STE WILLIAMS

Ever seen printer malware in action? Install this HP Ink patch – or you may find out

HP Inc has posted an update to address a pair of serious security vulnerabilities in its InkJet printers.

The firmware update patches CVE-2018-5924 and CVE-2018-5925, two flaws that can be exploited by printing a file that triggers a stack or static buffer overflow, giving you the ability to then execute malicious code on the targeted printer. Discovery of the bugs was credited to HP’s in-house Product Security Response Team.

In total, HP says the patch will need to be applied to some 225 different models of inkjet printers across its Pagewide, DesignJet, OfficeJet, Deskjet, and HP Envy product lines.

Expect to see more of this going forward. HP Inc recently opened up a bug bounty program to bring more researchers into the fold and find printer bugs before they can turn into zero-day exploits.

That bug bounty program, announced earlier this week in partnership with Bugcrowd, will see the printers n’ PCs side of the Hewlett Packard break-up offer researchers up to $10,000 apiece for reporting security vulnerabilities.

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The aim, says HP print security chief technologist Shivaun Albright, is to keep HP printers protected from the growing crop of botnets and malware packages that target printers and other internet-facing device that have traditionally had little to no security protection in place.

“As we navigate an increasingly complex world of cyber threats, it’s paramount that industry leaders leverage every resource possible to deliver trusted, resilient security from the firmware up,” Albright said.

“HP is committed to engineering the most secure printers in the world.”

The bug bounty program also gives HP another point for an ongoing marketing push the vendor is making to enterprise customers around the security of its printer line.

HP said that not only will it be handing out bounty payments for previously unknown bugs, but also “good faith” payouts to researchers who report bugs that HP itself had already discovered, but not gotten around to patching and disclosing yet. ®

Article source: http://go.theregister.com/feed/www.theregister.co.uk/2018/08/03/hp_printer_malware/

How safe is your DNA data?

As concerns mount over DNA privacy, a group of DNA collection and genealogy websites has released a set of best practice guidelines for handling sensitive genetic and family data. Will it give consumers much more protection though? Probably not.

23andMe, Ancestry, Helix, MyHeritage, and Habit worked with the Future of Privacy Forum to release the guidelines, which explain how to handle information about a family’s genetic makeup. Sites like 23AndMe offer genetic tests to consumers who send in a simple saliva swab. They can then use this to tell you about your ancestry and to let you know about genetic health risks.

The guidelines apply to any data about an individual’s inherited genetic characteristics. This includes three types: Data that comes directly from sequencing a person’s DNA, data that a company can create by analyzing that raw data (such as particular gene information or data about physical characteristics) and finally data that a person reports about their own health conditions.

The document broadly replicates many of the rules laid down by the EU’s General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR), which any company holding data on EU residents is already beholden to. It also draws on other guidance, including the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act.

It includes statements on accountability (companies should release reports on what they’re doing with peoples’ data) and privacy by design (implementing technical controls to support the other rules) among others. It also says:

Genetic Data, by definition linked to an identifiable person, should not be disclosed or made accessible to third parties, in particular, employers, insurance companies, educational institutions, or government agencies, except as required by law or with the separate express consent of the person concerned.

This document still leaves some privacy concerns. Let’s start with the timing of its release.

The companies have released the guidelines because genetic data is so sensitive, they say. It can be used to predict future medical conditions, reveal information about someone’s family members, or have cultural significance for groups of individuals.

A couple of days before the guidelines dropped, 23AndMe announced a deal with GlaxoSmithKline, effectively selling a heap of client data for a $300m investment.

Under the deal, the pharma giant gets access to de-identified data for research purposes. That is, data that doesn’t allow information to be “reasonably be associated with an individual”.

The guidelines released this week explain that none of the best practices apply to this de-identified data.

Deidentified information is not subject to the restrictions in this policy, provided that the deidentification measures taken establish strong assurance that the data is not identifiable.

Is a “strong assurance” enough to protect you?

In some cases, researchers can re-identify data. Consider this project, from 2013, in which a Harvard professor re-identified over 40% of the people in a high-profile DNA study. The guidelines recommend aggregating data before de-identifying it to make the protections strong enough.

That fact is that anonymising or de-identifying data in the era of Big Data is hard.

You have to complete a consent form for 23AndMe to use your data as part of its research programme, which would include giving it to Glaxo, but even if you don’t sign that form, it may still be given to other people. 23AndMe already has a privacy policy in place, which explicitly says that if you don’t consent to research, it can still share your genetic information with third party service providers.

The guidelines mirror this policy, requiring express consent for:

Onward transfer of individual level information (i.e., Genetic Data and/or personal information about a single individual) to third parties for any reason, excluding vendors and service providers.

That’s a pretty big exclusion. What are vendors and service providers, just for the record? From the guidelines:

Vendors and service providers are companies that act under the direct authority of the data controller or processor and are authorized to process personal data in support of providing the data controller’s commercial product or service.

What kinds of company might that include? The documents don’t specify.

How governments use DNA data

Those providing their DNA and/or ancestry data to companies may also have other privacy concerns based on law enforcement’s use of that data. The best practice guide allows DNA and genealogy sites to give data to law enforcement when they ask for it.

Perhaps they’re worried about the spate of recent stories highlighting just how sensitive this data is. The most famous case is the Golden State Killer, a serial killer, rapist and burglar who was active from 1974 until 1986. Law enforcement used DNA evidence to help unmask Joseph James DeAngelo Jr as the main suspect.

Detectives submitted DNA from a 1978 crime scene to GedMatch, a website that lets people upload their genetic profile from commercial DNA companies, and also their GEDCOM file, which is a standard file format used to hold genealogical data. They used this information to match the crime scene DNA with information provided by a relative of DeAngelo’s.

This technique has also been used to find identity thieves, and other murderers and sex criminals.

The use of DNA is raising concerns about privacy. On one hand, everyone wants to see killers and rapists jailed. On the other hand, people worry about misuse of the technology. Even GedMatch warned after the DeAngelo incident that people should understand the risks involved with submitting their personal genetic and genealogical data.

Police officers have in the past forced companies to hand over genetic data as part of investigations, and California has a law that allows the state to collect DNA from any child or adult convicted of a felony or any adult arrested for a felony.

Governments are using the data for other purposes, too. Canada’s border agency has been found using DNA testing and ancestry web sites to investigate immigrants.

What does all this mean for people considering using these sites? The choice to participate in these services is always in the hands of the individual, but it should be an informed choice.

As always consider how much of your own data that you want to expose and weigh the potential privacy risks against the benefits (in this case, finding out more about your health and history).

This means not just checking out the best practice document but wading through the language in the service providers’ own privacy policy to be sure that you understand what they mean. These are commercial sites, and in many cases could be making their use of the data far clearer.

If you do decide to avail yourself of these services, make sure that you adjust the privacy settings in your account to reflect your wishes, rather than simply trusting that the vendor has your best interests at heart.


Article source: http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/nakedsecurity/~3/-0E119FQVI8/

Alleged “high-ranking” members of the Fin7 cybercrime group arrested

The DOJ announced on Wednesday that three alleged, “high-ranking” members of the notorious Fin7 cybercrime organization have been arrested.

According to three federal indictments, Ukrainian nationals Dmytro Fedorov, 44, Fedir Hladyr, 33, and Andrii Kolpakov, 30, are allegedly members of a prolific, professional, highly adaptable hacking group widely known as Fin7, though it’s also referred to as the Carbanak Group and the Navigator Group, among many other names.

The DOJ says that since 2015, Fin7 has engaged in “a highly sophisticated malware campaign” targeting more than 100 US companies, predominantly in the restaurant, gaming, and hospitality industries, hacking into thousands of computer systems and stealing millions of customer credit and debit card numbers in order to sell them.

Security groups have been tracking the actors for longer than that, however: the thinking is that Fin7 evolved from malware campaigns between 2013 and 2015 that used the banking Trojans Carberp and Anunak to attack financial institutions.

Fin7 doesn’t just work in the US, but the DOJ says that just its US sprees alone have included raids on the networks of companies in 47 states and the District of Columbia, with the theft of more than 15 million credit card records from 6,500 Point-of-Sale (PoS) terminals at more than 3,600 separate business locations.

The organization has also ransacked computer networks in the UK, Australia and France. Publicly disclosed hacks attributable to Fin7 include Chipotle Mexican Grill, Chili’s, Arby’s, Red Robin and Jason’s Deli.

Each of the three Fin7 suspects is charged with 26 felony counts alleging conspiracy, wire fraud, computer hacking, access device fraud, and aggravated identity theft. Two of the suspects – Fedir Hladyr and Dmytro Fedorov – were arrested by foreign police in January 2018 at the request of the US.

Hladyr allegedly served as Fin7’s sysadmin: his alleged duties were maintaining servers and the organization’s communication channels, and he was also a manager who delegated tasks to, and trained, his hacker underlings. Hladyr was arrested in Dresden, Germany, and is now in prison in Seattle, awaiting his 22 October trial.

The DOJ described Fedorov as a top hacker who also allegedly supervised other hackers. He was arrested in Bielsko-Biala, Poland. Fedorov’s in custody in Poland pending extradition to the US.

The third alleged Fin7 member is Andrii Kolpakov, who Spanish police arrested in Lepe in June. Kolpakov was allegedly a supervisor of a group of hackers and is still in Spain, also pending the US’s request for his extradition.

Arresting three alleged high-ranking members of this crime syndicate is good news. It is, in fact, the first win against this powerful syndicate. But will it actually slow them down?

After all, a few months after two of the arrests of these allegedly top-level actors, Fin7 ripped off retailers Saks and Lord Taylor, stealing 5 million credit cards over Easter weekend in April.

After that Point-of-Sale-a-palooza, Wired painted a detailed portrait of the organization, which goes by a very, very long list of aliases besides “Fin7” (which is associated with retail and hospitality credit card number heists). What might be another group, another division within F7, or a pre-existing gang that Fin7 spun off from, focuses on targeting financial organizations to directly steal and launder money and has been called Carbanak or Cobalt, which are also the names of the malware it uses.

Just that operation alone has stolen a total amount that must be significantly above €1 billion, a spokesman for the European Banking Federation (EBF) has said. The security firm Crowdstrike, meanwhile, calls the two specialized outfits Carbon Spider (which goes after financial institutions and ATMs) and Cobalt Spider (which targets the retail and hospitality industries). Then again, threat intelligence firm Gemini Advisory also sometimes calls Fin7 “Joker Stash,” after the dark web marketplace where the group sells its stolen credit card data.

Dmitry Chorine, cofounder and CTO of Gemini Advisory, which works with financial institutions and which first reported the Saks/Lord Taylor breach, told Wired that years of tracking has shown that Fin7 operates as a legitimate business entity that must be worth “at least” $1 billion.

They definitely have a mastermind, they have managers, they have money launderers, they have software developers, and they have software testers. And let’s not forget they have the financial means to stay hidden. They make at least $50 million every month. Given that they’ve been in business for many years, they probably have at least a billion dollars on hand.

Still, while the arrests announced on Wednesday might not be a stake through Fin7’s heart, the DOJ thinks they have shone some daylight on the shadowy group and, to some extent, clipped its wings. US attorney Annette Hayes, at a press conference announcing the indictments:

This investigation continues. We are under no illusion that we have taken this group down altogether. But we have made a significant impact. These hackers think they can hide behind keyboards in faraway places, and that they can escape the long arm of United States law. I’m here to tell you, and I think this announcement makes clear, that they cannot do that.

Phishy business

The DOJ provided this fact sheet (PDF) on how Fin7 attacked and stole data. As the indictments describe, Fin7’s modus operandi is typified by a phishing email sent on or around 27 March last year to a Red Robin Gourmet Burgers and Brews employee from [email protected].

The sender complained about a recent experience and urged the recipient to open the attachment for further details. Alternatively, if Fin7 was targeting a hotel chain, the sender of the phishing email might claim to be interested in making a reservation with details enclosed in the attachment. These attachments looked like innocuous files – Microsoft Word docs, for example – but were rigged with malware. Sometimes, Fin7 would accompany the spearphishing messages with a telephone call, to legitimize the messages and talk employees into opening them.

The spear-phished Red Robin employee opened the attachment. Within days, Fin7 had mapped the restaurant chain’s internal network. Within a week, it had obtained a username and password for the restaurant’s PoS software management tool.

Once infected, a victim computer would connect to one of Fin7’s command and control servers, located throughout the world. Through a specially designed control panel, Fin7 could slather on yet more malware, remotely send commands and receive data, and move laterally through the company’s network.

Inside of two weeks, the DOJ says, a Fin7 member allegedly uploaded a file containing hundreds of usernames and passwords for 798 Red Robin locations, along with “network information, telephone communications, and locations of alarm panels within restaurants.”

Besides Red Robin, the indictment alleges nine other similar incidents, each of which followed more or less the same pattern. It started with an email that doesn’t necessarily have an attachment. It might be a reservation inquiry sent to a hotel, for example, or an order to a catering company. Further communications would push employees to opening up the attachment, the indictment said:

When targeting a hotel chain or restaurant chain, a conspirator would make a follow-up call falsely claiming that the details of a reservation request, catering order, or customer complaint could be found in the file attached to the previously delivered email.

To add insult to injury, and to further exemplify how slick it is at selling its crappy, phishy, malwarey goods, Fin7 also masqueraded as a security company called Combi Security, the DOJ says.

Combi was sheep’s clothing for Fin7’s wolf work: the legitimate sounding name enabled Fin7 to recruit hackers and possibly even clients gullible enough to buy its purported security services, which included penetration testing.

As of Wednesday, they have a few more vacancies to fill.


Article source: http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/nakedsecurity/~3/OC81YKqXeXA/

Routers turned into zombie cryptojackers – is yours one of them?

We’ll start this story right at the end:

  • Users and sysadmins. Patch early, patch often.
  • Vendors and programmers. Don’t store plaintext passwords.

In this particular case, the vulnerable devices that are now being attacked are Mikrotik routers that haven’t been patched since April 2018.

Security researcher Simon Kenin at Trustwave pieced the story together, following reports that there seemed to be a surge of web-based cryptojacking in Brazil.

Kenin quickly realised that Brazil was something of a red herring in the story, because the attack was happening wherever the crooks could find unpatched Mikrotik routers.

Brazil just happened to be where the story broke – it is, after all, the fifth most populous country in the world, so there are a lot of Brazilian home and small business networks for crooks to find and attack.

Here’s how this cryptojack attack seems to have gone down.

Back in April 2018, Mikrotik patched a remote access vulnerability in its products.

As far as we can tell, Mikrotik discovered the security flaw itself, describing it in basic terms as a vulnerability that “allowed a special tool to connect to the [administration] port, and request the system user database file.”

As it turned out, there was a bit more to it than that – the bug allowed any file to be read off the router, effectively giving any crooks who knew the trick the opportunity to leech any data they wanted.

The user database file just happened to be the crown jewels, because Mikrotik had stored both usernames and passwords in plaintext.

As any regular Naked Security reader will know, there’s almost never a need to store passwords in a way that they can be recovered.

You can verify that a password supplied in memory is correct by matching it against a database entry that is computed from the password using a cryptographic technique known colloquially as salt-hash-stretch.

In other words, you can calculate forwards from a supplied password to get a unique “match string” to confirm the password, but because of how the salt-hash-stretch algorithm works, you can’t go backwards from the match string to work out anything about the password from which it was computed.

Simply put, you hardly ever need to store actual passwords in files on on disk, or even to store encrypted versions of password that can be unscrambled on demand, because you only ever need to check that a password was correct, not to record permanently what it was.

Sure, the crooks aren’t supposed to be able to steal your user database file in the first place, but there’s no point in making your username file into an instant password giveaway if it does get stolen.

💡 LEARN MORE: How to store your users’ passwords safely ►

How the bug was weaponised

Unfortunately, perhaps, a pair of security researchers going by @n0p and @yalpanian took Mikrotik’s patch and reverse-engineered it to recover the bug it was supposed to fix.

They subsequently published a proof-of-concept exploit, written in Python, that showed how to use the recovered flaw to extract the admin password from an unpatched Mikrotik router.

In theory, security reports of this sort are often considered to be “mostly harmless” – indeed, to be informative and educational – assuming that the exploit comes out after there’s been time to apply the patch.

In practice, of course, patches are often ignored for weeks or months, so that proof-of-concept exploits are warmly welcomed by cybercrooks even if the exploits are published well after the holes they exploit have been fixed.

Anyway, the crooks in this cryptojacking saga seem to be using the Mikrotik admin-port attack vector (we have no idea if they actually started with n0p’s proof-of-concept or figured it out for themselves) to do their dirty work.

Sneakily, this particular router takeover doesn’t require any code modifications or low-level network trickery.

According to Kenin, the crooks simply replaced a file called error.html, transmitted by Mikrotik’s built-in web proxy whenever there’s an HTTP error, with a web page that loads the CoinHive browser-based cryptomining software.

In other words, if you’re at a coffee shop where the owner has an unpatched Mikrotik router and has configured it to push all HTTP traffic through the web proxy, you’ll end up cryptomining on behalf of the crooks every time there’s a browsing problem.

Silently redirecting all web traffic in this way is known as transparent proxying. It’s not unusual on free shared networks such as coffee shops, trains, airports and so on. Often, the network operator isn’t trying to spy on you, or to censor your browsing. The goal is simply to block access to sites that eat a lot of bandwidth a lot of the time, such as video streaming or gaming servers. This helps to spread the available bandwidth a bit more fairly amongst all users.

Will the crooks get rich?

We doubt that the crooks will make much out of this, so we’re hoping that their enthusiasm for the this sort of attack will wane pretty quickly.

You’ll only get cryptojacked if you are browsing via the Mikrotik proxy; the cryptojacking will only kick off when there’s an error to report; and the cryptomining will only last until you exit from the browser tab with the cryptomining code in it.

You’re very likely to notice the cryptojacking, not least because your computer will slow down as the processors dedicate themselves to cryptomining – if you have a laptop with cooling fans, you’ll probably hear the cryptojacking as your computer’s aircon kicks in.

Also, Mikrotik’s proxy only supports HTTP, not HTTPS.

Transparent proxies can’t peek inside HTTPS traffic without your explicit agreement, because the data in an HTTPS session is encrypted by your browser and, by default, can only be decrypted when it reaches the web server at the other end of the link.

So if you stick to HTTPS you won’t be sending traffic through the router’s proxy anyway.

What to do?

If you have a Mikrotik router, you really do want to patch this hole.

Firstly, cryptojacking is bad in absolute terms, even if the crooks only do a tiny bit of it very occasionally.

Secondly, if cryptojackers can reconfigure your router this easily as this, any other crooks can hack you, too, perhaps with more serious side-effects.

So, here are our two initial points again, with a bonus piece of advice for good measure:

  • Users and sysadmins: patch early, patch often. For better or for worse, patches may end up being the public documentation of how a security hole works – it’s usually much easier to go backwards from a patch to an exploit than to figure out the exploit from first principles. In other words, the longer you leave it before patching, the longer you give the crooks to work back from the fix to a viable attack.
  • Vendors and programmers: don’t store plaintext passwords. You almost never need to – you can store salted-hashed-and-stretched passwords instead so that a breach of your password database means the crooks still have plenty of work to do to figure out what passwords match which hashes. Users who change their passwords quickly will beat the crooks to it, and the old hashes will be useless.
  • Everyone on the internet: stick to HTTPS as much as you can. Why use HTTP, which makes it really easy for crooks to intercept, spy on and tamper with your browsing, when you can use HTTPS, which makes all of those things very much harder?

By the way, even if you don’t have any Mikrotik hardware, why not check your own router for an update – and why not do it today?


Article source: http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/nakedsecurity/~3/W7AduGhVgog/

Alaskan borough dusts off the typewriters after ransomware crims pwn entire network

A ransomware infection has cast the Alaskan borough of Matanuska-Susitna (Mat-Su) back to the dark ages.

The malware was activated in mid-July, infecting 60 of the borough’s Windows 7 PCs. As the IT department tried to clean the infection and reset passwords using a script, the malware started “attacking back”, spreading to almost all of the 500 workstations and 120 of 150 servers.

Networked telephones and email went down, door-card entry was disrupted, and citizens could no longer make payments or access some services.

“We immediately started to isolate servers, took workstations off the network, isolated servers, and called the FBI,” Mat-Su IT director Eric Wyatt said in a radio interview.

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Without computers to do the work, staff went back to basics. “They re-enlisted typewriters from closets and wrote by hand receipts and lists of library book patrons and landfill fees at some of the 73 different buildings,” said Mat-Su public affairs director Patty Sullivan.

An official release described the attack as having been spearheaded by the BitPaymer ransomware, but it seems an external attacker was also able to log into the borough’s network and embed other nasties such as the Emotet banking trojan.

The attackers gained Active Directory admin access, compromising the controller to reconfigure its security settings.

It seemed likely that data was compromised and “sent outside the network”, said Wyatt in a stark assessment.

And the motive? Despite the involvement of BitPaymer, Wyatt didn’t believe it was purely financial.

“In 35 years in the business, this is the worst I’ve seen. It’s meant to disrupt our way of life.”

Borough assembly member Ted Leonard went further, describing events as more like terrorism than computer crime.

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Mat-Su isn’t alone. According to Wyatt, the borough’s victim case number was 210, which meant that 209 others had suffered the same fate, including Valdez in Alaska.

The attack is notable not only for the way it dismantled an entire organisation’s computer infrastructure, but the remarkable honesty of the victims. Mat-Su even admitted its disaster recovery servers became infected.

The borough is now reimaging its systems using backups, some of them up to a year old. However, a lot of data such as email has been lost.

“Encrypted data will be stored for months or years in the hopes that the FBI will recover the decryption keys,” Wyatt said.

Article source: http://go.theregister.com/feed/www.theregister.co.uk/2018/08/03/alaskan_town_has_entire_network_owned_by_ransomware_crims/

Web doc iCliniq plugs leaky S3 bucket full of medical files

Exclusive Online medical consultation service iCliniq has restricted access to thousands of medical documents it left in a public AWS S3 bucket.

iCliniq acted earlier this week only after the slip-up was brought to its attention by German security researcher Matthias Gliwka. Gliwka approached El Reg after initially failing to get any response to notification emails he sent to the firm.

The global health startup, which is based in India, allows users to ask medical questions in private, to which they can attach private medical info, to be answered by doctors. However, iCliniq stored these private medical documents in a public AWS S3 bucket.

This bucket, according to Gliwka, contained about 20,000 medical documents (such as information on blood screens and HIV tests).

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Gliwka was able to establish a connection between the icliniq.com website and the S3 bucket. Test files he uploaded through the website appeared in the same cloud-based system.

He also found a second problem. The German researcher said iCliniq had failed to check for permissions in its web app so every user was able to see every question asked by other members – simply by guessing the ID number of the question. Technically, this is known as an IDOR (Insecure Direct Object Reference) vulnerability.

El Reg ran Gliwka’s findings past UK security researcher Scott Helme, who quickly confirmed iCliniq had a serious breach to resolve.

“They need to get this locked down ASAP,” Helme told El Reg. “The bucket should be easier to fix than the IDOR… but both need work.”

Armed with this confirmation, El Reg joined Gliwka in chasing iCliniq. This wasn’t straightforward, but as soon as we escalated the issue to iCliniq’s chief exec, Dhruv Suyamprakasam, both problems were promptly resolved.

Siddharth Parthiban, iCliniq’s data protection officer, apologised to Gliwka for the organisation’s initial failure to respond to a vulnerability notification.

An internal investigation revealed that medical files of patients of two regions of India, the states of Tamil Nadu and Punjab, that were meant to be open only to lab-testing partners were actually publicly accessible.

Online healthcare

iCliniq bills itself as an online medical consultation platform where users across the globe can solicit medical advice from doctors and therapists. Users can either post a health query or book a slot for face-to-face consultation over HD video or the phone, among other services.

Regular medical searches by users cover queries on everything from back pain, hypertension and pregnancy to sexual health and STDs.

iCliniq serves patients worldwide but its experts panel “consists of medical practitioners, physicians and therapists from US, UK, UAE, India, Singapore, Germany” and more.

“The S3 folder taken for these regions in India must have been moved [from] private,” Parthiban explained in an email. Challenged on this point, the data protection officer reiterated that only Indian data was exposed. “I confirm that ONLY files of the two states in India (Tamil Nadu and Punjab) were public. Files of other regions/countries/continents were/are NOT public,” Parthiban told El Reg.

Once it had confirmed the issue, iCliniq treated the problem as a critical priority and promptly restricted access to confidential medical data. iCliniq promised it would contact the particular patient whose data Gliwka cited as an example. It didn’t offer any commitment to other people whose data was kept in the same previously insecure S3 bucket.

Gliwka confirmed that when he tried to access the confidential repository on Wednesday, access was denied.

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“The Amazon S3 bucket no longer publicly lists its contents and the direct links to documents I have the link to are no longer accessible,” Gliwka told El Reg. “The IDOR vulnerability, which allowed to see the private questions of other users, is also fixed.”

Gliwka remains dissatisfied with iCliniq’s response. He’s not convinced that the issue was geographically contained to India and challenged iCliniq on this point.

The Register notes that test documents uploaded by both researchers – Gliwka (in Germany) and Scott Helme (in the UK) – ended up in the same publicly accessible AWS S3 bucket before the firm made the fix. “Your file is definitely accessible by you alone,” iCliniq told Gliwka when he raised this point.

Breach alert

The firm should be notifying everyone whose details were potentially exposed by the breach – not just the handful of files Gliwka and Helme accessed in verifying the problem, and not solely the patient whose file was emailed around by way of example. Ostensibly, even the names of files stored in the repository exposed sensitive information.

“While I believe that you’ve tried to protect those files by setting appropriate ACLs [Access Control Lists], I still had access to other files, even some files regarding data subjects outside of India,” Gliwka told iCliniq in an email shared with The Register. “The file listing did indeed contain sensitive information. Some file names contain the name of a patient combined with the name of a medical test/diagnosis/procedure, i.e. john-doe-hiv-test.pdf, john-doe-cancer.pdf… just with a real name.”

The firm said the files were pseudonymous and did not constitute personally identifiable information.

Gliwka told us: “The system uses the filename provided during the upload and saves it verbatim after prefixing the file id, user id, question id and a random looking value.”

Leaky buckets

Instances of sensitive data being publicly viewable in Amazon-hosted cloud storage are far from rare. The latest breach is arguably the worst of its type since thousands of files containing the personal information of US citizens with classified security clearance were exposed last year.

There has since been a steady stream of such breaches, which shows little sign of letting up. That’s bad enough, but at the same time it is getting easier for interested parties to locate unsecured S3 buckets thanks to automated scripts, as previously reported.

Gliwka came across iCliniq’s bucket in the process of developing a tool to discover breaches of sensitive nature, something he described as a side project. “During the research on how to approach this problem I came across a multitude of buckets with sensitive information,” he said. “Most companies took them down rather quick[ly].”

The UK’s Information Commissioner’s Office has been informed of the breach. ®

Article source: http://go.theregister.com/feed/www.theregister.co.uk/2018/08/03/icliniq_cloud_breach/

Is SMS 2FA Enough Login Protection?

Experts say Reddit breach offers a prime example of the risks of depending on one-time passwords sent via text.

The “serious attack” against Reddit, disclosed earlier this week, may have only resulted in a limited breach, but Reddit’s engineering team and many experts in the security industry believe it should be a strong wake-up call for organizations to bolster their methods of two-factor authentication (2FA). 

According to Reddit’s engineering staff, “we suspect weaknesses inherent to SMS-based 2FA to be the root cause of this incident,” which exposed old user data and hashed credentials. In its announcement of the scope of the breach, the firm encouraged fellow security professionals to move to token-based authentication. 

That lesson was heard in a loud refrain from security pundits following Reddit’s disclosure. 

“While lots of organizations think 2FA is a silver bullet for authentication, it actually isn’t, thanks to weaknesses in mobile networks that allow SMSes to be intercepted,” says Leigh-Anne Galloway, cybersecurity resilience lead at Positive Technologies.

The way Reddit was breached is a common attack that takes advantage of unwarranted faith in SMS-based 2FA, she adds. “SMS alone is not enough to constitute adequate defense of customer and employee data,” Galloway says. “Two-factor authentication that involves standalone hardware token generators is needed to mitigate the risk of such attacks.”

The vulnerabilities of SMS one-time password (OTP) tokens to interception are hardly a secret, says Andy Smith, vice president of product marketing at Centrify. He sees another lesson here about how important it is for security and IT teams to stay abreast of the latest security standards. For example, he points to the fact that the National Institute of Standards and Technologies in its Special Publication 800-63 Guidelines recommends restricting the use of SMS for OTP and advises to completely remove OTP generation via email. 

“Instead, NIST is propagating the use of either application-enabled or hardware-based security keys that are leveraging the FIDO standard,” he says.

In fact, hardware-based security keys utilizing FIDO’s Universal Second Factor (U2F) standard have been gaining some very high-profile traction from big brands using them both for customers and employees. For example, in January Facebook extended support for U2F to customers that wanted to start protecting their accounts with more secure 2FA methods.

Meantime, just last month Google said it has managed to keep all of its 85,000-plus employees from being phished for over a year since it started making them use U2F-based security keys for logins. The program has been so successful that Google plans on rolling out its own branded security keys to Google Cloud corporate customers.

Nevertheless, some security evangelists believe that the industry shouldn’t pile too much on SMS-based 2FA.

“In many cases, it’s still better than nothing,” says Ilia Kolochenko, CEO of High-Tech Bridge. “Moreover, when most of business-critical applications have serious vulnerabilities varying from injections to RCE, 2FA hardening is definitely not the most important task to take care of.” 

SANS senior instructor Jake Williams agrees, stating in a Twitter post that “2FA hard token zealots” should tone it down.

“Stop discouraging orgs from implementing ‘good-enough’ security,” he wrote.

Nevertheless, while SMS 2FA is indeed better than a password alone, it is important for organizations not to be lulled into a false sense of security using it, says Craig Young, computer security researcher for Tripwire’s Vulnerability and Exposure Research Team (VERT).

“Although any form of multifactor authentication is a considerable improvement on simple password models, SMS-based verification tokens can be stolen with a variety of well-known techniques, including social engineering, mobile malware, or by directly intercepting and decrypting signals from cell towers,” he says.

The interesting aspect of the Reddit breach, Young adds, is that it is not a financial institution, which traditionally is the target for these types of attacks.

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Article source: https://www.darkreading.com/endpoint/authentication/is-sms-2fa-enough-login-protection/d/d-id/1332479?_mc=rss_x_drr_edt_aud_dr_x_x-rss-simple

4 Reasons Why Companies Are Failing at Incident Response

When it comes to containing the business impacts of a security breach, proper planning is often the difference between success and failure.

The cybersecurity threat landscape continues to evolve and expose companies in all sectors to breaches. In 2018 alone, a diverse range of companies — including Best Buy, Delta, Orbitz, Panera, Saks Fifth Avenue, and Sears — have been victimized. 

Not only are threats escalating in scope and sophistication, new smart technologies — particularly those leveraging the Internet of Things — can add fuel to the fires that security staff need to fight. These are often not fully tested for security flaws, which create hard-to-defend gaps for companies trying to proactively defend and protect their networks and assets.

Not only is prevention becoming increasingly difficult, but many organizations are also failing at incident response. Here are four main reasons why they struggle to detect, contain, and remediate threats.

Reason 1: Inadequate Resources
As the number and sophistication of threats have grown over the past decade, there has been an explosion in the number of security tools in the enterprise. Most create more work for security analysts — more monitoring, correlating, and responding to alerts. Analysts are forced to work between multiple platforms, manually gathering data from each source, then enriching and correlating that data. Limited security budgets — compounded by the fact that it is often easier to garner executive support for additional security applications than it is for additional employees — mean that most security teams must find innovative ways to do more without increasing staff levels. Intense competition for experienced analysts often forces companies to choose between hiring one highly skilled analyst or several junior ones.

Reason 2: Alert Overload
The number of security tools in the average company has greatly increased over the years to deal with the avalanche of threats. Even when alerts from these tools are centrally managed and correlated through a security information and even management system, the volume of alerts often overwhelms security teams. Each alert must be manually verified and triaged by an analyst. Then, after an alert is determined to be valid, it requires additional manual research and enrichment before any action can be taken to address the potential threat. While these manual processes are taking place, other alerts sit unresolved in the queue and additional alerts continue to roll in. Any one of these simmering alerts can represent a window of opportunity for attackers until they are addressed.

Reason 3: Lack of Tribal Knowledge
Training new analysts takes time, especially when security processes are manual and complex. Even when highly documented procedures are in place, companies often rely heavily on their most senior analysts to make decisions based on their experience and knowledge of the organization — something commonly referred to as tribal knowledge. The more manual and complex the security process, the longer it takes to transfer tribal knowledge.

Highly skilled analysts are extremely valuable resources. Each time a company loses a seasoned person, some tribal knowledge is lost — and incident response automatically suffers. While companies strive to retain at least one experienced analyst who can transfer tribal knowledge to new hires, they are not always successful in doing so.

Reason 4: Dearth of Measurement, Management Processes
Unlike other business units — which typically have concrete, proven processes for measuring the success or failure of a program — the security department often has metrics that are abstract and subjective. That’s because traditional approaches for measuring return on investment are not appropriate for security projects and can lead to inaccurate or misleading results. Properly measuring the effectiveness and efficiency of a security program requires a measurement process specially designed to meet these unique requirements.

To complicate matters, security incidents are dynamic events that often involve many moving parts at the investigation, containment, and mitigation phases. Failing to correctly manage each step of the incident response process can result in exponential increases in loss and reputational damage to the organization. To best manage security incidents, companies need a documented, repeatable process that has been thoroughly tested and is well understood by all stakeholders.

To take back control and address these shortcomings, organizations should consider these three best practices.

Orchestration
Coordinate security tools and data sources into one seamless process, often called orchestration. Technology integrations are the most common method used to support technology orchestration. There are numerous methods, such as APIs, software development kits, and direct database connections, which can be used to integrate technologies such as endpoint detection and response, network detection and infrastructure, threat intelligence, IT service management, and account management.

Automation
Although the concepts of orchestration and automation are closely related, their goals are fundamentally different. While orchestration is intended to increase efficiency through increased coordination and decreased context switching between security tools to support faster, more informed decision-making, automation is intended to reduce the time these processes through repeatable processes and applying machine learning to appropriate tasks. Typically, automation is utilized to increase the efficiency of the orchestrated technologies, processes, and people. The key to successful automation is the identification of predictable, repeatable processes that require minimal human intervention. 

Tactical and Strategic Measurement
Information to support tactical decisions typically consists of incident data, aimed at analysts and managers, which may include indicators of compromise, related events, assets, process status, and threat intelligence. This tactical information enables informed decision-making from incident triage and investigation, through containment and eradication.
Strategic information, on the other hand, typically is aimed at managers and executives and is used to make informed high-level decisions. Strategic information may include incident trends and statistics, associated costs, threat intelligence, and incident correlation. More-advanced security programs may also use strategic information to enable proactive threat hunting.

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Article source: https://www.darkreading.com/endpoint/4-reasons-why-companies-are-failing-at-incident-response/a/d-id/1332445?_mc=rss_x_drr_edt_aud_dr_x_x-rss-simple

FBI Offers New IoT Security Tips

A new article from the FBI offers insight into IoT risks and ways to reduce them.

Following the FBI’s May request to router owners to reboot their devices, the bureau has released a “Security Tip” about risks associated with the Internet of Things (IoT). Included among suggestions to be alert to unusual increases in network traffic and reminders about the wisdom of firmware updates are statements regarding the importance of the IoT and the true nature of the risks involved.

Security professionals, who likely won’t find anything surprising in the tips, might want to share the document with non-IT employees. The article, which begins with a statement that IoT devices are defined by their ability to ” … talk to other machines and trigger additional actions,” briefly walks through the dangers posed by these connected devices and the data they can access.

The suggestions offered are basic but important, and could require help from IT staff for employees to implement. For organizations in which employees work from home, the FBI’s latest security primer can be the start of a valuable conversation.

Read here and here for more.

 

 

 

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Dept. of Energy to Test Electrical Grid Against Cyberattacks

This is the first time the Department of Energy will test the electrical grid’s ability to recover from a blackout caused by cyberattacks.

Can the electrical grid bounce back from a blackout caused by hackers?

The Department of Energy wants to find out, so it’s launching the first hands-on exercise to test the grid’s ability to recover from a blackout caused by cyberattacks, EE News reports. Its weeklong experiment, dubbed “Liberty Eclipse,” will take place starting Nov. 1 on a restricted area off the New York coast called Plum Island.

Experts want to replicate the process of restarting the power grid while addressing an attack on the United States’ electric, oil, and natural gas infrastructure. Their goal is to learn how industry might execute its response to a major incident – a sign of the DoE’s increasing interest in arming against digital threats to the country’s energy system.

Over the course of the test, participants will work to kick-start attack recovery and energize a “blackstart cranking path” by detecting the attack, eliminating the attackers, and getting crank path digital systems up and running, the DoE states in a memo. Previous tests have avoided testing “blackstart” in an effort to stay on track with their other goals.

Read more details here.

 

 

 

Black Hat USA returns to Las Vegas with hands-on technical Trainings, cutting-edge Briefings, Arsenal open-source tool demonstrations, top-tier security solutions and service providers in the Business Hall. Click for information on the conference and to register.

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Article source: https://www.darkreading.com/vulnerabilities---threats/dept-of-energy-to-test-electrical-grid-against-cyberattacks/d/d-id/1332481?_mc=rss_x_drr_edt_aud_dr_x_x-rss-simple