullion mint, and its repository is the customers buy-and-sell trading platform for precious metals.

The organisation launched an investigation into the original breach, and as part of that, CEO Richard Hayes yesterday announced the breach involved 3,200 customers.

Hayes’ announcement stated: “As previously advised, ongoing forensic investigations continue and we were made aware of this development over the weekend. We have moved quickly to contact the affected Depository Online customers in order to protect their interests.“

Hayes attributed the breach to a third party provider, and said the mint’s internal systems have not been compromised.

Affected customers had their personal information breached, the mint said, but “we have again assured our customers that their investments are unaffected and remain safe and secure”.

The mint also said it believes it’s now identified the full scope of the breach, with Hayes saying he was “confident that no data belonging to any other investors or customers had been accessed”.

The Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Western Australian Police, and the Australian Federal Police have been notified.

A user has told Vulture South that users’ entire profiles leaked, and that the mint is advising those affected to look for suspect transactions in their bank accounts. We have asked the mint for confirmation. ®

Article source: http://go.theregister.com/feed/www.theregister.co.uk/2018/09/18/perth_mint_leaks_13_accounts_in_data_breach_no_make_that_3200/

RDP Ports Prove Hot Commodities on the Dark Web

Remote desktop protocol access continues to thrive in underground markets, primarily to hackers who lack expertise to find exposed ports themselves.

Security trends come and go, but the sale of Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) ports continues to thrive on the Dark Web as malicious hackers seek easier means of gaining access to corporate networks.

RDP is a Microsoft protocol and client interface used on several platforms including Windows, where it has been a native OS feature since Windows XP. Most of the time, RDP is used for legitimate remote administration: when companies outsource IT, or remote admins have to access a colleague’s machine, they most commonly use RDP to connect to it.

But the same technologies that enable administrators to access remote machines can give hackers the keys they need to break into, move around, and steal data from enterprise targets.

“It really goes with the entire story of this growing crime-as-a-service market,” says Ed Cabrera, chief cybersecurity officer at Trend Micro. The buying and selling of RDP credentials – like any other credentials bought and sold on the criminal underground – has evolved from one-stop shop transactional forums to a decentralized, specialized marketplace, he says. Attackers can buy RDP credentials in bulk or they can seek out data they need to target specific industries.

There are many actions a threat actor can take with RDP access (credential harvesting, account takeover, cryptocurrency mining among them) and it’s easier for them to launch these threats if they have access to an RDP port. Skilled attackers often find the ports themselves by scanning infrastructure exposed to the Internet and using brute force to access open ports. Automated tools and the Shodan search engine help them find systems configured for RDP access online.

Still, many threat actors of all skill levels buy RDP access on the Dark Web, where the ports are hot commodities, as are tools to delete attackers’ activity once their work is done.

“Knockoff versions of some popular tools proliferate as well once the original developers decide to no longer support their tools,” write Flashpoint’s Luke Rodeheffer, cybercrime intelligence analyst, and Mike Mimoso, editorial director, in a blog post on the topic. The tools continue to generate interest on Dark Web forums, primarily Russian-speaking marketplaces, according to Flashpoint.

How much will attackers spend on these credentials? It depends what they’re looking for. Earlier this year, researchers on the McAfee Advanced Research Team found RDP access for a major international airport was being sold via Russian RDP shop UAS for the low price of $10. However, actors may pay more for access to specific sectors and/or high-value targets.

Chet Wisniewski, principal research scientist in Sophos’ Office of the CTO, says the quantities of RDP ports available on the Dark Web have kept prices low, “almost identical to what we see with stolen credit cards,” he says. “Same with RDP, there are tens of thousands of open RDP systems across the Internet.”

So You Have RDP Credentials. Now What?

Once they have RDP credentials, an attacker can use their access to launch several attacks. Stolen usernames and passwords mark the initial attack vector in just about every cyberattack, Cabrera says, noting they help start phishing campaigns, ransomware, and data breaches. RDP access helps attackers target server infrastructure directly.

“If I get access to a server, to RDP, I can just launch the Web browser that’s built in and download anything and everything I want to build on that system,” says Wisniewski. It doesn’t take an advanced attacker to abuse RDP; as he puts it, “even the dumbest criminal” can do a reasonable amount of damage.

Once they’re inside, attackers typically target the passwords of admin accounts to maximize their system access. They might download and install low-level system tweaking software and use it to disable or reconfigure anti-malware software on the machine, Sophos researchers explained in a post on RDP and ransomware distribution. They may also turn off database services to leave files vulnerable, or upload and run their choice of ransomware.

“If it’s handy for a system administrator, it’s handy for a hacker,” Wisniewski adds. If you have remote control software facing the Internet, any attacker can find and abuse it.

However, advanced attackers can do more damage with the same level of access.

Hotter Targets, Higher Prices

Less skilled attackers are more likely to purchase bulk RDP access on the Dark Web, Wisniewski adds, because they lack expertise to find open ports. Skilled hackers are more likely to seek out and purchase credentials to high-value targets; for example, defense contractors.

“It’s not only identifying and selling in bulk,” says Cabrera. “I think what’s happening with RDP credentials, like other services and commodities, is that the criminals today are becoming a little more sophisticated in what they’re looking for.” Instead of selling credentials in bulk, they can categorize them and provide guaranteed persistence or system access.

Someone who finds 100 exposed RDP servers can instead of selling access on a forum for $10 each, figure out who they belong to, says Wisniewski. Low-value credentials sell in bulk for cheap, but high-value targets can go for markedly higher prices – up to tens of thousands of dollars. The high dollar value is limited to adversaries who want that specific access.

Oftentimes high-value targets are sold by attackers who harvested many RDP ports, conducted reconnaissance, and recognized they had something valuable but didn’t want to risk exploiting it and facing criminal penalties. Rather than risk jail time, they take their findings to the Dark Web in hopes a more skilled attacker will want to buy it, he continues.

Cybercriminals are serving other criminals and becoming more sophisticated in the offerings they’re able to provide, Cabrera explains. Not every criminal enterprise is the same, and those that provide the best services and commodities will continue to grow. “It is incredibly valuable for [RDP] to be sold in the criminal underground,” he says.

How to Stay Safe: Get Offline

“The way you know it’s been compromised is it’s on the Internet at all,” says Wisniewski. Under no circumstances should RDP ports be exposed online, and they should always go through a VPN and be protected with multi-factor authentication.

“That’s table stakes for 2018,” he continues. “If it’s on the Internet, someone’s going to make money with it.

He advises companies to lock down their servers so they have fewer capabilities if and when they are compromised. Make sure any system that is exposed, or available via VPN, is locked down so it can’t access critical systems. Most organizations are smart enough to be scanning their own network interfaces to ensure they’re offline, he says.

Breaching networks and servers via RDP ports remains of great interest to cybercriminals, according to Flashpoint, and there is a clear trend toward automating the process of detecting exposed RDP targets and brute-forcing access. The company recommends using complex passwords for RDP instances and avoiding relying on default or weak credentials.

“Flashpoint assesses with high confidence that cybercriminals will likely continue to use such automated technology to obtain illicit RDP access, breach servers, and remove traces of their activity,” Flashpoint’s blog says. Flashpoint predicts “with moderate confidence” that the potential for RDP access tools in cryptomining will drive their popularity among criminals.

Related Content:

Black Hat Europe returns to London Dec 3-6 2018  with hands-on technical Trainings, cutting-edge Briefings, Arsenal open-source tool demonstrations, top-tier security solutions and service providers in the Business Hall. Click for information on the conference and to register.

Kelly Sheridan is the Staff Editor at Dark Reading, where she focuses on cybersecurity news and analysis. She is a business technology journalist who previously reported for InformationWeek, where she covered Microsoft, and Insurance Technology, where she covered financial … View Full Bio

Article source: https://www.darkreading.com/endpoint/rdp-ports-prove-hot-commodities-on-the-dark-web/d/d-id/1332830?_mc=rss_x_drr_edt_aud_dr_x_x-rss-simple

New Xbash Malware a Cocktail of Malicious Functions

The new malware tool targeting Windows and Linux systems combines cryptomining, ransomware, botnet, and self-propagation capabilities.

Adding to the rapidly growing list of multi-functional malware, a particularly nasty – and unique — data-destroying malware tool has been discovered that combines botnet, coin mining, ransomware, and self-propagation capabilities.

The malware, which researchers at Palo Alto Network’s Unit 42 group has named Xbash, is targeting Linux and Windows servers and contains capabilities that when fully implemented can help it spread very quickly inside an organization’s network.

Researchers from Palo Alto Network say their analysis shows the malware is being used to target Linux servers for their ransomware and botnet capabilities, and Windows servers for coin mining and self-propagation purposes.

Xbash’s ransomware capabilities are designed to target and delete Linux-based databases. Worse, the malware appears to contain no functionality at all for helping victims recover lost data in the event they end up paying the demanded ransom.

So far, at least 48 victims have paid a total of $6,000 to the attackers, but there is no evidence that any of them were able to recover data that Xbash might have deleted, Palo Alto Networks said in an advisory Monday.

“Taken as a whole, we’ve not [before] seen this combination of ransomware, coinmining, worm capabilities, and targeting both Linux and Windows systems,” says Ryan Olson, vice president of threat intelligence at Unit 42.

The malware appears to be the work of Iron Group, a threat actor associated with previous ransomware attacks and for spreading cryptocurrency mining tools mostly in Windows environments. With Xbash, the group appears to have broadened their targets to include Linux systems as well.

Unlike other recent Linux malware such as Gafgyt and Mirai, which scan for vulnerable devices using randomly generated IP addresses, Xbash scans for them also by domain name. The capability makes it harder for defenders to spot Xbash using honeypots, which are typically deployed with IP addresses only.

“Xbash uses a list of IP addresses and domains provided by its C2 to scan for specific open ports, weak credentials, or three known vulnerabilities in Hadoop, Redis and ActiveMQ — which it uses for self-propagation,” Olson notes.

Two of the three vulnerabilities have no formal CVE number assigned to them. One of them is an unauthenticated command execution flaw in Hadoop YARN that was first disclosed in October 2016; the Redis flaw is from October 2015 and gives attackers a way to remotely execute files of their choice on a target machine. The third-flaw — n Active MQ — enables arbitrary file writes and has an assigned CVE number (CVE-2016-3088).

When it is exploiting a vulnerable Redis instance, Xbash is capable of determining whether it is running on a Windows system so the malware can then download and execute a coinminer it.

If the target that Xbash is scanning happens to be an IP address, it tries to scan multiple UDP and TCP ports. Among them are ports used by HTTP services, VMC, MySQL, Telnet, FTP, NTP, DNS and LDAP. If certain ports happen to be open—such as those used by VNC, MySQL and PostgreSQL—the malware uses a weak username and password dictionary—to brute force its way into the service.

 “Xbash uses weak passwords in its attacks against both Windows systems and Linux services,” Olson says. “It uses both a built-in dictionary and also updates from its C2 server with an additional set of weak passwords.”

When Xbash breaks into a service such as MySQL or MongoDB, it immediately deletes almost all the databases on the server and serves up a ransom message. “Because the malware deletes the databases based on brute forcing weak credentials for specific services, it could also happen on Windows with the same open ports/services and weak credentials,” Olson warns.

Shades of WannaCry, NotPetya

The samples of Xbash that researchers at Palo Alto Networks analyzed show that the authors of Xbash are developing a new capability that will let the malware scan infected networks for other vulnerable servers. The capability has not yet been enabled, but if it is, Xbash will be able to spread quickly within an infected network like the WannaCray and Petya/NotPetya ransomware did.

For organizations, multi-functional and highly modular malware tools are quickly becoming a new threat. In recent weeks, several security vendors have issued warnings about malware tools capable of carrying out multiple malicious functions or of being modified after installation to do different things.

Proofpoint, for instance, recently warned about AdvisorsBot and Marap, two modular tools that allow criminals to add new functions to malware that has already been installed on a system. In an August advisory, Kaspersky Lab said it had observed a near doubling of multipurpose Remote Access Tools being distributed via botnets over the past 18 months or so, from 6.5% to 12.2%.

The trend highlights the need for a more high-level approach to defending against threats. “Organizations and defenders are better off focusing on prevention than specific threats,” Olson notes. “A threat-based approach against Xbash would require multiple threats against multiple vectors, which is not scalable and is inherently advantageous to the attackers.”

Related Content:

Black Hat Europe returns to London Dec 3-6 2018  with hands-on technical Trainings, cutting-edge Briefings, Arsenal open-source tool demonstrations, top-tier security solutions and service providers in the Business Hall. Click for information on the conference and to register.

Jai Vijayan is a seasoned technology reporter with over 20 years of experience in IT trade journalism. He was most recently a Senior Editor at Computerworld, where he covered information security and data privacy issues for the publication. Over the course of his 20-year … View Full Bio

Article source: https://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/new-xbash-malware-a-cocktail-of-malicious-functions/d/d-id/1332831?_mc=rss_x_drr_edt_aud_dr_x_x-rss-simple

Vote now! Which web browser do you trust the most?

You take your web browser with you wherever you go on the web. Amongst other things, it knows what you see and when; it tags along when you visit your friends on social media; goes with you to the bank; helps you book your holidays; and aids and abets you in pursuing your internet vices.

But how much do you trust it?

It’s a question we like to ask our readers from time to time because when it comes to browsers, trust is important and it’s… well, it’s complicated.

We put a tremendous amount of trust in browsers simply by using them. We trust them to protect us from exploits, drive-by malware and phishing. Many of us also trust third party browser plugins to protect us from ads, trackers and malicious scripts (while trusting the browser to protect us from rogue third party plugins with their own ads, trackers and malicious scripts).

The trouble is, the only companies that can afford to produce such complicated and costly software, for free, are the ones we seem to trust the least.

Judging by comments left on Naked Security, many of you think that Google doesn’t live up to “don’t be evil”; Microsoft will never recover from the 1990s; Mozilla has sold out to Google’s ad money; Apple’s sheen is wearing off; and Tor can’t escape its military roots

The feature set we expect from web browsers is largely settled and so, for the last decade or more, they’ve competed with each other based on speed, privacy and security.

Since our last poll ad handling has been added to the list, as responsibility for what to do about online ads starts to migrate from third plugins into the browsers themselves.

Brave, an entirely new browser, is built around the idea that if it can effectively filter out bad ads, we won’t mind seeing good ones. Unsurprisingly Google Chrome, a browser built by an advertising company, is backing the same filter-don’t-block approach. Meanwhile, Firefox has announced plans to block the tracking that targeted ads rely on by default.

The threat of malicious plugins has loomed large in the last couple of years too. Both Firefox and Chrome have had to withdraw malicious plugins from their stores, while Chrome will soon make it impossible to get ad-ons from outside of the Web Store.

Let’s talk about trust

This is neither a scientific poll nor an attempt to objectively measure browser security. This about how you feel, and who and what you are willing to trust. The poll is here to gauge the temperature and provoke discussion about our attitudes to the software we rely on and the companies that make it.

So, while our poll asks, simply, “Which browser do you trust the most?” we would love to know more about what you think after you’ve voted, so please leave a comment too.

(If the embedded poll doesn’t appear, you can view it on the Poll Daddy website)


Article source: http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/nakedsecurity/~3/ois0CYcpRxw/