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An intelligence analyst (IA) with the New York State Intelligence Center has uncovered a major 16-member credit card fraud ring responsible for 32 incidents in eight US states. She was able to find the gang with the help of the FBI’s National Data Exchange (N-DEx) System, says a release on the agency’s website. 

In early 2015, the IA was responding to an “Attempt to Identify” alert from Virginia pertaining to an incident in which two people were found using cloned credit cards at a liquor store. The IA could identify one and dug up the N-DEx System for information on the other. This led her to find data that linked one incident to another until she eventually unearthed an extensive credit card fraud scheme originating from Far Rockaway, New York, targeting liquor and cigarette stores.

The IA was able to put together detailed information in a 22-page dossier that benefited 21 law enforcement agencies all over the country.

“I developed this case [almost] exclusively with N-DEx, and without the system, this case would not have been nearly as successful,” she says.

Read more details here.

Dark Reading’s Quick Hits delivers a brief synopsis and summary of the significance of breaking news events. For more information from the original source of the news item, please follow the link provided in this article. View Full Bio

Article source: http://www.darkreading.com/fbis-n-dex-system-helps-unearth-credit-card-fraud-ring/d/d-id/1328161?_mc=RSS_DR_EDT

Cybersecurity is built, at least in part, on fingerprinting and cataloging malware. Polymorphic malware has always existed, but the recent proliferation of do-it-yourself builders, which allow novice hackers to easily create unique crimeware, is sending ripples through the threat intelligence industry.

The primary method of identifying malware has always been file hashing. A file hash is produced through a mathematic operation that creates a unique fingerprint for files, allowing security vendors to compare a suspicious sample against known files from the past.

The weakness of the file hash is that if even a single byte changes, the hash value changes too. The ease of building “zero-day” hash variations killed the old antivirus industry, which relied too heavily on looking up hashes in signature databases. Today’s detection industry has already adjusted to polymorphic malware. Instead of using hashes, modern detection products monitor malware behavior on the endpoint or in sandboxes, or utilize machine learning to look inside files and recognize similarities to known malware.

In today’s detection industry, one should think of hashing as more of a shortcut to locate the easy stuff, or rule out known good files (whitelisting). It’s also a data transfer shortcut: one can avoid moving an entire file across the network or into the cloud by instead sending a small hash value, and then query it against a hash database.

While detection products have adjusted, file hashes are still used in categorizing malware, sharing intelligence, and working backward to figure out who your adversary is, referred to as attribution. Herein lies a growing problem.

Threat Intel to Know Your Enemy and Predict Behaviors
Humans are habitual creatures who do not get up in the morning each day and learn an entirely new set of tools and a way of operating. They fall into a pattern of “Tools, Tactics, and Procedures,” or TTPs. TTPs can also be used to profile and predict hacker behaviors. Because TTPs include the tendency for hackers to reuse malware for multiple targets, there is value in organizations comparing their suspicious samples with others across the industry.

For example, upon locating a file sample in your organization, a researcher might want to tap into threat intel to identify the type and family of malware and learn of its behavior and capabilities. Thus, the workflow of threat intelligence usage is often, “I have malware with this hash; who else has seen it?” But what happens when the proliferation of uniquely hashed malware is so great they are all unique to your organization? This erodes the collaborative value of threat intel.

It would be extreme to say the threat intelligence industry has lost its value. Intelligence also includes correlating malware behavior as well as URLs and IP addresses of command and control servers beaconed to by malware. Additionally all malware will never be unique; there are cases such as advanced persistent threats designed to sit on networks for many months, which — if their files are completely unique — would draw the attention of infosec personnel.

Yet there is a definite trend the industry is seeing toward increasing amounts of malware uniqueness. The 2015 Verizon DBIR Report, when commenting on the hashes of malware, proclaimed in capital letters that “Seventy to ninety percent OF MALWARE SAMPLES ARE UNIQUE.” Last year, Verizon doubled down on this stating, “We first wanted to reaffirm what we found last year regarding the uniqueness of hashes.” 2017’s DBIR Report claims that in data sets that it monitors, 99% of malware files are replaced by uniquely hashed binaries within 58 seconds of appearing.

The industry needs methods to classify malware, to determine who’s behind breaches, and what can be done to stop them. File hashing certainly appears to becoming less useful to accomplish these aims. It’s time to adjust our thinking.

Editor’s Note: This is the first of a two-part series. Next week’s installment, Why We Need To Reinvent How We Catalogue Malware, will discuss how hackers have become adept at producing uniquely hashed malware, and what can be done, if anything, to classify this new ocean of unique cyberthreats.

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• How Technologies Incubated A Decade Ago Shape The World Today

Paul Shomo is a senior technical manager at Guidance Software, Inc. He first joined Guidance’s new product research group in 2006, which launched the industry’s first incident response solution. For years Paul managed and architected cybersecurity and forensic products, and … View Full Bio

Article source: http://www.darkreading.com/threat-intelligence/-what-to-do-when-all-malware-is-zero-day/a/d-id/1328155?_mc=RSS_DR_EDT

A Russian-speaking hacker who last November broke into the US Election Assistance Commission (EAC) network and attempted to sell access to its database has breached dozens of universities as well as city, state, and federal government agencies.

All but 10 of the more than 50 victims targeted by the hacker are based in the US. They include Cornell University, Virginia Tech, the City of Springfield, MA, the Office of the Chief Financial Officer in D.C., US Department of Housing and Urban Development, and the Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory.

In an alert, threat intelligence management firm Recorded Future described the breaches by the hacker dubbed Rasputin as similar in nature to the intrusion at the EAC, and involving the use of a proprietary tool to locate and verify SQL injection flaws.

Recorded Future, which was the firm that first tied Rasputin to the EAC intrusion, said it had been monitoring the hacker’s activities in the months since then.

The scrutiny has shown Rasputin to be engaged in a systematic and sequential targeting of organizations in specific verticals, Recorded Future said. The targeting appears to be based on the hacker’s perception of the security preparedness of the victim organizations and the potential value of their data.

As with the EAC intrusion, Rasputin has been using a self-developed tool to search targeted websites for potential SQL injection flaws. But he isn’t actively exploiting his latest round of victims, says Levi Gundert, vice president of intelligence and strategy at Recorded Future.

“[Instead] he is selling the access so that other criminals can exploit the access for their own respective monetization strategies,” Gundert says.

The tactic is similar to the one Rasputin used after gaining access to the EAC website via an unpatched SQL injection vulnerability. In that incident, Recorded Future found that Rasputin had gathered about 100 access credentials, which included several with administrative privileges that would have allowed an attacker to access or modify data on the EAC network or plant malware on it.

The company identified Rasputin as trying to sell at least one unpatched system flaw to a buyer representing a Middle Eastern government.

Rasputin’s latest list of victims indicates he’s targeting organizations that likely have not paid as much attention to addressing low-hanging SQL injection flaws, compared to entities in regulated sectors like healthcare and financial services, Gundert says. “I think what you see in these attacks, is industry vertical-targeting where there may be less resources for monitoring or prevention via code auditing.”

SQL injection flaws have been well-understood and researched for a long time and are relatively easily addressed via proper coding practices. Yet they have continued to pose major problems for organizations across industry sectors. A slew of free tools like Havij, Ashiyane SQL Scanner, and SQL Inject Me, have made it trivially easy for virtually anyone to find exploitable SQL injection errors.

“These attacks are easy to perform, but potentially expensive to proactively remediate because code rewriting—especially in business critical applications—can be time consuming and require multiple human and technical resources,” Gundert says.

Regulations like PCI, HIPAA, and Sarbanex-Oxley have pushed financial and healthcare companies to better secure their code against the error. Even so, “there is a lack of economic incentives across all verticals to compel more investment in security fundamentals like code auditing,” he says.

Related stories:

• Obama: US Will Retaliate Against Russian Cyberattacks In Proportional Manner
• Russia Likely Behind DNC Breach, Says FBI
• SQL Injection Vulnerabilities Surge

Jai Vijayan is a seasoned technology reporter with over 20 years of experience in IT trade journalism. He was most recently a Senior Editor at Computerworld, where he covered information security and data privacy issues for the publication. Over the course of his 20-year … View Full Bio

Article source: http://www.darkreading.com/threat-intelligence/russian-speaking-rasputin-breaches-dozens-of-organizations/d/d-id/1328176?_mc=RSS_DR_EDT

RSA CONFERENCE – San Francisco – Email leaks notwithstanding, Hillary Clinton’s campaign manager Robby Mook says the campaign conducted regular security training for staffers, which included sending fake phishing emails to campaign staffers to see how they’d be handled.

“We sent out phishing emails of our own to test people and communicate back to team to see how far they were clicking, to educate people, and show their vulnerability and how much their choices matter,” Mook said in an interview at RSA Conference. He recalls at least three faux-phishing tests, adding there may have been more.

Mook says the campaign also emailed staffers regularly about good IT hygiene. “We had signs up in the bathrooms about not sharing passwords and ‘Don’t click on that link, stop and think’,” Mook says. Staff meetings also included regular security updates from the campaign’s IT director, he adds.

Mook made the rounds at the RSA Conference here this week, speaking about user vulnerability to inside attacks and speaking at the Global Insider Threat Summit sponsored by security vendor Dtex Systems.

Mook also wants to make clear that it was the Democratic National Committee’s servers that were hacked, not those of the Clinton campaign. The distinction is important; the campaign suffered from emails that were leaked from personal email accounts, notably, those from candidate Clinton, campaign chairman John Podesta, and other staffers. Hackers may have been helped by real phishing emails that Podesta or other users clicked on, and ultimately gave up addresses and passwords.

The DNC, separate from the Clinton campaign, had its servers hacked sometime in 2016; WikiLeaks published excerpts in July.

“We reminded people to keep [campaign] information out of their personal accounts,” Mook told Dark Reading. And they tried to encourage use of two-factor authentication and stronger passwords. The campaign also encouraged people to use texting when they didn’t want something showing up in email, Mook says.

What happened to the Clinton campaign wasn’t the result of malicious insiders but rather staffers clicking on a bad link, and the organization’s inability to mitigate an inside threat, Mook adds.

Some 68% of breaches can be traced back to some kind of employee negligence, says Dtex CEO Christy Wyatt. Her company teamed with Ponemon Research on a study called 2016 Costs of Insider Threats that surveyed 240 IT and security professionals.

But whether it’s a national political campaign, state or local governments or even SMBs, there’s not enormous sensitivity to the threat level that cyberattacks pose, Mook says. “Campaigns are money-strapped and security got pushed down – but that won’t be the case in the future,” he adds.

Political figures are vulnerable and prone to these sorts of online attacks. “They need to plan for the most aggressive attacks,” Mooks says.

Had the DNC been outfitted with a more robust system to monitor for inside threats, they may have caught the breach sooner, Mook claims. “The potential to disrupt like the Russians did is huge. We have to take steps to prevent that sort of thing from happening again.”

Mook believes there’s genuine bipartisan interest in security, pointing across the aisle to recent comments from Republican Senators John McCain, Mike McCall, and Marco Rubio. “If anyone is concerned about this, it’s politicians themselves,” Mook says. “They understand they may be the ones hurt tomorrow” by careless insiders, bad actors, and breaches.

Related Content:

• Clinton Campaign: Voter Analytics Program Compromised, Not Internal Systems
• Russian Hackers Behind DNC Breach Wage Post-US Election Attacks
• FBI, DHS Report Implicates Cozy Bear, Fancy Bear In Election-Related Hacks

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Terry Sweeney is a Los Angeles-based writer and editor who has covered technology, networking, and security for more than 20 years. He was part of the team that started Dark Reading and has been a contributor to The Washington Post, Crain’s New York Business, Red Herring, … View Full Bio

Article source: http://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/clinton-campaign-tested-staffers-with-fake-phishing-emails/d/d-id/1328177?_mc=RSS_DR_EDT

A newly discovered “app-in-the-middle” attack threatens the security of business data stored in Android for Work, which was designed to keep business and personal accounts separate.

The premise behind Android for Work, introduced in version 5.0 Lollipop, was to support the growth in bring-your-own-device (BYOD) policies. Users create two separate personas: a business persona with enterprise-level controls, and an open, unmanaged personal profile.

Enterprise apps, emails, and documents could be managed and secured through the business persona so admins wouldn’t be able to monitor their personal apps. IT departments could manage their environments for work activities without restricting personal apps.

The platform relied on Android’s user separation functionality, which allows different users to employ the same device. Work profiles are considered separate users, but they share icon badges and notifications with the personal profile.

It was a seemingly secure framework. Android for Work was created as an additional secure container so apps in the device’s personal profile should not have any access to the activity or content in the business persona.

Unfortunately, this isn’t the case. At this year’s RSAC, Skycure will demonstrate how a vulnerability in the separation logic of Android for Work can let malicious personal apps to view, steal, and manipulate apps and content that should be secured in the business profile.

“We will show how a malicious app installed on the personal side, which should only be able to access personal apps, can easily watch everything a person does on their business persona and perform acts on their behalf,” explains CTO and co-founder Yair Amit.

Skycure has been working with Google as part of a “coordinated disclosure” process through which users are informed of the flaw, which was discovered at the end of 2016 as Skycure was researching the security of mobile systems.

“It is imperative to share with the public the exposure,” Amit continues. “Android for Work is a very good system with the premise of good security, but it puts the organization at stake when they have a lot of control over what goes on in the business persona, but no control over what goes on in the personal side. The damage is actually pretty high.”

This technique is the “app-in-the-middle attack,” which resides in the personal profile but can steal corporate data as users interact with it. Because IT admins can’t monitor the personal profile from the work profile, they don’t know whether sensitive data has been exposed.

These attacks start by getting the victim to install a malicious personal app. The app uses system-level permissions built into Android — notifications permissions, accessibility permissions — to gain access to the business persona.

Once they have access to business apps, hackers can read emails, recover passwords to other systems, archive email, and perform a range of sensitive business activity. Victims have no clue they are under attack, says Amit. Attackers can gain access to more systems using this method.

One “app in the middle” attack is the Notification Access attack. Android for Work notifications are presented alongside personal notifications in the same interface. Because notifications access is a device-level permission, a malicious app in the personal profile can have permission to view and act on all notifications, including business alerts, because of the way it’s designed.

There’s also the Accessibility Permissions attack, which leverages Android’s Accessibility Service to improve user interface interaction with features like audible narration of text for the visually impaired. The Accessibility Service has access to all device content and controls, so a personal app that acquires Accessibility permissions can also access apps in the business side.

This vulnerability poses a risk to businesses, especially as Google pushes Android as a business tool. The more organizations that use it, the bigger risk it is. “Everything you do in your persona is compromised in these attacks,” Amit emphasizes.

There are steps businesses can take to mitigate the risk, he continues. In addition to employing a mobile defense system, Amit recommends educating employees of the danger. “Awareness is valuable,” he notes, and organizations should be aware of the technical ramifications of these attacks.

*Google recently switched the branding of Android for Work and now calls it “work features in Android”

Related Content:

• What To Do When All Malware Is Zero-Day
• The 10 Most Cyber-Exposed Cities In The US
• Clinton Campaign Tested Staffers With Fake Phishing Emails

Kelly is an associate editor for InformationWeek. She most recently reported on financial tech for Insurance Technology, before which she was a staff writer for InformationWeek and InformationWeek Education. When she’s not catching up on the latest in tech, Kelly enjoys … View Full Bio

Article source: http://www.darkreading.com/mobile/new-attack-threatens-android-for-work-security/d/d-id/1328180?_mc=RSS_DR_EDT

Researchers have discovered a new version of medical device hijack (MEDJACK), which is leaving medical devices like x-ray machines and MRI scanners vulnerable to cybercriminals. MEDJACK.3 is a sophisticated zero-day attack through which hackers steal patient data.

MEDJACK was discovered in 2015 as an organized initiative targeting medical devices in three disparate hospital attacks. TrapX Labs found medical devices provided backdoors for hackers to infiltrate healthcare networks because they’re the hardest devices to secure and remediate after an attack.

MEDJACK.2, discovered in 2016, is a more advanced version of the original. Cybercriminals used backdoors and botnets to exploit devices and enter networks. Because they used old malware to exploit older versions of Windows, they went undetected by endpoint security software.

At RSAC 2017, TrapX vice president of marketing Anthony James will discuss a new variation of the threat in the session MEDJACK.3: New Research on Attacks on Hospital Medical Devices. The company was conducting a proof-of-value investigation on the medical infrastructure of ten UK member hospitals when it noticed sophisticated advancements in how hackers entered networks.

James explains how experts created fake medical devices like MRI scanners and CT scanners on the hospital networks. When the devices started to get probed, the researchers learned how vulnerable the fake devices were. Devices were deployed on both older operating systems (Windows XP, Windows Server 2003) and newer ones (Windows 2008, 2012).

“What was really interesting and different was this [attack] was a little more targeted,” he says. “The others were indiscriminate – they would take anything that would accept malware.”

As the attack progressed, interesting data came to light. Researchers learned hackers were using an old malware spreader to redirect the attack towards older operating systems. An OS without specific security patches would be left vulnerable and accept the hacker’s tool.

The attack had been architected in a way that new operating systems would ignore it because they had been patched against those spreading capabilities. Newer systems wouldn’t even be alerted to such a low-level vulnerability.

A Dangerous Combination

Further, James continues, there were interesting characteristics in the malware, which is equipped with anti-detection capabilities. “It didn’t want to be detected by sandboxing systems and newer advanced protection threat systems,” he says. If a victim had a sandbox, it would lay dormant.

“The combination is concerning,” he notes. “Attackers are leveraging legacy malware-spreading tools that bypass a lot of today’s operating systems and target older systems.”

This is a major problem for the healthcare industry because most medical devices run old software. A high percentage of healthcare infrastructure already has these types of attacks resident in their medical devices; they just don’t know it.

“Of all the [healthcare] breaches in the last 1-2 years, there hadn’t been a drastic change in how to protect the infrastructure,” James notes.

It takes years for healthcare devices to get certified, and technology continues to change in the meantime. Once a device is certified on the Windows XP operating system, they won’t go back through the multi-year process to get re-certified on an upgraded system.

The healthcare space is a hotspot for cybercriminals seeking easy access to sensitive patient data. Major cyberattacks on the healthcare industry grew 63% in 2016, TrapX found. Sophisticated hackers were responsible for 31% of all major HIPAA data breaches in 2016, marking a 300% jump over the past three years.

It’s a tough problem to tackle, and lack of both funding and awareness is putting institutions at risk. There are best practices healthcare organizations can adopt to protect themselves. Segregating the networks is an important step, James notes.

“It’s one of the glaringly obvious things,” he says. For example, make devices separate in design so the x-ray doesn’t connect to the nurses’ station; this could prevent the spread of an attack.

He also recommends healthcare organizations regularly update devices with new software and patches as often as they can. This isn’t very different from standard IT infrastructure, but healthcare institutions often don’t have the mentality that devices are all on the same network. These devices are viewed as industrial machines, but they can be breach points.

TrapX will discuss the details of MEDJACK.3 and strategies healthcare institutions can implement to protect themselves from this threat and future MEDJACK attacks.

Related Content:

• IoT Security: A Ways To Go, But Some Interim Steps For Safety
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Kelly is an associate editor for InformationWeek. She most recently reported on financial tech for Insurance Technology, before which she was a staff writer for InformationWeek and InformationWeek Education. When she’s not catching up on the latest in tech, Kelly enjoys … View Full Bio

Article source: http://www.darkreading.com/endpoint/medjack3-poses-advanced-threat-to-hospital-devices/d/d-id/1328172?_mc=RSS_DR_EDT

Yahoo is sending messages to some users alerting them to the use of forged cookies to access their data in a third breach of customer accounts in 2015-2016, CNBC reports. Some of these hacks are attributed to a “state-sponsored actor” also involved with the 2014 Yahoo breach in which 500 million accounts were compromised.

Yahoo did not reveal the number of accounts affected by the third breach but confidential data, including email addresses and security details, were compromised in the incident disclosed last December.

A company spokesperson said: “The investigation has identified user accounts for which we believe forged cookies were taken or used. Yahoo is in the process of notifying all potentially affected account holders.”

The three incidents have been bad news for Yahoo, particularly because the company has been in a takeover deal with Verizon Communications. Bloomberg reports the breach disclosures have allowed Verizon to renegotiate the deal and reduce the decided purchase price of $4.8 billion by $250 million.

Click CNBC for details.

Dark Reading’s Quick Hits delivers a brief synopsis and summary of the significance of breaking news events. For more information from the original source of the news item, please follow the link provided in this article. View Full Bio

Article source: http://www.darkreading.com/yahoo-warns-users-of-forged-cookies-in-third-breach-/d/d-id/1328178?_mc=RSS_DR_EDT

Ukraine has accused the Russian security service of attacking the country’s infrastructure using a new virus designed to render industrial equipment non-functional, Reuters reports. At a recent press conference, Ukraine’s security service chief of staff Oleksandr Tkachuk stated the attacks appear to come from the creators of malware BlackEnergy; the same people were allegedly responsible for cyberattacks on the country’s energy industry since December 2015.

Ukraine blamed Russia for 6,500 cyberattacks in November and December of last year, including those on Kiev’s power grid and the State Treasury. If the most recent allegations are true, Ukraine could push the US for a joint effort in fighting the Russian cyberthreat.

“Russian hackers and infobots become an important tool of the aggression against our country,” said Tkachuk, adding that a mechanism called Telebots was employed to target computers controlling its industrial infrastructure.

Another cybersecurity company, CyberX, claims to have unearthed an espionage scheme in Ukraine targeting 60 victims. It fears this could be a launching pad for further attacks.

Read full story here.

Dark Reading’s Quick Hits delivers a brief synopsis and summary of the significance of breaking news events. For more information from the original source of the news item, please follow the link provided in this article. View Full Bio

Article source: http://www.darkreading.com/ukraine-blames-russia-for-new-virus-targeting-infrastructure/d/d-id/1328179?_mc=RSS_DR_EDT

The past few months have seen a deluge of attacks on database deployments in production environments. Victor Gevers, an ethical hacker and founder of GDI Foundation, broke news about attacks on MongoDB instances in December, and this was covered again in the Kaspersky Labs blog. We then heard about attackers going after CouchDB and Hadoop databases in the wild.

Attackers all targeted instances that they thought would have valuable data — for example, databases owned by healthcare providers and telcos. Soon, tens of thousands of database instances were reported to be held for ransom, and the world of IT security had its next mega-crisis. This trend of going after corporate data in production environments for fame and profit, known as data-jacking, has only just begun.

Here’s what we know so far about these attacks:

This round of attacks was opportunistic and relatively unsophisticated. Attackers were going after low-hanging fruit and quick wins rather than specifically picking targets they wanted to compromise. For example, in the case of MongoDB, the attackers used a Shodan query to find unprotected MongoDB servers online. In other cases, the attackers used readily available toolkits to get access to vulnerable instances.

The rise of untraceable cryptocurrency is making it easier for data-jackers to get away with ransom. The attackers invariably asked for ransom in Bitcoins. In many instances, the attackers did not make backups of the data before deleting it. In other words, they didn’t intend to return the data to the victims even after the ransom was paid.

The attacks can almost always be traced back to user error and permissive security policies that expose vital internal resources to the public. For example, in the case of MongoDB, the default database installation does not require authentication to access the database — a recipe for disaster for companies using third-party software such as open source databases without putting adequate security measures in place. In the software-defined world of the public cloud, exposed weaknesses are bound to get exploited very quickly. As Gartner predicted, 95% of cloud security failures will be the customer’s fault.

Here are three ways to prepare your company to deal with data-jacking in a cloud environment:

1. Design cloud security in layers, starting with policies that minimize the attack surface by eliminating unnecessary asset exposure. Gartner, in its report titled How to Make Cloud IaaS Workloads More Secure Than Your Own Data Center (registration required), describes the hierarchy of security measures in a cloud workload protection platform from foundational technologies such as configuration and vulnerability management, network segmentation and traffic visibility, to less critical technologies such as antivirus (AV) and vulnerability shielding. Understand the value of what you are trying to protect and decide how much security you are going to invest in.

2. Before using third-party software such as an open source database in your applications, educate yourself about best practices and known vulnerabilities, do’s, don’ts and gotchas. In the public cloud, one strike is all it takes to bring a business to its knees.

3. Be proactive about compliance and security maintenance. Compliance doesn’t just refer to adhering to industry standards such as PCI DSS and SOC 2, but also to best practices such as the CIS AWS Foundations Benchmark. Don’t make tracking, fixing, and monitoring a once-a-year exercise.

In many ways, data-jacking today is reminiscent of Telnet-based (pre-SSH) hacking in the ’90s, when open ports and weak admin passwords were invitations to get hacked. But as data in the cloud becomes more valuable, the cost of weak security may soon be higher than many organizations can bear.

Related Content:

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• Cloud Is Security-Ready But Is Your Security Team Ready For Cloud?

Zohar Alon is the founder and CEO of Dome9 Security, and a veteran in networking security. He helped shaped the early days of network security while at Check Point Software, where he built Provider-1, Check Point’s service provider’s management solution, which is still used … View Full Bio

Article source: http://www.darkreading.com/the-era-of-data-jacking-is-here-are-you-ready-/a/d-id/1328173?_mc=RSS_DR_EDT