STE WILLIAMS

Your biz won’t be hacked by a super-leet exploit. It’ll be Bob in sales opening a dodgy email

Backgrounder The good news for enterprise security is that the number of reported cyberattacks is going down, in the UK at least.

The cloud behind that silver lining? According to the British government, 61 per cent of large businesses experienced some sort of breach last year and, more worryingly, 20 percent of large firms were hit on a weekly basis.

Trying to keep one step ahead of the bad guys has proved tricky, and enterprise security professionals who have moved to protect themselves in one area will invariably find cyber-criminals probing a new spot. According to Peter Firstbrook, research director at Gartner, “Whenever they do a new method of attack, then it’s going to work because we haven’t worked out how to build a defense for the countermeasure.”

In other words, there’s always going to be a way in to the enterprise – even the best protected ones. So what are the attack vectors, and how can you protect yourself?

One of the most common methods used to introduce malware remains, still, the faithful email attachment. According to a 2018 survey from Verizon, this was the chosen method for 94 per cent of all attacks, with Office and PDF documents the favorite delivery vehicles.

One of the newer forms of techniques deployed by cyber criminals is to use non-standard server ports for incursion into corporate systems.

‘Cost reasons’

Paul Kenealy, head of instant response at PA Consulting, said it’s a method that’s been made possible because sysadmins put development servers on non-standard ports, or because there’s a proliferation of IoT devices that have been put by default onto non-standard ports. Going through such ports gives attackers a vital means of establishing a beachhead because the servers that employ these ports are connected via the corporate network so once in the malware can spread. “Ideally the entire infrastructure should be separated – development, pre-development, production environment – but we know they’re not, generally for cost reasons,” Kenealy adds.

One route that’s proving a particular favorite in this field is port 8080 or similar, which can be a shortcut for attackers. “It’s more usually used for a web proxy, but a sysadmin could put a development server there,“ Kenealy explains. The reason these ports are left hanging is a consequence of the fast pace of corporate IT. Somebody invariably wants to provision development servers quickly to work on a new project or product, but the sysadmins then move on and forget about these unsecured connections.

Another growing threat to the enterprise is fileless malware. A Ponemon Institute survey [PDF] found 77 per cent of compromised malware employs fileless. What’s more, the report suggests these types of attacks are more likely to succeed. Fileless doesn’t require executable code for a way in and can hide in places like memory that make it difficult for conventional anti-virus software to pick up. Further, fileless is versatile: it can get in through one of those non-standard ports or an attached document.

There are, of course, other methods being employed in attack that are proving fruitful, not least the growing use of encryption. A few years back, Gartner Research highlighted how encrypted and encapsulated traffic “weakens defense-in-depth efficiency, exposing endpoints and DMZ servers to threats from outbound and inbound traffic.”

Encryption can be a force for good in the enterprise, but Kenealy warns organisations now need to be wary of its use against them. “Encryption, like many things, is a double-edged sword,” he says. “It means that attacks can’t be unpicked so easily. And as more attacks get encrypted, it’s easier for malware to hide.”

So, how does the enterprise defend itself against attacks, new and old?

Bill Mew, managing director of The Crisis Team, says people are increasingly interested in measuring the strength of their protection using the services of cyber risk agencies who claim they can give your organisation a risk rating.

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Article source: http://go.theregister.com/feed/www.theregister.co.uk/2019/07/19/new_enterprise_threats/

Crack the Defenses of iOS and other Platforms at Black Hat USA

Get the latest insights into how to attack and defend platforms like iOS, MacOS, and Windows 10 at this upcoming August security conference.

Cybersecurity professionals, take note: There’s an entire track of Platform Security Briefings lined up for Black Hat USA this August that will equip you with the latest knowledge, tools, and tricks to improve or compromise the security of iOS Windows hardware and software.

Apple security professionals will be presenting Behind the scenes of iOS and Mac Security, an in-depth 50-minute Briefing that will demo everything from code integrity enforcement on Apple chips (including the A12 Bionic and S4) to the T2 security chip. You’ll get a guided walkthrough of processes like the T2 secure boot, with stops along the way to examine common attacks and defenses at each stage. Most importantly, you’ll be introduced to two publicly undisclosed firmware security measures.

For outside perspective on the same tech check out Inside The Apple T2, in which Duo Labs researchers will give you an assessment of the T2 chip’s security posture and the strengths and weaknesses of its communication with MacOS. They’ll also demonstrate the ability to interface directly with the T2 chip from unprivileged user space code by writing their own client application, and present methods and tooling to query the T2’s exposed services as well as decode and encode valid messages.

For some insight into the security of Microsoft’s Windows platform, make time to attend Battle of Windows Service: A Silver Bullet to Discover File Privilege Escalation Bugs Automatically. In this 25-minute Briefing you’ll see how one researcher created a “silver bullet” to discover Windows 10 file privilege escalation bugs, then used it to discover at least four new vulnerabilities. You’ll also see how this technique makes use of the Advanced Local Procedure Call (ALPC), found new attack surfaces, and devised a system to discover file privilege escalation bugs automatically. Plus, you’ll learn advanced skills about how to exploit those vulnerabilities, bypass the security check, and play with impersonation. Don’t miss it!

Black Hat USA returns to the Mandalay Bay in Las Vegas August 3-8, 2019. For more information on what’s happening at the event and how to register, check out the Black Hat website.

Article source: https://www.darkreading.com/black-hat/crack-the-defenses-of-ios-and-other-platforms-at-black-hat-usa/d/d-id/1335293?_mc=rss_x_drr_edt_aud_dr_x_x-rss-simple

2015 database hack is the terrible gift that keeps giving for Slack: Tens of thousands of passwords now reset

Slack says a 2015 database theft is to blame for a large-scale reset of stolen passwords.

The Discord-for-Suits developer said on Thursday that it was resetting the passwords for roughly 1 per cent of its 10 million or so accounts after an investigation revealed that stolen credentials were being sold online. These included customer profiles, hashed passwords and also some passwords in clear text that were harvested on the fly.

Arriving as a tip through Slack’s bug bounty program, the stolen account credentials were originally thought to be the result of isolated malware infections or phishing operations. After investigating further, the usernames and passwords were found to have been lifted from a Slack network intrusion that occurred more than four years ago.

“We immediately confirmed that a portion of the email addresses and password combinations were valid, reset those passwords, and explained our actions to the affected users,” Slack said in a post explaining the move.

“However, as more information became available and our investigation continued, we determined that the majority of compromised credentials were from accounts that logged in to Slack during the 2015 security incident.”

The incident occurred in March of 2015 when it was found that in the month prior someone had managed to get access to an internal database containing customer profile information. While the passwords in that database were hashed, the attackers did manage to insert code that harvested account credentials as they were entered onto the Slack website, resulting in the theft of some accounts.

Pixellated Slack logo

How do you know it’s finally the weekend? Clock hits 5pm? No, Slack goes down on a Friday afternoon in June

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Jump back to 2019, when Slack received reports of the credentials being sold. It turns out that someone had dug up the details lifted during the earlier infection, found credentials that still worked, and then flogged those on a crimeware market.

Fortunately, Slack says, the overwhelming majority of users did not need to have their accounts reset. The only users at risk are people who began using Slack before February of 2015 who have not reset their passwords since the break-in took place, and have not implemented two-factor authentication on their accounts.

In short, only those old-timers with poor security practices are at risk, and they are now going to have to get a new, secure password, whether they like it or not.

This all comes as the chat app maker struggles to push its stock price up in the wake of a June IPO that fell flat. At the time of writing, Slack shares had closed at $32, down 4.36 per cent on the day. ®

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Article source: http://go.theregister.com/feed/www.theregister.co.uk/2019/07/19/2015_database_hack_slack/

It’s never good when ‘Magecart’ and ‘bulletproof’ appear in the same sentence, but here we are

A growing crop of so-called bulletproof hosting companies are using the ongoing civil war in Ukraine to host Magecart malware without fear of the police coming knocking.

Researchers with security shop Malwarebytes say that the data-exfiltration and hosting servers used by Magecart operations to collect harvested card details have been traced to the Ukrainian city of Luhansk, located in an area contested by pro-European and pro-Russian forces.

Here’s how it works: Magecart’s operators hacked websites to install malicious script code onto the payment webpages of reputable sites. After netizens type in their bank card details into those infected payment pages, the Magecart code uploads the victims’ sensitive personal information to a command-and-control servers physically housed in Luhansk, Ukraine, where hosting companies know that the ongoing conflict means there is little chance of a raid from police officers or g-men. Basically, there’s no functioning government available to investigate the server hosts.

These data centers, pitched as ‘bulletproof,’ naturally appeal to groups running less-than-reputable operations that would be subject to raids or takedown requests if hosted in other locations.

“Due to the very nature of such hosts, takedown operations are difficult,” Malwarebytes explained. “It’s not simply a case of a provider turning a blind eye on shady operations, but rather it is the core of their business model.”

The use of bulletproof hosting is particularly bad in the case of Magecart, as it eliminates one of the more effective means of stopping the infection – disabling command and control servers.

card

Breaking news: Bank-card-slurping malware sneaks into Forbes’ mag subscription website

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Because Magecart operates by injecting a simple chunk of code into the individual payment pages (as opposed to installing an entire malware payload, for example) it can be difficult to scrub from the infected machines themselves.

On the other hand, the exfiltration servers where the harvested card data was sent and the command servers where the malware was controlled are weak spots that, if disabled, would effectively shut down the card-harvesting operation.

Now, with the CC and exfiltration servers stashed behind bulletproof hosts, Malwarebytes says it is having to block all domains and IP addresses associated with the skimmers.

This as Magecart is also expanding its operation into the fertile ground of unprotected S3 buckets.

Last week researchers reported that more than 17,000 sites had been seeded with Magecart code after the storage bucket hosting their pages was left facing the public internet with no security protections. ®

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Article source: http://go.theregister.com/feed/www.theregister.co.uk/2019/07/18/magecart_ukraine_hosting/

8 Legit Tools and Utilities That Cybercriminals Commonly Misuse

Threat actors are increasingly ‘living off the land,’ using publicly available management and administration tools to conceal malicious activity.

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Image Source: Shutterstock

Image Source: Shutterstock

Cybercriminals have long used legitimate management and administration tools to break into enterprise networks, move laterally within them, and maintain persistence.

Lately, though, use of these so-called living-off-the-land tactics has increased substantially.

Positive Technologies recently analyzed the tools that 29 advanced persistent threat groups are currently using in their campaigns worldwide. Its study shows that more than half of them leverage legitimate, publicly available penetration testing and systems administration tools to develop their attacks after gaining an initial foothold on a network.

The reason? Such tools allow attackers to hide their activities in a sea of legitimate traffic. “Threat actors increasingly leverage dual-use tools or tools that are already preinstalled on targeted systems to carry out cyberattacks,” said Fortinet in a recent report.

This makes it harder for defenders to spot malicious activity and makes attack attribution much more difficult. “Unfortunately, adversaries can use a wide range of legitimate tools to accomplish their goals and hide in plain sight,” Fortinet said.

Here, according to security experts, are eight of the mostly commonly abused legitimate utilities and tools.

 

Jai Vijayan is a seasoned technology reporter with over 20 years of experience in IT trade journalism. He was most recently a Senior Editor at Computerworld, where he covered information security and data privacy issues for the publication. Over the course of his 20-year … View Full BioPreviousNext

Article source: https://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/8-legit-tools-and-utilities-that-cybercriminals-commonly-misuse/d/d-id/1335254?_mc=rss_x_drr_edt_aud_dr_x_x-rss-simple

Open Source Hacking Tool Grows Up

Koadic toolkit gets upgrades – and a little love from nation-state hackers.

An open source white-hat hacking tool that nation-state hacking teams out of China, Iran, and Russia have at times employed to avoid detection has been updated with new features that allow attacks to persist and spread more efficiently.

Sean Dillon, creator of the so-called Koadic tool that works like a remote access Trojan (RAT), says the software he first released two years ago at DEF CON can now extract information and intelligence about a targeted Windows environment, more efficiently scrape user credentials, and more easily spread around a network. “It’s much more efficient now. It can be used to compromise entire networks in a matter of minutes,” says Dillon, who plans to show off Koadic’s new features next month at the Black Hat USA Arsenal in Las Vegas.

Koadic is basically a RAT based on VBScript and JScript that uses Windows executables such a PowerShell rather than malware, so it mimics a growing trend of sophisticated attackers employing legitimate tools instead of writing or burning their own exploits. The trend, known as “living off the land,” also allows attackers to remain under the radar as they run internal Windows tools like PowerShell to hack their way through networks.

Koadic uses built-in Windows executables and most recently added a Windows Management Interface and SysAdmin to its quiver. “These are binaries that are shipped by default with all versions of Windows,” Dillon notes, and they are signed by Microsoft so they can slip past most whitelisting applications. The original version of Koadic targeted a single machine and had little ability to move laterally to other machines.

“We now have several different ways to poke into the system, and when a computer is back up from a restart” the attack will continue, he notes.

Among some of the newer features: UAC (user account control) bypasses, automated file-discovery, and credential storage that converts Mimikatz outputs into a searchable form.

Nation-state groups, such as China’s Stone Panda, Iran’s MuddyWater, and Russia’s Fancy Bear, all have been spotted using Koadic in their hacking campaigns. “In the past year or two, APT groups have been using open source tools in order to hide out,” Dillon says. “If they write custom malware, the attack could be attributed to them. … If they use something open source, it’s hard to see who is attacking an organization.”

But Dillon’s intent for the tool is to help professional penetration testers find holes before the bad guys do. Still, Koadic today continues to easily bypass most endpoint security tools: “Every time [the vendors] come up with a detection for it, we come up with another evasion,” he says. Sometimes it’s only a matter of changing a comma or a word in the string, and it breaks the anti-malware vendor’s detection signature, he notes.

That underscores the need for better behavioral detection methods for defenses, he adds.

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Black Hat USA returns to Las Vegas with hands-on technical Trainings, cutting-edge Briefings, Arsenal open-source tool demonstrations, top-tier security solutions, and service providers in the Business Hall. Click for information on the conference and to register.

 

 

Kelly Jackson Higgins is Executive Editor at DarkReading.com. She is an award-winning veteran technology and business journalist with more than two decades of experience in reporting and editing for various publications, including Network Computing, Secure Enterprise … View Full Bio

Article source: https://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/open-source-hacking-tool-grows-up/d/d-id/1335296?_mc=rss_x_drr_edt_aud_dr_x_x-rss-simple

RDP Bug Takes New Approach to Host Compromise

Researchers show how simply connecting to a rogue machine can silently compromise the host.

Most security professionals know they can use Microsoft’s Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) to connect to other machines but may not consider how merely using RDP could compromise one.

A recently discovered RDP vulnerability could silently compromise a host when it connects to a rogue machine, researchers report. CVE-2019-0887, discovered by Eyal Itkin, a vulnerability researcher with Check Point Software Technologies, was classified as Important and patched this month. Microsoft has not yet seen any evidence this flaw has been exploited in the wild.

The remote code execution bug is in Remote Desktop Services, formerly known as Terminal Services, when an authenticated attacker abuses clipboard redirection. A successful attacker could execute malicious code on a target system; install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights. To exploit the vulnerability, however, an attacker must first compromise Remote Desktop Services and wait for a victim system to connect.

Most RDP vulnerabilities allow an attacker to compromise the server, then approach new victim machines using RDP, says Dana Baril, security software engineer at Microsoft. An example is BlueKeep, the critical remote code execution vulnerability that prompted Microsoft to issue patches for out-of-support Windows systems when it fixed the bug in June. BlueKeep could let unauthenticated attackers break into a server and abuse a bug in the server itself.

“Most of the time people look for vulnerabilities in the server and try to expand from their computer to a new one on the network,” Itkin explains. This flaw is different.

“In this case, the victim machine is the one that initiated the connection,” Baril continues. “We have one compromised machine using lateral movement technique; this gets connections from victim machines and spreads the exploit.”

Itkin was researching lateral movement attack vectors when he discovered the vulnerability. “If we take over a single machine and ambush a single user or IT admin, we directly get privilege without moving around a network too much,” he explains. This specific bug exists in the clipboard, particularly in the way it synchronizes communication between the client and server.

By default, when a host connects to a machine, the clipboard connects the client and server. When a client copies a file from the server, the server tells the client where to store them. If attackers have control over a single device, they can slow it down, post pop-up messages, or cause other distractions so the corporate user opens a ticket and says the machine isn’t working.

“Usually when you take over a machine you try to be stealth,” says Itkin. But because an attacker wants the IT manager to remotely connect to their target using RDP, “we make a lot of noise, and we make IT users to connect to a machine and check it out.” When the client connects, the attacker could use the clipboard function to download and store malicious files.

Clipboards were designed to be used locally and therefore trusted, Baril adds. This vulnerability exposes machines to a clipboard they can no longer trust. Baril and Itkin will discuss the details of the vulnerability, and approach the attack from both offensive and defensive perspectives, in their upcoming Black Hat USA briefing, “He Said, She Said — Poisoned RDP Offense and Defense.”

Following his discovery, Itkin informed Microsoft and went through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process. After Microsoft issued a patch, he continued to collaborate with the research team and later found the same bug was inherited by Hyper-V; the Hyper-V manager uses RPD under the hood to manage virtual machines. Both issues are now fixed.

While companies should install the patch to fully protect themselves, Baril notes this technique can be detected with internal Windows telemetry. “This attack technique was very hard to detect using existing telemetry,” she says, adding that normal detection wouldn’t work because this behavior doesn’t appear unusual to users. To help users before they install the patch, Microsoft created behavioral detection using Windows Event Log. Researchers used the clipboard and RDP events to generate detection logic that could detect this tactic in action so businesses will know if they’re targeted even if they haven’t yet applied the update.

Related Content:

 

Black Hat USA returns to Las Vegas with hands-on technical Trainings, cutting-edge Briefings, Arsenal open-source tool demonstrations, top-tier security solutions, and service providers in the Business Hall. Click for information on the conference and to register.

Kelly Sheridan is the Staff Editor at Dark Reading, where she focuses on cybersecurity news and analysis. She is a business technology journalist who previously reported for InformationWeek, where she covered Microsoft, and Insurance Technology, where she covered financial … View Full Bio

Article source: https://www.darkreading.com/risk/rdp-bug-takes-new-approach-to-host-compromise/d/d-id/1335297?_mc=rss_x_drr_edt_aud_dr_x_x-rss-simple

BitPaymer Ransomware Operators Wage Custom, Targeted Attacks

A new framework is allowing the threat group to compile variants of the malware for each victim, Morphisec says.

The BitPaymer ransomware operators now are creating new variants of the malware hours before deploying it on a target network – making detection much more difficult.

Researchers from Morphisec say they have observed the tactic being used against numerous public and private sector organizations across the US over the last three months.

In a report Thursday, the security vendor said it is aware of at least 15 organizations including those in the finance, agriculture, and technology sectors that have been targeted in this way. Most had between 200 and 1,000 employees, while two of the victims employed more than 2,000 people. Numerous servers belonging to at least two of the targeted organizations were infected.

In each of the attacks, the threat group gained initial access to the target network via phishing emails that distributed Dridex, a well-known data and credential-stealing malware. Once on the network, the attacker stole Active Directory credentials and conducted reconnaissance for sensitive servers and systems to infect. They then waited for the weekend to actually deploy the ransomware.  

“This carefully planned timing allows them to propagate the ransomware to 24/7 running servers and then spread as the first employees returning to work from the weekend login to the compromised network,” Morphisec said.

Michael Gorelik, CTO at Morphisec, says what makes the latest BitPaymer campaign interesting is a new attack framework that enables the threat group to obfuscate and compile a custom loader for the malware literally hours before it is deployed.

The ransomware payload version itself that is being used in the attacks was complied about four months ago, and has been used in previous campaigns including one that disrupted operations in a major way at Arizona Beverages last May. But by wrapping the payload in new loaders for each target just hours before attacking them, the BitPaymer attackers are making it much harder for signature-based detection tools to spot the malware, Gorelik says.

Also complicating matters for targeted organizations are the sophisticated tactics that threat group has begun using to evade detection by static and behavior-based detection tools. Upon loading, BitPaymer like many other malware tools looks for certain clues about where it is running and terminates automatically under certain conditions.

But one new tactic the malware uses—first described by a security researcher at Black Hat 2018—is to look for a specific dummy file (“C:\aaa_TouchMeNot.txt”) that is found only in a Windows Defender AV Emulator environment and to terminate execution if it spots the file. “If the malware sees the file it stops working, so the emulator thinks it’s harmless,” Gorelik says. “But when the malware runs in the real environment it suddenly starts working.”

There are multiple other features in the malware that make it dangerous as well, he says. One is a function that allows the malware to bypass User Account Control (UAC) settings to elevate its privileges on an infected system. When running with elevated privileges, the malware erases shadow copy files from the infected host – making recovery harder. BitPaymer also includes several obfuscation capabilities, including the use of a lot of junk code, to make it tough to spot.

Growing Targeted Threat

For organizations, ransomware like BitPaymer once again highlight the importance of preventive controls, Gorelik says. None of the sophisticated features the malware incorporates would matter if enterprises can prevent it from getting an initial foothold in the first place, he says.

This latest BitPaymer campaign is consistent with other reports about a sharp spike in targeted ransomware attacks over the past year. Increasingly, attackers have begun eschewing mass low-payoff attacks for highly targeted ones against medium and large companies where the potential returns are several magnitudes higher.

Hackers hit the city of Riviera Beach, Florida, this June, for example, and collected $600,000 after officials there decided to pay the demanded ransom rather than risk lengthy downtime in recovering encrypted systems. Lake City, in Florida paid $460,000 a few weeks later for the same reason.

A new report from Coveware shows that average ransom payments increased 184% between the first and second quarter this year – from $12,762 to $36,295. Much of the increase stemmed from the growing prevalence of Ryuk and Sodinokibi, two ransomware variants associated with high ransom demands.

Significantly, the average downtime following a ransomware attack also jumped substantially from 7.3 days in Q1 to 9.6 days in the second quarter. The Coveware study found that organizations that paid off their attackers received a decryption key 96% of the time and were able on average to recover about 92% of their encrypted data.

Related Content:

Black Hat USA returns to Las Vegas with hands-on technical Trainings, cutting-edge Briefings, Arsenal open-source tool demonstrations, top-tier security solutions and service providers in the Business Hall. Click for information on the conference and to register.

Jai Vijayan is a seasoned technology reporter with over 20 years of experience in IT trade journalism. He was most recently a Senior Editor at Computerworld, where he covered information security and data privacy issues for the publication. Over the course of his 20-year … View Full Bio

Article source: https://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/bitpaymer-ransomware-operators-wage-custom-targeted-attacks/d/d-id/1335298?_mc=rss_x_drr_edt_aud_dr_x_x-rss-simple

Security Lessons From a New Programming Language

A security professional needed a secure language for IoT development. So he wrote his own, applying learned lessons about memory and resources in the process.

When a security researcher needs to create an application, there are many choices in terms of programming languages and frameworks. But when project requirements include SSL and an embedded Internet of Things (IoT) platform, the number of good options becomes limited. That’s why Thomas Pornin decided to build his own language.

Pornin, who is technical director and member of the cryptography services practice at NCC Group, has been thinking about programming languages, their strengths, and their weaknesses for more than 30 years. He has worked on many different, complex tech deployments and has the experience of launching an open source project, BearSSL, an SSL stack that is smaller than most SSL implementations available to developers.

The language Pornin wanted to build had two significant requirements: First, its resulting applications had to fit onto a resource-constrained IoT device, and that those applications performed reasonably well. Next, the applications developed using the language would not be subject to certain built-in vulnerabilities seen in some applications. Those vulnerabilities tend to revolve around the way the processor allocates and uses memory, so Pornin focused on memory in his thinking about language security.

Getting the project started took time. “I took care to write a big specification, a 65-page document,” Pornin says. “In it, I explained how it should work and why it should work that way.”

From Spec to Language
The initial specification was the basis for T0, Pornin’s first pass at the programming language. T0 was designed to create applications that would work on an embedded system — defined as one with severely limited memory resources, a CPU that’s not very powerful, no memory management unit, and no operating system to mediate the application’s interaction with the hardware.

Pornin decided to base the design of his secure IoT language on Forth — a programming language that is oriented around the idea of stacks (memory structures where the last item pushed in is the first thing pulled out). He says the decision was partially driven by practical considerations about the discipline that stacks impose on the way memory is used, and partially by aesthetics. The stack orientation means that Forth code uses a distinctive notation (Reverse Polish Notation) familiar to anyone who used an HP calculator without the “=” key.

T0 was able to create compact, operational code. Pornin simplified the job of writing the T0 compiler by having it produce C source code as its output — code that then had to be recompiled and linked into the final executable code using an existing C compiler. It was much of what he wanted, but it was not yet secure. That waited for T1.

The Next Step
In T1, which Pornin described in a presentation at NorthSec 2019, protection for memory and restrictions on stacks were introduced. While Pornin is still working on building out the details of T1 and creating the full compiler for the language, he believes the language is moving in his desired direction.

There are already a number of languages that can be used for embedded applications. Depending on the hardware in use, C, Java ME, Go, Rust Embedded, and Forth may be possibilities. So does Pornin think other security practitioners should write their own programming languages?

“I think that anybody who is really serious about development should have the idea somewhere in their head,” he says. “They should think about what they would like to see in a programming language.” He adds with a laugh, “And it would also be good for people at large if most would stop before actually doing it.”

It is useful, though, for developers and security practitioners to understand how the compilers work and the sort of code they produce. Understanding whether they create code that makes the most of memory protection and memory structures available in the hardware can help them write more secure, more robust applications.

Related Content:

 

Black Hat USA returns to Las Vegas with hands-on technical Trainings, cutting-edge Briefings, Arsenal open-source tool demonstrations, top-tier security solutions, and service providers in the Business Hall. Click for information on the conference and to register.

 

 

 

 

Curtis Franklin Jr. is Senior Editor at Dark Reading. In this role he focuses on product and technology coverage for the publication. In addition he works on audio and video programming for Dark Reading and contributes to activities at Interop ITX, Black Hat, INsecurity, and … View Full Bio

Article source: https://www.darkreading.com/application-security/security-lessons-from-a-new-programming-language/d/d-id/1335300?_mc=rss_x_drr_edt_aud_dr_x_x-rss-simple

Series 2 launch episode – RDP exposed [PODCAST]

The Naked Security Podcast is back!

Everyone loved the content of our podcasts, but quite a few of you said that you found them hard to listen to.

We didn’t have a studio to record in, so the sound quality wasn’t great – you had to concentrate on the words themselves rather than their meaning.

Some of you said that it sounded as though we’d recorded our Series 1 episodes in a meeting room…

…and the reason was that we had.

Well, we heard you loud and clear, even if you couldn’t always hear us the same way – we’ve now got a brand new studio, soundproofing on the walls, new microphones and even a cool acoustic sofa. (That’s like a regular sofa, but more so.)

So, here’s our Series 2 Launch Episode, entitled RDP Exposed.

Host Anna Brading talks to Matt Boddy, Ben Jones and Mark Stockley about their latest research into RDP attacks and just how quickly crooks can (and will) find you online.

Listen now, and let us know what you think!

You can find out more about our RDP research here on Naked Security, or by reading the full report.

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