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Who Says Brilliant Security Engineers Can’t Be Amazing People Managers?

Don’t let midcareer stagnation be an exit ramp from the cybersecurity industry. Use it as an opportunity to explore and to deepen your enthusiasm.

Many of us, for most of our lives, have heard about the necessity of “climbing the ladder of success.” When you reach a certain age, the expectation is that you naturally will have progressed into middle or upper management. In the security industry, I’ve seen quite a few incredibly talented and passionate individuals burn out or leave their jobs due to the lack of a clear, authentic path for career progression. Even for those of us who have remained, there can be a lingering sense of confusion or a lack of motivation if we are uncertain about the road ahead as we achieve a certain level of seniority.

This is a fairly new industry, which means there are fewer identifiable “next steps” as far as careers go. Many of us seem to fly by the seat of our pants and take whatever position that sounds appealing rather than be directed by specific goals. And when that no longer works, some feel it necessary to get out of the industry entirely.

Another complication is that the sorts of job transitions into management that might be sensible in other industries are less applicable in tech and information security. The skills needed to configure a corporate network or code a complex widget are significantly different from getting a group of unpredictable hominoids to do your bidding. As a result, it becomes perfectly acceptable (and often more efficient) to hire people into management positions who are less technically savvy but better at motivating a group of technical subject-matter experts.

That’s not to say that brilliant engineers can’t be amazing people-managers. These skill sets can and often do overlap. Plus, there are ways to improve your management skills, if this is something you want to pursue. On the other hand, if you find you’ve achieved your “highest level of incompetence” in management, it does not have to be a career-limiting maneuver if you decide to go back to a technical trajectory.

Considering the Options
There is usually a short list of things people are after when they think about “climbing the corporate ladder”: money, intellectual enrichment, and respect. While joining the C-suite is certainly one way to achieve that, it’s not the only way. Here are a few suggestions to help you find a career path in line with your abilities and interests:

Focus on technology. Many higher-level positions revolve around technology management rather than people. Think of these as architect-type positions where you plan or design research and development projects rather than direct the people implementing them. These are often higher-paying positions, if more money is your objective.

If this is too far removed from the nitty-gritty, consider two alternative directions. The first is to explore laterally: are there projects or subjects you’d be interested in investigating? Sometimes a departmental “exchange program” can be an interesting change of pace. The second is to specialize: Can you get a much more in-depth knowledge of your area of interest? Specialist roles may also allow you to command a higher salary. While this choice carries some risk — all areas of specialization eventually will go extinct — if you’re willing to move laterally, it need not be a dead end.

Find inspiration. Sponsorship and mentorship are great ways to get ahead once you’ve decided on a pathway, as is having a peer who is on a similar career expansion journey. Having someone who can amplify your voice as well as your insight can make your own trek seem less overwhelming. And don’t be deterred by the people who express concern about their ability to attract mentors and sponsors when they don’t get the reflected glory of having a protégé climbing the ranks. It’s certainly possible to find people who are intrinsically motivated to offer assistance. But performing well at a high-profile project can also offer extrinsic motivation.

Inspire others. It’s also very possible to act as a leader without having official management responsibilities. “Thought leadership” can raise the profile of individuals and their organizations by giving others the benefit of expert experience. Team leaders can raise the skill level of a single mentee, a group, or a whole organization. And, as with mentorship and sponsorship, this type of leadership can provide both extrinsic and intrinsic motivation.

With an ever-growing skills gap, we can scarcely afford to lose any talent, much less people with significant experience. Don’t let career stagnation be an exit ramp. Use it as an opportunity to explore and to deepen your enthusiasm.

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Lysa Myers began her tenure in malware research labs in the weeks before the Melissa virus outbreak in 1999. She has watched both the malware landscape and the security technologies used to prevent threats from growing and changing dramatically. Because keeping up with all … View Full Bio

Article source: https://www.darkreading.com/vulnerabilities---threats/who-says-brilliant-security-engineers-cant-be-amazing-people-managers/a/d-id/1330248?_mc=rss_x_drr_edt_aud_dr_x_x-rss-simple

Office 365 Missed 34,000 Phishing Emails Last Month

Nearly 10% of emails delivered to Office 365 inboxes were spam, phishing messages, and known or zero-day malware.

Microsoft Office 365 missed 9.3% emails containing spam, phishing, and malware from the beginning of September through early October, report Cyren researchers, who analyzed 10.7 million messages.

The threat intelligence firm gauges clients’ email security with its Email Security Gap Analysis tool. Inbound emails are processed by its email security system, and all messages that go on to users’ inboxes are BCC’d to Cyren’s system for automated analysis.

“It’s a standard engagement we have with clients,” says Pete Starr, Cyren’s director of field engineering. “But occasionally we get some interesting nuggets of information.” Researchers were curious about how Office 365 was performing, which led to evaluating its security.

During the month of September, Cyren analyzed 10.7 million emails forwarded by Office 365 to user mailboxes for companies tested during that time frame. Of the messages evaluated, 9.75 million (90.7%) were found to be clean. This included 4.6 million newsletter emails, which made up nearly half of legitimate email traffic.

Nearly one million (9.3% of) messages were spam or malicious emails missed by Office 365, says Cyren, noting that the standard Office365 email service has Exchange Online Protection (EOP) to protect against malware and spam. The “false negatives” should not have made it to inboxes.

Researchers found 957,039 emails, or 8.93% of all email traffic, turned out to be spam. Usually, these messages are filtered out through content scanning or pattern detection applied to elements of the email message or its distribution pattern.

Spam aside, 34,077 emails delivered to Office 365 users were phishing messages. Of these, 18,052 were financial phishing emails requesting banking details or account access, 5,424 were password phishing emails, and 10,601 were general phishing emails.

“The biggest shock was just how much was coming through,” says Starr. “Yes, the majority of it is spam, but quite a lot is something you don’t want.”

He refers to the malware attachments found on 3,900 emails delivered to users. While a tiny percentage (0.04%) of all emails delivered, it’s also the most dangerous. Of those malware emails, 1,438 were zero-day attachments with no previously known malware signatures. However, malware attached to 2,462 emails was known and should have been detected.

“What really surprised me was the two-and-a-half thousand samples of known malware,” Starr says. “Stuff caught by basic, signature-based detection. You expect that kind of stuff to be filtered out.”

Is the customer at fault, or is Microsoft? Starr puts some blame on both parties. “Your average Office 365 customer is less well-configured; they perhaps don’t have the best policies on average,” he explains.

However, he continues, Microsoft’s solution is particularly reliant on reputation-based filtering, meaning the extent of their knowledge is only as good as their database. Today, with the rise of distributed attacks involving malware, phishing, spam, and botnets, many machines involved are fresh IPs. There’s a good chance they won’t exist inside an IP reputation database, he says.

“Being able to track new IPs is very, very difficult,” says Starr. “You find out about them when it’s too late.”

For businesses hoping to improve their email security, he advises being more sensible about whitelists, noting that many organizations are too broad when adding domain names to their whitelists and letting potentially harmful messages in.

Another mistake is not appreciating how much valid email exists in other languages, like Chinese or Russian. “People either completely block, or completely allow them,” he adds, suggesting users take full advantage of email features to set more specific filters.

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Kelly Sheridan is Associate Editor at Dark Reading. She started her career in business tech journalism at Insurance Technology and most recently reported for InformationWeek, where she covered Microsoft and business IT. Sheridan earned her BA at Villanova University. View Full Bio

Article source: https://www.darkreading.com/cloud/office-365-missed-34000-phishing-emails-last-month/d/d-id/1330282?_mc=rss_x_drr_edt_aud_dr_x_x-rss-simple

North Korea Faces Accusations of Hacking Into Warship Builder Daewoo

North Korea suspected by South Korea of stealing warship blueprints from Daewoo Shipbuilding Marine Engineering.

South Korea’s Ministry of Defense alleges a recent security breach of Daewoo Shipbuilding Marine Engineering’s database was committed by North Korea, according to a Reuters report.

The defense ministry believes copies of Daewoo’s warship blueprints were taken in the breach, which occured in April, states the Reuters report.

South Korea’s investigators claim the hacking techniques used on Daewoo were similar to ones North Korea is believed to have used in other attacks, a South Korean opposition lawmaker told Reuters.

North Korea hackers allegedly stole a cache of South Korea’s classified military documents, including operational plans from the US-Korean War, the report states.

Read more about the Daewoo breach here.

Dark Reading’s Quick Hits delivers a brief synopsis and summary of the significance of breaking news events. For more information from the original source of the news item, please follow the link provided in this article. View Full Bio

Article source: https://www.darkreading.com/endpoint/north-korea-faces-accusations-of-hacking-into-warship-builder-daewoo/d/d-id/1330286?_mc=rss_x_drr_edt_aud_dr_x_x-rss-simple

Troll gets 5 years for framing brother-in-law as terrorist and paedophile

A troll who launched what police called a “despicable” online smear campaign against his former brother-in-law, casting him as a paedophile and a would-be bomber, has been sentenced to more than five years in jail.

The Independent reports that 26-year-old Shohidul Islam, of Bradford, in the UK, “fell to pieces” when he couldn’t scrape together the £30,000 needed to bring his wife – Fahmida Parveen Shuba – and son over from Bangladesh.

It had been an arranged marriage. The couple wed in 2010, but she stayed in Bangladesh. Judge Rebecca Poulet QC last week told the court that Islam’s ex-wife had been “unhappy and afraid” of him at the time. By 2016, their relationship was over.

But Islam was not, evidently, through with his ex-wife or her family.

Acting out of revenge, Islam set up fake social media profiles in the name of Mohammed Razaul Karim – his ex-wife’s brother. Islam used those fake profiles to falsely paint Karim as an Islamic State supporter, somebody who was plotting bomb attacks, and as a child predator.

Islam used his brother-in-law’s photos to take out the fake accounts on Twitter, Facebook and YouTube. Then, he used the accounts to publish praise for previous terror attacks in the UK and showing support for the Islamic State.

Islam also used the imposter accounts to publish names and addresses of British soldiers, in an apparent call for others to target them in terror attacks. Posing as Karim’s uncle, he also filed a false report about Karim supposedly planning to detonate a “microwave bomb” at a primary school in Canning Town, east London.

According to the News Star, Islam also framed Karim as a paedophile by creating a video using the fake social media profile on YouTube. The video was reportedly titled “Must watch child abuser, stay away from him” and included an image of Karim.

Prosecutor Mark Weekes told the court that the video alleged that Karim had been convicted of child abuse in his “home country”, in 2001 and suggested that he targets children online, has been arrested several times for child sex offenses and should be deported from the UK.

Weekes:

Needless to say, the allegation is entirely untrue.

Islam also made “pseudo indecent images of children” and sent them to Karim’s family. He also created a profile on the porn website X Videos and posted material to it in the name of Karim and his wife.

When police arrested Islam at a job centre in January 2016, they found a copy of the notorious Anarchist Cookbook on his mobile phone. First published in 1971, the book contains, amongst other things, instructions on making bombs and other weapons.

Islam initially denied the charges, but he changed his plea to guilty four days into his trial. He admitted to two counts of reckless encouragement of terrorism, possession of material useful to a terrorist, making a bomb hoax and making indecent images.

He was sentenced to five years and eight months jail time. Separate charges of making indecent images will be kept on file. He was also given a restraining order against further contact with Karim and his family.

The judge said that Karim, the target of the “wicked campaign”, was completely innocent but could have faced “dire consequences” had he come to the attention of authorities.


Article source: http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/nakedsecurity/~3/bRdUbOdvT5k/

London Heathrow Airport’s security laid bare by one lost USB stick

If someone set out to invent a risky way to transport important data around it’s hard to imagine they’d better the USB flash stick for calamitous efficiency.

They’re cheap enough to feel disposable, store large numbers of files, and despite years of mishaps barely any are sold with encryption security.

They’re also incredibly popular – which is why in 2017 we’re still writing about cases like the USB stick found in a west London street that turned out to contain 2.5Gb of unprotected files detailing many of the anti-terrorism procedures and systems used to protect one of the world’s busiest airports.

This included: the route taken by the Queen, politicians and dignitaries when using the airport’s secure departure suite; radio codes used to indicate hijackings; details of maintenance and escape tunnels and CCTV locations; a timetable of police patrols; information of security ID cards; and details of the surveillance system used to monitor runways and the airport perimeter.

The only reason we know any of this is that the man who picked up the stick decided to report the discovery to a national newspaper, prompting the airport to launch a “very, very urgent” investigation.

Superficially, this resembles a good news story, a lucky escape that could have been so much worse.

Heathrow will ask the same questions as countless organisations before it: who copied the data and why? Did they have permission? Why wasn’t the stick secured?

The optimistic scenario is that someone unwisely decided to move a few files around and lost the USB stick in an act of carelessness. A more pessimistic possibility is that someone stole the data to order or to sell, which implies troubling things about network data security at Britain’s biggest airport.

The nature of the leaked information shows that USB stick incidents aren’t merely embarrassing, they can be extremely serious.

The lesson might be that in an era when employees can use more secure cloud storage, USB sticks should simply be banned. This has been tried, most notably by the US Department of Defense in 2008.

Mandating that sticks must be encrypted is another option, but this comes with the drawback that drivers are needed for every platform the drive might be plugged into (i.e. Mac and Linux machines as well as Windows).

Using sticks in this way also means organisations must invest in a provisioning system capable of tracking individual drives, resetting passwords, and remotely wiping data.

Even then, there’s still the small matter of making the sticks immune to more advanced cryptographic and physical tampering demanded by many compliance regimes, which for storage is governed by the US Government’s FIPS 140 levels 1-4.  This involves a lot of testing and doesn’t come cheap.

We haven’t even mentioned the fact that USB sticks have a bad habit of picking up malware on their travels.

But let’s not fall into the trap of assuming that because USB sticks are somewhere between an expensive hassle and an outright grade one security risk, they can be quickly pensioned off.

Like it or not, they are inside every organisation by the bucket-load and won’t go away any time soon. As long as there are USB ports on computers to plug them into, they will be a problem.

From the fateful day the first USB sticks were plugged into computers by delighted employees in the late 1990s, securing them has been – at best – about containment. If only we’d known then what we know now.


Article source: http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/nakedsecurity/~3/3taRVWqPuEA/

Majority of Employees Hit with Ransomware Personally Make Payment

Office workers pay an average ransom of $1,400, according to a new report.

A whopping 59% of employees who have sustained a ransomware attack at work personally paid the extortion money, according to a report released today by Intermedia.

The 2017 Data Vulnerability Report Part 2, a survey of 1,000 office workers at small-to midsized businesses, also found 68% of business owners and executives personally paid ransom payments. The average ransom paid was approximately $1,400, the study notes.

Potential Payment Drivers

“I think employees pay it because it’s fast,” speculates Jonathan Levine, Intermedia’s CTO. “While everyone is trying to figure out the company’s policy on paying ransom, the people still need to get the work done.”

He believes most employees do not back up their work, and adds it’s not surprising a majority of the workers personally paid the ransom.

But Chris Hornick, president-elect of the Northern California Human Resources Association and CEO of HBSC Strategic Services, has a different view on why employees are willing to shell out hundreds of dollars of their own money.

If an employer learns that company equipment is used for non-work related activities, it could be a fireable offense, Hornick says.

For example, if an employee clicks on a bogus email attachment touting details for a free luxurious vacation to the Bahamas and it results in a ransomware attack, the employee may face termination.

“This could be why employees don’t want to disclose it and pay the ransom themselves,” Hornick says. “It’s a double-edged sword because usually employees know their employer wants them to disclose ransomware attacks.”

Workforce Ransomware Education

The survey also reports that 70% of respondents say their employer regularly communicates about cyberthreats, and that 69% are familiar with ransomware. However, given that the majority of office workers still pay the ransom themselves, Levine says it suggests companies have not yet taken the extra step to inform employees what to do if they are attacked by ransomware.

“A lot of the security education is around how not to get hit, versus what to do once you get hit,” Levine says, adding, “People are bad when it comes to planning for low-probability events, even catastrophic ones.”

Thirty-seven percent of survey respondents note their employers paid the ransom. The Intermedia report advises companies to inform workers about the possible dangers of dealing with ransomware attackers directly.

The report also advises creating an environment where employees realize there is no shame in becoming a ransomware victim, and that personally paying ransom should never be an option.

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Join Dark Reading LIVE for two days of practical cyber defense discussions. Learn from the industry’s most knowledgeable IT security experts. Check out the INsecurity agenda here.

Dawn Kawamoto is an Associate Editor for Dark Reading, where she covers cybersecurity news and trends. She is an award-winning journalist who has written and edited technology, management, leadership, career, finance, and innovation stories for such publications as CNET’s … View Full Bio

Article source: https://www.darkreading.com/endpoint/majority-of-employees-hit-with-ransomware-personally-make-payment/d/d-id/1330267?_mc=rss_x_drr_edt_aud_dr_x_x-rss-simple

Phishing Kits Regularly Reused by Cybercriminals

In 27% of cases, a phishing kit is re-used on more than one host.

Phishing kits get re-used across multiple websites in 27% of cases, a new study shows.

All it takes to generate a new phishing kit is a single change to a file, the Duo Security report says. “Seeing so many unique phishing campaigns shows it is easy to make these kits and re-use them,” says Jordan Wright, senior research and development engineer at Duo.

In its report – which examined 66,000 URLs over the course of a month and more than 7,800 phishing kits – researchers found two kits used on more than 30 hosts.

Re-using phishing kits ups the return on investment (ROI) for cybercriminals, who don’t need to spend time to recreate various assets from a legitimate site to make a bogus one to steal users’ credentials and information.

To create a phishing kit, attackers clone a legitimate site and alter the login page to point to a credential-stealing script, Duo notes in its report. The website’s modified files, such as logos, images, and other features, are put into a zip file to create a phishing kit, which is then uploaded to the hacked website where the files are unzipped. The attacker then blasts out phishing emails, hoping to lure victims to click on the bogus malicious website.

“These kits are being used for commodity phishing, so the spoofed pages are not as convincing as spear phishing,” Wright notes. “Some kits are bad and I don’t think will fool anyone and some kits are almost exact replicas. The actors want to spoof large service providers like Gmail and get as many credentials as possible.”

Typical phishing kit users include both beginners who favor the ease-of-use of the kits, as well as seasoned attackers who want to expand their phishing campaigns quickly, Wright explains.

Tracking the Bad Guys

And bad actors have no qualms when it comes to stealing from each other. Some of the phishing kits that were sold, traded, or offered for free had backdoor shells in the kits, allowing the initial phishing kit owner to pilfer any data gleaned from the new campaigns launched by the subsequent attacker.

“The backdoor also allows the author to run system commands on the host, so it can take over the host,” Wright adds.

Duo also tracked the email addresses found in the phishing kits to correlate actors to specific campaigns and kits. As a result, they discovered 24% of the email addresses were tied to multiple phishing kits, according to the report.

One email address, wirez[@]googledocs[.]org, had more than 115 unique phishing kits to spoof multiple service providers.

The prevalence of phishing kits tracks with a general trend in cybercrime that is focusing on attacking the end-user as a means to get credentials to go deeper into the bowels of a company’s network, rather than directly breaking into the network, Wright notes.

Duo, meanwhile, has released a free phishing tracking tool for others to use.

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Join Dark Reading LIVE for two days of practical cyber defense discussions. Learn from the industry’s most knowledgeable IT security experts. Check out the INsecurity agenda here.

Dawn Kawamoto is an Associate Editor for Dark Reading, where she covers cybersecurity news and trends. She is an award-winning journalist who has written and edited technology, management, leadership, career, finance, and innovation stories for such publications as CNET’s … View Full Bio

Article source: https://www.darkreading.com/endpoint/phishing-kits-regularly-reused-by-cybercriminals/d/d-id/1330269?_mc=rss_x_drr_edt_aud_dr_x_x-rss-simple

Stop Counting Vulnerabilities & Start Measuring Risk

When security teams report on real risk, executive teams can gain a much better understanding of the company’s security posture.

As a security team, you are what you measure. The problem is that too many security teams are counting vulnerabilities, not measuring risk. It’s time we examine how vital it is for security teams to establish risk-based metrics, while offering some examples of both the right and wrong measures to use.

Why is the distinction between these approaches so vital? It’s essential for security teams to understand the spectrum of risk, based both on the likelihood of an incident and the potential damage that may result.

Fundamentally, risk measurement provides a way for security teams to work smarter. They can focus their time, budget, and resources on what matters most: reducing risk. Risk measurement also provides teams with a centralized way to accumulate, analyze, and report on risk, which helps significantly improve operational efficiency.

When you adopt a risk management approach, you focus on what poses the largest and likeliest effects on the business, effectively tracking and making progress toward the ultimate goal: reducing uncertainty. Contrast this with measuring the quantity of vulnerabilities, where metrics are focused on measuring work rather than outcomes.

Before we can discuss risk, let’s establish definitions. Rather than starting from scratch, I’d suggest you take a look at these from the Open Group and Daniel Miessler:

It’s often easiest to think of risk as uncertainty, and our job as security professionals is to remove as much uncertainty as we can.

The Problem: Security Can’t Go It Alone
The security team has started taking a risk management approach and everything is going to be rosy, right? Not exactly. Once a security team embraces risk management, the hard work is just beginning. The rest of the organization needs to start following the team’s example. How does security build support for risk management across teams?

For security teams and the business to succeed in reducing uncertainty, risk management must be incorporated into operations across the organization. When security starts to be part of operations — rather than an ad hoc afterthought— the critical efforts that need to happen, do happen.

To begin, focus on two key steps:

  • Measurement. Practitioners must make sure they’re measuring actual risk. All key stakeholders should buy off on what is being measured and ensure actual risk reduction is being addressed.
  • Integration. Once you’re reporting on risk, it’s critical to make sure risk management is part of operations.

Step 1: Selecting the Right Metrics for Measuring Risk
I meet with practitioners from a wide range of industries and often see the same missteps. Chief among these is that security teams are measuring the wrong things.

More often than not, teams take a “best practices” approach. Security analysts may run a report and find their checklist of vulnerabilities has been unaddressed for longer than 90 days. Then they’ll prioritize efforts based on this aging data, focusing on how long a vulnerability has existed. Likewise, I often see companies focusing on the security news of the day over items that may be less attention-getting but pose a greater risk.

Contrast these somewhat arbitrary approaches with a risk-based strategy. With a risk-based approach, you may realize that those older vulnerabilities don’t pose as much risk, but that three vulnerabilities discovered yesterday pose both a great likelihood of resulting in an incident and significant potential damage to the business. With this insight, the need to remediate these three vulnerabilities sooner is clear.

When you focus on the quantity or aging of vulnerabilities, you deprioritize higher-risk items that have a high likelihood or impact.

These contrasting scenarios underscore the importance of tracking and reporting with the right metrics. Metrics are vital in guiding behavior and play a key role in measuring success, tracking progress, getting buy-in, and investing in new approaches

It can be far better to address one high-risk vulnerability than even 100 low-risk vulnerabilities. The key is to establish metrics and analytics that measure risk in an empirical, meaningful way, so you can make these calculations with clarity.

While specific metrics that are optimal will vary somewhat depending on the nature of the business and environment, there are some common do’s and don’ts when it comes to choosing metrics.

Here are some metrics to avoid:

  • Total open vulnerabilities
  • Average vulnerability age
  • Total vulnerabilities open longer than X days

Organizations that use a risk-based approach can consider tracking a number of key metrics:

  • Remediation rate of high-risk vulnerabilities with breakdowns
  • Median time to remediate a high-risk vulnerability
  • Median time to discover a high-risk vulnerability
  • Number of high-risk assets (which is very different than tracking high-risk vulnerabilities)

By and large, if you’re tracking these metrics and seeing progress, you are making real improvements in reducing risk.

Step 2: Integrate Risk Management into Operation Processes
When it comes to operationalizing risk management, don’t start by trying to create new operational processes. Instead, focus on transparently integrating risk management into existing processes.

Too often, security teams create out-of-band tools and procedures — and results suffer. Under any circumstances, it will be challenging to get teams to focus on security activities. Creating unique tools and workflows significantly exacerbates this challenge.

To significantly enhance your odds of success, leverage existing teams’ processes wherever possible. Look to bake risk management into existing tools and workflows that staff members are using every day, including bug tracking and incident management. In effect, you’re starting with what everyone is doing today and applying a risk-based lens to it.

The Payoff of Operationalizing Risk Management
When security teams adopt risk management, good things start to happen for these groups:

  • Security staffers start measuring real risk and understand how best to reduce uncertainty.
  • Those in IT operations become more productive. They aren’t stuck feeling like they’re doing busywork for the security folks; rather, they get visibility into risks facing the business and how they can play a part in reducing them.

When security teams start tracking and reporting on real risk, executive teams can gain a much better understanding of the company’s security posture, how it’s changing, and, most importantly, which efforts and investments need to be made to improve it.  

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Ed Bellis is a security industry veteran and expert and was once named Information Security Executive of the Year. He founded Kenna Security to deliver a data-driven, risk-based approach to remediation and help IT teams prioritize and thwart would-be security threats. Ed is … View Full Bio

Article source: https://www.darkreading.com/vulnerabilities---threats/stop-counting-vulnerabilities-and-start-measuring-risk/a/d-id/1330220?_mc=rss_x_drr_edt_aud_dr_x_x-rss-simple

Only good guys would use an automated GPU-powered password-cracker … right?

FireEye reckons sysadmins need help enforcing enterprise password rules, so it’s released and open-sourced a tool that distributes password testing across multiple GPU-equipped machines.

GoCrack (at GitHub) combines the management of a red team’s cracking tasks with privilege management, so the password tests don’t fall into the wrong hands.

Only creators of task data, or those they delegate permission to, can see the contents of a cracking task. “Modifications to a task, viewing of cracked passwords, downloading a task file, and other sensitive actions are logged and available for auditing by administrators”, the company explains in its blog post.

The cracking engine’s dictionaries, mangling rules and the like are made available to other users, but the administrator can protect them against views or edits.

Under the hood, GoCrack uses hashcat v3.6 or higher, and while it doesn’t need an external database server, it supports LDAP or database-backed authentication.

The server component runs on any Linux server with Docker, and NVIDIA Docker lets GoCrack run in a container with full GPU access.

Future plans include MySQL and PostgreSQP database support, UI support for file editing, automatic task expiration, and expanded hashcat configuration. ®

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Article source: http://go.theregister.com/feed/www.theregister.co.uk/2017/10/31/fireeye_simplifies_hashcat/

Updating Things: IETF bods suggest standard

A trio of ARM engineers have devoted some of their free time* to working up an architecture to address the problem of delivering software updates to internet-connected things.

Repeated IoT breaches – whether it’s cameras, light bulbs, toys or various kinds of sex toys – have made it painfully clear that too many Things aren’t updated, and/or can’t be.

In this so-far-informational Internet Draft, Brendan Moran, Milosch Meriac and Hannes Tschofenig note that the problem is worse “when devices have a long lifetime, are deployed in remote or inaccessible areas or where manual intervention is cost prohibitive or otherwise difficult”.

Updates have to use authentication to ensure malicious updates are an impossibility, and also protected against recovering the binary.

Other requirements are that updates are medium-agnostic, support broadcast delivery, are secure, can use a small bootloader, don’t need a new firmware format, and have “robust permissions” (including authoring, storage, apply the update, approval, and qualification).

The document outlines how PKI should be used to manage those permissions, and update both the firmware’s digital certificate and a target device’s public key.

The work arises out of last year’s Internet of Things Software Update Workshop (IoTSU), and is discussed at this mailing list. ®

*As always, while the authors have identified their employer, contributions to IETF standardisation work is offered as individuals.

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Article source: http://go.theregister.com/feed/www.theregister.co.uk/2017/10/31/ietf_internet_of_things_update_security/